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Abstract 
UNDERSTANDING THE GLASS CLIFF EFFECT: WHY ARE FEMALE LEADERS BEING 
PUSHED TOWARD THE EDGE? 
by 
Yael Shira Oelbaum 
 
Dissertation Advisor: Dr. Kristen Shockley   
The glass cliff effect describes a real-world phenomenon in which women are more likely 
to be appointed to precarious leadership positions in poorly performing organizations, while men 
are more likely to be appointed to stable leadership positions in successful organizations (Ryan 
& Haslam, 2005). This effect represents a subtle, yet dangerous, form of gender discrimination 
that may limit workplace diversity as well as women’s ability to become successful leaders. 
Importantly, research exploring why women are preferred for more perilous leadership positions 
is lacking. The main focus of this dissertation is to systematically organize previous theory and 
empirically examine processes underlying the glass cliff effect. Data was collected through an 
online study in which participants evaluated fictional leadership candidates for an open 
leadership position (Study 1) as well as a media study in which coders content analyzed media 
perceptions regarding CEO appointments using a matched sample of 84 male and female Fortune 
500 CEOs (Study 2). Findings from both studies most strongly demonstrate that females are 
likely to be preferred over males when being promoted to a precarious position as a way for the 
organization to signal change. Theoretical implications of the study findings regarding gender 
and leadership as well as practical implications regarding organizational procedures and 
women’s careers are discussed.    
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Understanding the Glass Cliff Effect: Why Are Female Leaders Being Pushed Toward the Edge? 
For women, the climb up the company ladder is frequently a rocky one, and advancement 
to top leadership positions in the corporate world is a challenge. Even when armed with superior 
experience, qualifications, and credentials, a woman’s ascent is often encumbered by the glass 
ceiling: the invisible, yet rigid barrier that prevents women from accessing the very upper 
echelons of an organization’s hierarchy (Barreto, Ryan, & Schmitt, 2009; Bendl & Schmidt, 
2010; Morrison, White, & Van Velsor, 1987; Russo & Hassink, 2012). Social policies, such as 
affirmative action, and organizational initiatives, such as women focused leadership programs, 
have been implemented over the years in an effort to rectify the demographic disparities in the 
field of leadership. Though the gender gap remains wide, apparent advances have been made. 
For example, as of 2013, 14.6% of Fortune 500 executive officer positions were held by women 
(Catalyst, 2014a) in comparison to 12.5% in 2000 and 8.7% in 1995 (Catalyst, 2000). 
Additionally, women currently occupy slightly over 5% of Fortune 500 CEO positions (Catalyst, 
2014b) as opposed to less than 1% in 2000 (Catalyst, 2000). 
The increased presence of female leaders has led some to claim that the gender disparity 
in the leadership realm is no longer a pressing issue. However, recent research has illuminated 
the need to examine not only the quantity of leadership positions being offered to women but the 
quality of those positions as well (Bruckmuller, Ryan, Haslam, & Peters, 2013; Bruckmuller, 
Ryan, Rink, & Haslam, 2014). While the gradual growth of women’s occupancy in senior roles 
is encouraging, before we can definitively conclude that gender inequity in the leadership 
domain has been resolved, a closer look at the conditions under which women are promoted, the 
types of positions that women are obtaining, and how women leaders are evaluated once they do 
reach the top is warranted.  
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The glass cliff effect (Ryan & Haslam, 2005) offers a novel twist on the glass ceiling 
concept by specifically focusing on the context surrounding women’s ascendency to high 
powered positions. According to Ryan and Haslam (2005), there is a tendency for women to be 
favored over men for top leadership roles when companies are performing poorly. In other 
words, women may increasingly be breaking through the glass ceiling just to find themselves 
perched on a “glass cliff.”  The glass cliff metaphor symbolizes a stressful, risky leadership 
position in which the leader is asked to direct an organization that is on the decline (Ryan & 
Haslam, 2005, 2007). While the glass cliff literature is still in its nascent stages, there is growing 
recognition that this metaphor represents a real-world problem and another critical obstacle that 
women must face as they strive to ascend company ranks.  
Over the past several years, there has been an abundance of headlines announcing the 
promotion of women in various industries to C-suite positions. Marissa Mayer, CEO of Yahoo 
since July 2012, Mary Barra, CEO of General Motors as of January 2014, and Lisa Su, CEO of 
Advanced Micro Devices as of October 2014 are only a few very recent examples. The 
experiences of many of these women follow the pattern outlined by the glass cliff theory in that 
these females were placed at the helm when the organization was struggling or in crisis mode. 
The notion that women are specifically appointed to risky senior roles in which the likelihood of 
failure is strong presents a serious issue that threatens to jeopardize any real progress that 
females can make in the leadership sphere. The existence of the glass cliff poses potential 
difficulties for both individual inhabitants of these risky roles as well as women’s careers more 
generally. Firstly, it is it likely that the individual occupants of these precarious leadership 
positions will experience negative outcomes, such as greater levels of stress, reduced motivation 
and organizational commitment, and subsequently increased turnover (Ryan, Haslam, Hersby, & 
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Kulich, 2008). Secondly, consistently placing more women than men in command when 
organizations are performing unsuccessfully and more men than women in command when 
organizations are performing successfully may substantiate stereotypical, negative perceptions 
regarding women and leadership capabilities. As women leaders are generally subject to more 
scrutiny and criticism (Brescoll, Dawson, & Uhlmann, 2010), a lack of success in reversing 
company performance may be highlighted as confirmation that women are not effective leaders.  
Until now, the central focus of the glass cliff literature has been to document the 
existence of the effect using both archival and empirical data (Cook & Glass, 2014a, 2014b; 
Haslam & Ryan, 2008; Haslam, Ryan, Kulich, Trojanowski, & Atkins, 2010; Mulcahy & 
Linehan, 2013; Ryan & Haslam, 2005). Recently, some researchers have turned to exploring the 
processes underlying the glass cliff in an effort to better understand why it occurs (Brown, 
Diekman, & Schneider, 2011; Bruckmuller & Branscombe, 2010; Gartzia, Ryan, Balluerka, & 
Aritzeta, 2012; Rink, Ryan, & Stoker, 2013; Ryan, Haslam, Hersby, & Bongiorno, 2011; Stoker, 
2012). Several propositions have been offered and, to a lesser extent, tested. One popular 
proposition, dubbed “think crisis-think female,” suggests that people believe that typically 
feminine attributes (e.g., communicative, cooperative) are needed in times of crisis, making 
females uniquely suited to handle poorly performing organizations (Bruckmuller & Branscombe, 
2010; Gartzia et al., 2012; Rink et al., 2013). In these situations, a think crisis-think female 
perspective outweighs the typical “think manager-think male” viewpoint, in which it is generally 
assumed that successful managers possess masculine, agentic attributes (Eagly & Karau, 2002; 
Powell, Butterfield, & Parent, 2002; Schein, 1973). A second possibility, labeled “think crisis-
think not male” describes a general reluctance to jeopardize a man’s career by placing him in 
charge of an organization that is not performing well (Ryan et al., 2011). This think crisis-think 
 UNDERSTANDING THE GLASS CLIFF   4 
 
not male mentality may plausibly motivate the favoring of women for more difficult leadership 
positions so that a woman, viewed as more expendable than a man, must deal with the penalties 
of taking the blame for a failing organization (Ryan et al., 2011). A third explanation focuses 
around the idea that companies may wish to make a change when the organization is performing 
poorly. As women represent a departure from the typical leadership model, the promotion of a 
woman under these circumstances sends a message both internally and externally that the 
organization is making a significant change (Brown et al., 2011).  
Evidence for these disparate explanations has been disjointed. Most of this research has 
focused on think crisis-think female. To my knowledge, only one study has examined the 
females as signals of change theory, and there is no empirical research devoted to think crisis-
think not male. As such, no consensus has been reached regarding the processes that drive the 
glass cliff effect. The lack of clarity regarding why women are more likely than men to be 
chosen to lead organizations in crisis makes it impossible to accurately redress the potential 
challenges for women’s careers and leadership trajectory that the glass cliff may impose. 
The main objective of the current research is to fill a major gap in the glass cliff literature 
by further examining the processes behind the decision to favor women over men for perilous 
leadership roles. I aim to contribute to the literature by conducting the first set of studies that 
comprehensively and simultaneously assesses previously proposed theoretical explanations 
(think crisis-think female, think crisis-think not male, and females as signals of change) in order 
to investigate which emerges as the strongest predictor of the glass cliff effect. A first step in 
researching these explanatory processes was to conduct an experimental study that mirrored the 
glass cliff laboratory paradigm. Participants received information regarding a male or female 
applicant for a leadership role in a company that was either performing well or poorly and were 
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asked to make certain judgments of the applicant and the position, which shed light on the 
processes driving the decision. A second step was to conduct a complementary archival study in 
which I analyzed these possible explanations using published media following the appointment 
of a matched sample of male and female CEOs.  
The current research makes several contributions, from both a theoretical and practical 
perspective. Research concerning the glass cliff effect has accumulated since the theory was 
introduced by Ryan and Haslam in 2005. Studies providing support for the existence of this 
phenomenon in various geographic locations, such as England (Ryan & Haslam, 2005; Mulcahy 
& Linehan, 2013), the United States (Cook & Glass, 2014a, 2014b), and Turkey (Uyar, 2011) 
have established a solid foundation for this body of scholarship. However, theoretical progress 
on this topic has been slower to develop. Through my proposed set of studies, I significantly 
advance theory regarding the processes underlying the glass cliff effect. I consolidate the 
previously suggested disparate explanations into a comprehensible and inclusive theoretical 
framework that encompasses the categories of think crisis-think female, think crisis-think not 
male, and females as signals of change. Moreover, by being the first to examine these processes 
together in one experiment, I attempt to reconcile previous conflicting evidence in order to better 
understand the way in which each of these impact glass cliff decisions. Specifically, do these 
theories propel the glass cliff phenomenon in tandem, or can one more powerfully explain the 
effect than the others?  
This program of research additionally adds to the literature on gender and leadership 
stereotypes. Both theoretically and practically, my studies aim to contribute to the ongoing 
discussion concerning the persistence of gender stereotypes and the ways in which these 
stereotypes impact women at work. Specifically, understanding how strongly the think crisis-
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think female mechanism drives the glass cliff effect can add to our knowledge of how gender 
stereotypes guide women’s careers and the ramifications for female leaders of abiding by or 
subverting these stereotypes. It has been repeatedly demonstrated that women in power face a 
double bind with regard to displaying masculine and feminine attributes (Nichols, 1993; Phelan 
& Rudman, 2010). Female leaders who display masculine traits are often evaluated unfavorably 
for acting out of line with prescriptions of their feminine role (Eagly & Karau, 2002). 
Conversely, because masculine traits are considered to be better matched to leadership roles, 
when female leaders exhibit feminine behaviors, they are often judged as incompetent (Eagly, 
Karau, & Makhijani, 1995). According to think crisis-think female, females are more likely to be 
selected for risky leadership roles because they are assumed to possess the stereotypical, 
feminine characteristics traditionally not valued as essential leadership qualities. On one hand, 
this may represent a situation in which women can present feminine characteristics without 
receiving negative judgments regarding their leadership competence. On the other hand, this may 
mean that only women who fulfill the female stereotype would be promoted in these precarious 
scenarios and that women who do not conform to typical gender stereotypes would not be 
considered. If the latter statement holds true, the glass cliff may represent yet another situation in 
which women are penalized for acting against gender role expectations.  
Understanding why the glass cliff effect occurs may practically impact both women 
leaders and organizations in several crucial ways. In essence, this line of research can inform us 
as to the depth of this issue as well as the best way to address it. Answering this question can not 
only help women make sounder judgments regarding their career paths but can equip 
organizations to better deal with the subtle discrimination they are (perhaps unknowingly) 
perpetuating.  For example, if a woman advancing through an organization is aware of the 
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existence of this general phenomenon as well as the specific, psychological motivations behind 
glass cliff appointments, she may recognize that it is necessary to gain a complete understanding 
of the position being offered and the state of the organization, as well as the likelihood of failure 
in that position.  
Until this point, the organizational emphasis on amending gender inequality in the 
leadership domain has revolved around attempts to increase the numbers of women at the top, 
such as women-focused leadership training or women-directed mentoring programs. However, 
glass cliff research clearly demonstrates that diversity programs solely intended to increase the 
quantity of females in leadership positions are no longer sufficient to deal with these 
fundamental issues. From this perspective, the need to discern why the glass cliff effect occurs is 
imperative as organizational initiatives meant to tackle this problem will be designed differently 
depending on the reason for this effect. Importantly, the different explanations proposed to 
account for the glass cliff effect vary in their deliberateness (Ryan & Haslam, 2007). For 
example, according to think crisis-think female, certain feminine qualities are perceived to 
facilitate success in precarious roles. As this does not describe a purposeful attempt to 
consistently place women in perilous roles, organizations may be unaware that they are 
perpetuating disadvantages for women. If that is the case, then raising awareness about this 
phenomenon must be the first step. If the glass cliff effect is inadvertent, it is likely that 
organizations would want to be conscious of the effect so that they are not acting unfairly or 
illegally towards women, or unintentionally alienating their top women talent. As a second step, 
organizations promoting women into these positions should focus on ensuring that the women 
are fully equipped with the proper support and resources that they may need to increase their 
chances of success. Furthermore, this explanation implies the need for a more rigorous selection 
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and promotion system that begins with organizations analyzing the positions for which they are 
hiring, identifying the characteristics and attributes truly needed to perform well, and scrutinizing 
whether stereotypic feminine attributes are truly required in the leadership role. Organizations 
should then utilize measures of the required attributes when appointing leaders in order to ensure 
that the leader chosen does possess the needed characteristics, rather than assuming than an 
individual woman possesses certain attributes because they are stereotypically female. 
Conversely, if a preference for female leaders in crisis is due to the desire to protect 
males from suffering the penalties associated with weakening organizational performance (think 
crisis-think not male), then the glass cliff effect is repositioned as a pernicious and more 
deliberate form of gender discrimination. While organizational awareness and a system for 
leadership support would still be important, additional endeavors would be needed. On top of the 
exigency for greater rigor in the leader selection and promotion process, it may be necessary to 
devise a way to monitor adverse impact, not just for the numbers of males and females being 
promoted to top positions, but specifically for the numbers of males and females being promoted 
to senior positions when the organization is declining or in crisis versus when the organization is 
succeeding.  
In the following sections, I describe the glass cliff theory in detail and discuss the 
archival and experimental studies that have been conducted to date. I present research on the 
processes underlying the glass cliff effect, specifically delineating the three categories of 
explanations outlined above: think crisis-think female, think crisis-think not male, and females as 
signals of change. I then introduce the need for my studies. For each study, I outline my 
predictions regarding these glass cliff explanations, detail the methodology used, present the 
research findings, and discuss the study limitations. Finally, I include a general discussion that 
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focuses on the joint results of both studies, as well as on the implications of my work and 
suggestions for future research.  
The Glass Cliff Effect 
Preliminary research indicates that our understanding of gender equity in organizational 
leadership should not be limited to solely the numbers of men and women who reach the highest 
corporate levels. Rather, it is equally important to understand the experiences of men and women 
leaders, in terms of both their climb to the top and the types of positions for which individuals of 
each gender are selected (e.g. Lyness & Schrader, 2006; Lyness & Thompson, 1997). With 
regard to ascending the company ladder, research shows that men and women tend to follow 
markedly different pathways en route to an organization’s upper ranks. For example, women 
tend to lack the informal social networks that men often rely on for advancement and are likely 
to need a greater amount of evidence proving their capabilities than men in order to be promoted 
(Foschi, 2000; Lyness & Thompson, 2000; Lyness & Heilman, 2006). Because greater doubt 
exists with regard to women’s versus men’s leadership abilities, women are held to stricter 
standards (Foschi, 2000). For example, Lyness and Thompson (2006) demonstrated that 
performance ratings for women promoted into managerial positions were higher than ratings for 
men promoted into corresponding positions. Additionally, the relationship between performance 
ratings and promotions was stronger for women than for men. Compared to men, women are 
frequently offered leadership positions that have less authority (Lyness & Thompson, 1997) and 
decision-making influence (Sabharwal, 2013). Further, the compensation and rewards that 
female executives receive fall below those paid to male executives (Kulich, Trojanowski, Ryan, 
Haslam, & Renneboog, 2011; The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013).  
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The glass cliff literature adds to this prior work relating to continued gender inequality in 
leadership by highlighting a discrepancy concerning the quality of leadership positions offered to 
men and women. Specifically, research on the glass cliff effect demonstrates a critical 
dissimilarity in the circumstances surrounding the promotion of men and women leaders. 
According to Ryan and Haslam (2005), women are more likely to be selected for leadership roles 
than men primarily when organizations are performing poorly. Decreasing performance is likely 
associated with bad press, financial difficulties, and the need to restructure, and the probability of 
leader failure in these circumstances is high (Bruckmuller, Ryan, Rink, & Haslam, 2014). 
Therefore, positions of leadership in declining organizations are considered risky and precarious. 
It is precisely in these negative situations where women are favored over men to be leaders.  
Before delving into the literature, an important clarification needs to be made with regard 
to the comparison group in the glass cliff effect. Two important comparisons are possible: 1) 
whether women are more likely than men to be selected as leaders when companies are 
performing poorly and 2) whether proportionately more women are appointed to lead companies 
whose performance is weak than companies whose performance is strong. Theoretical 
discussions of the glass cliff effect chiefly focus on this first comparison, the idea that women 
are more likely than men to be selected as leaders when the leadership role is precarious. 
However, the empirical research tends to incorporate both of these comparisons to a similar 
degree. In general, many of the laboratory studies analyze both the preference for female over 
male leaders under conditions of organizational decline as well as the greater likelihood of 
women being appointed to lead when organizational performance is weak versus strong. The 
archival work tends to be split with regard to which comparison is emphasized. From a real-
world standpoint, the comparison between male and female leader selection when firm 
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performance is suffering may be difficult to digest based on raw numbers, because there are so 
many more males than females overall selected into top executive positions in organizations.  
However, one way in which archival work has been able to specifically study the greater 
likelihood of female versus male leaders being appointed in struggling organizations is by 
utilizing conditional logistic regression analyses in which a case/control type analysis is 
conducted, with the male leaders as the control group and female leaders as the case group (Cook 
and Glass, 2013, 2014a, 2014b). For clarity, I will specifically indicate which comparison the 
authors focused on when describing the archival work below. 
Archival Evidence for the Glass Cliff Effect 
The seminal work by Ryan and Haslam (2005) on the glass cliff effect was motivated by 
an article written by Judge (2003) in The [London] Times claiming that the performance of 
companies among the London FTSE 100 with a greater presence of women on their boards was 
worse than the performance of companies with fewer women board members. Based on a 
correlational analysis, Judge made a causal statement: appointing more women to company 
boards is detrimental to organizations and leads to poor performance.  
Drawing from the dataset that Judge (2003) utilized, Ryan and Haslam (2005) 
constructed a matched sample of 19 companies in the London FTSE 100 that appointed male and 
female board members in 2003. The match was based on the time of board appointment and 
business sector. Taking into account company performance 5 months before and 3 months after 
board appointments, Ryan and Haslam (2005) found that while relatively stable company 
performance both preceded and followed the appointment of a man to the board, there was 
greater variability in company performance preceding and following appointment of a woman. 
Overall, market performance in the first half of the year was stronger than performance in the 
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second half of the year. Therefore, Ryan and Haslam (2005) divided their analyses to separately 
examine company performance before and after board appointments during the first half of the 
year (when the market was up) and the second half (when the market was down). During the 
time of an overall market slump, most companies that appointed a woman to their boards 
experienced steadily decreasing performance before the appointment. During the time of an 
overall market upturn, most companies that appointed a woman to their boards experienced great 
oscillation in their performance in the months before the appointment. Taken together, as 
compared to the circumstances under which men were appointed, women tended to be appointed 
as board members when the organization was experiencing significant turbulence and/or decline 
prior to the appointment. Conversely, as compared to the circumstances under which women 
were appointed, men tended to be appointed as board members under conditions of generally 
steadier organizational performance. The board positions to which women were more likely to be 
appointed in both situations contained a certain level of riskiness and precariousness that did not 
apply to the board positions available when organizational performance was stable, i.e. when 
men were more likely to be appointed. Importantly, counter to Judge’s (2003) assertions, the 
appointment of women to board positions was not linked to an ensuing decline in company 
performance.  Rather, during a period of general downturn, company performance following the 
appointment of a woman actually improved.  During a period in which the overall state of the 
market was strong, company performance following the appointment of a woman was stable.  
Results from this original work by Ryan and Haslam (2005) were further substantiated by 
Haslam et al. (2010), who investigated female board appointments in the London FTSE 100 from 
2001 to 2005. In terms of the above discussion concerning the possible comparisons involved in 
the glass cliff effect, rather than comparing board appointments of women with those of men, 
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Haslam et al., (2010) focused more exclusively on whether women were more likely to be 
appointed as board members when firm performance was weak rather than strong. Using time-
lagged correlations, they found that as a general trend, poor company performance, 
operationalized as a stock-based measure, was related to the greater likelihood of women being 
appointed to the board.  Support for the glass cliff effect in England was also established by 
Mulcahy and Linehan (2013), who revealed that organizational performance impacted change in 
the gender diversity of boards, which included men leaving and women joining the board. 
Mulcahy and Linehan (2013) focused on an objective accounting-based variable as their measure 
of organizational performance; an initial reported loss (following two years of consecutive 
profits). They compared a sample of 138 companies who experienced reported loss and a 
matched number of companies who reported positive earnings in 2004 – 2006. The match was 
based on industry and firm size. The authors illustrated that firms whose circumstances were 
indubitably precarious, as represented by the severity of losses experienced, were more likely 
than firms that did not experience severe losses to increase the number of women on their boards 
(i.e. the gender diversity of their board composition). Similar to Haslam et al. (2010), this study 
compares the probability of women becoming leaders (namely, board members) under conditions 
of organizational decline versus success.  
Evidence for the glass cliff effect in global locations outside of the United Kingdom has 
only recently emerged. Cook and Glass (2014a) explored the glass cliff phenomenon in the 
United States, focusing on CEO transitions of Fortune 500 companies from 1996 to 2010. Their 
sample included the appointment of 21 female CEOs, 40 racial minority CEOs, and 551 white, 
male CEOs. Firm performance was operationalized using both accounting-based measures 
(return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE)) and market-based measures (share price 
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returns). According to Cook and Glass (2014a), both gender and racial minorities were more 
likely than white males to be appointed to CEO positions when organizational performance was 
poor, taking into account performance one, two, and three years prior to the appointment. This 
result was only significant when return on equity, one of the accounting-based measures, was 
entered as the predictor. Results were not significant when return on assets and market-based 
measures were evaluated. In exploring a matched sample of 54 CEOs appointed in the 1990 to 
2011 time range, Cook and Glass (2014b) did not find statistical support for the glass cliff effect. 
Data revealed that trends for ROE were in the anticipated direction, in that females were more 
likely to be appointed CEO as return on equity decreased. However, these results were not 
significant.  
Interestingly, unlike Haslam et al. (2010) and Mulcahy and Linehan (2013), Cook and 
Glass (2014a; 2014b) specifically highlight the comparison between male and female CEO 
promotion when organizational performance is weak. As described earlier, the authors make this 
comparison statistically through the use of conditional logistic regression and case/control 
analyses.  
It is notable that the only other archival study to examine the glass cliff effect in the U.S 
did not find a statistically significant difference in company performance preceding the 
appointment of male versus female CEOs (Adams, Gupta, & Leeth, 2009). Adams et al. (2009) 
studied 48 female CEOs appointed in the time period of 1992 to 2004, and used two comparison 
groups. The first comparison sample was comprised of 1303 males that had been appointed CEO 
in the 1992 to 2004 time frame to companies with the same two digit SIC code as the companies 
to which the female CEOs had been appointed. The second comparison sample was comprised of 
male CEOs that had been appointed to the same companies as the female CEO sample, either 
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preceding or following the female appointment. Performance was assessed via stock-based 
measures. Specifically, raw, market-adjusted, and risk-adjusted returns, and mean cumulative 
returns preceding CEO selection were compared. It is interesting that within the few research 
attempts to document the glass cliff phenomenon among U.S. CEO samples, the hypothesized 
effect was not found when a stock-based measure rather than an accounting-based measure was 
studied as the predictor variable.  
In discussing the null findings from the Adam et al. (2009) study, Haslam et al. (2010) 
explicate that while both stock-based and accounting-based measures represent company 
performance, they do so in different ways and are not always aligned. Explicitly, accounting-
based measures provide more objective accounts of past performance, while stock-based 
measures are less direct representations of company performance, influenced by world events, 
investor perceptions, market behavior, and analyst assessments (Akerlof & Shiller, 2009; 
Bradshaw, Richardson, & Sloan, 2006; Fama, 1965). Though stock-based measures served as the 
original gauge of company performance in the analysis by Ryan and Haslam (2005), the 
volatility of stock returns can be attributed to a number of converging dynamics, aside from 
actual company activities. It is possible that more objective, accountancy-based measures better 
represent company performance and will therefore ultimately prove to be more demonstrable 
predictors of the glass cliff effect. Moreover, Adams et al. (2009) only considered the impact of 
company performance in the 120 trading days leading up to the CEO appointment. Their results 
may have been influenced by the relatively short window of roughly 6 months that they 
investigated. It is possible that the glass cliff effect among CEOs in the U.S. is more robust when 
longer time periods are considered. In fact, data from Cook and Glass (2014a) support this idea. 
Specifically, with regard to organizational performance as operationalized by ROE, the effect 
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was strongest when examining the three year performance average and least strong when 
examining the one year average. Overall, these varying results concerning male and female 
CEOs in the U.S. suggest the need for continued testing of the glass cliff effect in America.  
The concept of the glass cliff has also been extended to politics. Through an archival 
study focusing on the 2005 United Kingdom general election, Ryan, Haslam, and Kulich (2010) 
revealed that women were more likely than men to be chosen by their political parties to run for 
government seats that were more difficult to win, in that the opposition party won the seats by a 
considerable margin in the prior year’s election. Moreover, Thomas and Bodet (2013) explored 
differences in the political seats to which women and men were nominated using data from the 
2004 to 2011 Canadian federal elections. Their findings supplement evidence for the glass cliff 
in politics, showing that women were disproportionately selected to run for political seats in 
districts in which the likelihood of being elected was small (i.e., in districts where the other 
political party was popular).  
Experimental Evidence for the Glass Cliff Effect 
Ryan and Haslam (2009) point out that the conflicting results from the study done by 
Adams et al. (2009) underscore the importance of going beyond archival research to 
experimentally explore the glass cliff phenomenon. As there are so many factors that can 
influence results when utilizing a real world sample, the relative control and isolation that can be 
accomplished in a laboratory setting are truly needed as a counterpart to the archival work in 
order to more fully explore the proposed effect. Beyond being able to isolate the effect of interest 
in a contained, laboratory environment, the benefit of experimental research is that researchers 
can manipulate relevant variables in order to study the way in which the main effect is impacted. 
Further, Ryan and Haslam (2009) stress that it is the precariousness of the leadership position 
 UNDERSTANDING THE GLASS CLIFF   17 
 
that drives the preference for female over male leaders. While poor financial performance is one 
way in which to indicate the precariousness of a leadership role and perhaps the best 
operationalization when studying a real-life business sample, it is possible to operationalize 
leadership precariousness in other ways. Demonstrating the existence of the glass cliff effect 
across various representations of position precariousness serves as more powerful evidence for 
the strength and pervasiveness of the phenomenon. As described below, the precariousness of a 
leader position has been operationalized in numerous ways in prior experimental studies, 
including: the progress of a legal case (progressing well versus poorly), the popularity of a 
festival (decreasing versus increasing), and the economic performance of an organization 
(declining versus improving).  
The first of these studies provide evidence for the glass cliff effect with regard to counsel 
appointment to legal cases (Ashby, Ryan, & Haslam, 2007). Ashby et al. (2007) provided law 
students with one of two legal cases. The first was categorized as low-risk, in which the lead 
counsel had to resign for personal reasons but expressed that the case was progressing positively. 
The second was categorized as high-risk, in which the lead counsel resigned because the case 
was not progressing well and was receiving adverse media attention. Participants received 
descriptions of three candidates. The descriptions consisted of a male and female candidate that 
were well-matched and extremely qualified, as well as a male candidate that was noticeably less 
qualified. Participants were instructed to rank the candidates according to who they thought 
should take over as the lead counsel. Ashby et al. (2007) found that while there was no 
preference for a male or female candidate as the lead counsel for the low-risk case, there was a 
strong preference for the qualified female candidate over the similarly qualified male candidate 
for the high-risk case.  
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Moreover, across two studies, Haslam and Ryan (2008) demonstrated the existence of the 
glass cliff effect in a corporate setting using participant samples of graduate students in 
management (Study 1) and business men and women (Study 3). In both Studies 1 and 3, 
participants were provided with fictional information about organizational performance (either 
improving or declining) and an open position for a senior management role. As Study 1 was a 
within-subject design, participants received descriptions of three candidates. Like in Ashby et al. 
(2007), two of the candidates were equally experienced (one male and one female) and the third 
was decidedly less so (a male). Participants ranked the candidates in terms of who was most 
appointable and evaluated them on a number of dimensions. Study 3 was a between-subject 
design in which an identical description of either a male or female candidate was given to 
participants, who then had to evaluate leader suitability. The glass cliff effect emerged across 
both studies. In Study 1, female candidates received significantly higher appointability rankings 
when company performance was declining versus improving. On the other hand, company 
performance did not impact the appointability rankings for male candidates. With regard to 
evaluations of ability, female candidates were perceived as equally able across conditions of both 
performance incline and decline, while male candidates were viewed as significantly more able 
when company performance was increasing versus decreasing. Further, in Study 3, when 
performance was improving, female and male candidates received comparable ratings with 
regard to suitability and ability. Conversely, participants rated the female candidate as being 
more suitable and able than the male candidate when performance was declining.  
Haslam and Ryan’s (2008) third study, Study 2, was a within-subject design that tested 
for the glass cliff in a non-business context using a sample of high-school students.  As expected, 
participants ranked the female candidate as more appointable for the role of heading a festival 
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when the festival was decreasing versus improving in popularity. In addition, participants ranked 
the male candidate as more appointable when festival popularity was improving versus 
decreasing. Under conditions of decreasing festival popularity, female candidates were more 
likely to be preferred over male candidates, with 75% of participants ranking the female 
candidate as their first choice to be leader based on chi-square analyses. Under conditions of 
increasing festival popularity, male candidates were favored over females, with 62.2% of 
participants ranking the male candidate as their first choice. Following Haslam and Ryan (2008), 
a number of other studies investigating the glass cliff phenomenon were conducted that mirrored 
these authors’ methodology and produced similar results authenticating the glass cliff effect 
(Bruckmuller & Branscombe, 2010; Gartzia et al., 2012; Hunt-Earle, 2012, Rink et al., 2013; 
Uyar, 2011). 
Brown, Diekman, and Schneider (2011) provide indirect support for the glass cliff effect 
in a series of studies. The authors examined the preference for male versus female leaders under 
conditions of personal threat (Study 3). In the threat elicitation conditions, participants were 
instructed to write a response regarding the emotions they experience when they think about 
safety concerns in their university Participants in the control conditions were asked to write 
about the emotions they experience when they think about watching television. Participants were 
then provided with descriptions of either a male or female candidate lobbying for the position of 
University Safety Director and asked to rate their likelihood of supporting and voting for the 
candidate. Results of Study 3 showed that there was a significant decrease in preference for the 
male candidate under conditions of threat. In other words, participants favored the male as 
opposed to the female candidate in the control condition, but exhibited no preference for either 
gender in the threat condition. Though these researchers did not precisely follow the glass cliff 
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laboratory paradigm, it is reasonable to assume that decision-makers in a failing organization 
would feel threatened, whereas decision-makers in a successful organization would not feel 
threatened (Brown et al., 2011). In other words, the authors draw an equivalence between the 
threat conditions and situations in which organizational performance is deteriorating or in crisis 
as well as between the non-threat conditions and situations in which organizational performance 
is favorable or stable. Therefore, the decreased preference for the male candidate in the threat 
condition that occurred in Study 3 can be interpreted as additional experimental corroboration for 
the glass cliff.   
Importantly, a few studies have considered relevant factors that may impact the glass cliff 
phenomenon. For example, Bruckmuller and Branscombe (2010) illustrated that the glass cliff 
effect strongly emerged when the firm’s history of leadership was chiefly male but was 
significantly reduced when the firm’s history of leadership was chiefly female (Study 1).  
Another key moderator investigated by Rink et al. (2013) focused on whether or not social 
resources within the organization were available to the new leader (Study 2). Interestingly, under 
conditions of organizational crisis, the preference for a female leader was strong when the new 
leader could not rely on social resources, but that preference diminished when the new leader 
could rely on social resources. In their studies, the presence versus absence of social resources 
was represented by whether or not key stakeholders supported the selection of the new leader. 
The authors suggest that women are particularly favored over men when social support is not 
available because of the stereotypic expectation that women possess certain relational qualities 
that would enable them to garner those social resources once in office. Masculinity/femininity of 
the industry and gender of the decision-maker were explored as possible moderating variables, 
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but no evidence was found for significant moderating effects (Bruckmuller & Branscombe, 
2010; Haslam & Ryan, 2008; Rink et al., 2013). 
What Drives the Glass Cliff Effect? 
Collectively, the archival and empirical work reviewed presents a powerful case for the 
notion that men and women are differentially favored as leaders in noticeably disparate contexts. 
Consistently favoring women for leadership positions that are inherently risky and difficult and 
favoring men for leadership positions under comparatively better circumstances can potentially 
lead to a number of negative outcomes for women leaders. However, before being able to take 
measures to counter this apparent discrimination, it is necessary to attain some understanding 
regarding why decision-makers tend to prefer females rather than males when positions are 
precarious.  
As a starting point, Ryan, Haslam, and Postmes (2007) asked participants to read and 
respond to a news article summarizing Ryan and Haslam’s (2005) original archival study. 
Participants responded to several close-ended questions assessing the degree to which they 
viewed the glass cliff phenomenon as problematic for women and an open-ended question asking 
for comments about factors that prompt glass cliff effects. A number of reasons for the effect 
were offered, ranging from more pernicious explanations that emphasized sexism and women’s 
expendability to relatively more benign explanations that emphasized gender stereotypes and the 
desire to promote equality. Notably, while over half of the male participants denied the existence 
of the phenomenon altogether, only 5.4% of female participants voiced any doubt with respect to 
the reality of the glass cliff effect.   
Based on the themes identified in the study conducted by Ryan et al. (2007), suggestions 
as to possible reasons for preferring women over men for more precarious leadership positions 
 UNDERSTANDING THE GLASS CLIFF   22 
 
were subsequently generated. As noted previously, these explanations can be grouped into three 
distinct categories: think crisis-think female, think crisis-think not male, and females as signals 
of change. In the following sections, I discuss each of these theoretical categories and detail the 
empirical support that relates to each one. I explain why the extant evidence is inconclusive and 
present a research program intended to shed light on the underlying mechanisms of the glass cliff 
effect.  
Think Crisis-Think Female 
One feasible explanation for the glass cliff effect, labeled think crisis-think female, refers 
to the possibility that individuals assume that feminine characteristics are needed to lead an 
organization in crisis. Consequently, females are perceived as a better match for these positions. 
The notion of think crisis-think female is based on implicit gender stereotypes that individuals 
typically hold and apply to leadership roles. According to conventional stereotypes, men are 
linked to agentic attributes and women to communal attributes (e.g. Scott & Brown, 2006). 
Agentic attributes include characteristics such as ambitious, dominant, independent, and 
achievement-oriented (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Koenig, Eagly, Mitchell, & Ristikari, 2011). 
Communal attributes include characteristics such as nurturing, socially sensitive, and 
relationship-oriented (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Koenig et al., 2011).  
Traditionally, a strong and persistent association exists between qualities perceived to be 
masculine and those perceived as necessary for successful leadership. This think manager-think 
male notion was heralded by Schein (1973, 1975), who demonstrated that across both male and 
female participants, there tended to be a significant overlap between characteristics rated as 
typical of successful managers and characteristics rated as typical of men in general. However, 
there was decidedly less of an overlap between characteristics rated as indicative of successful 
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managers and characteristics rated as indicative of women in general. Although the strength of 
this association has weakened slightly over time, recent work demonstrates that individuals still 
very much espouse the think manager-think male paradigm (Dennis & Kunkel, 2004; Koenig et 
al., 2011).  
Schein’s original work was used as the foundation for later theories concerning gender 
and leadership, such as the lack of fit model (Heilman, 1983) and role congruity theory (Eagly & 
Karau, 2002). According to both of these theories, since the skills traditionally viewed as needed 
for success in a leader are overwhelmingly masculine in nature, there is an incongruity between 
the characteristics that females are perceived to possess and the perceived requirements for a 
leader role. This apparent mismatch between stereotypical female attributes and archetypal 
leader attributes leads to negative expectations about female leaders’ anticipated effectiveness as 
well as the assessment that males are better suited for leadership roles. Further, these stereotypic 
notions create a double bind for women (Nichols, 1993; Phelan & Rudman, 2010; Rudman & 
Phelan, 2008). When female leaders exhibit agentic behaviors in line with the leader role, they 
are often judged unfavorably for violating their feminine role (Eagly & Karau, 2002). However, 
when females conform to their gender role and exhibit feminine behaviors, they are often 
evaluated as incompetent because they are seen to lack the masculine traits considered 
compatible with the leadership role (Eagly et al., 1995). Research has shown that while 
pervasive, these perceptions are context dependent (Garcia-Retamero & Lopez-Zafra, 2006). In 
certain times, the nature of the job changes, causing the leadership role to be seen as more 
congruent with the female gender role. When this happens, it is anticipated that female leaders 
can be equally effectual.  
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According to think crisis-think female, an organization in a state of decline represents a 
situation in which the leader characteristics viewed as required for success are female, rather 
than male, oriented. One of the spontaneous explanations provided by participants in the 
qualitative study done by Ryan et al. (2007) referred to the belief that women possess particular 
abilities that are especially useful for leadership positions when an organization is performing 
poorly. For example, participants mentioned that communication skills and the ability to 
motivate others are particular qualities held by women that would be beneficial in such 
circumstances. Powerful emotions and conflict situations are more likely to arise when a 
company is not doing well (e.g. Cameron, Kim, & Whetten, 1987). It may be that interpersonal 
qualities such as cooperation and conflict management are expected to help a leader better 
traverse these challenging situations. A general belief exists that women are more likely than 
men to enact transformational leadership styles (Appelbaum, Audet, & Miller, 2002; 
Vinkenburg, van Engen, Eagly, & Johannesen-Schmidt, 2011). Behaviors associated with 
transformational leaders include creating a compelling organizational vision, presenting an 
action plan for how to achieve that vision, and inspiring employees to work towards that vision 
(Bass & Riggio, 2006). It is reasonable to imagine that behaviors such as these would be 
advantageous when dealing with organizational performance problems. In a survey conducted by 
McKinsey and Company (2009), female leaders were seen to have the competitive advantage in 
a crisis because of their ability to craft an engaging future vision, clearly demarcate expectations, 
and fairly reward accomplishments. The perceived need for feminine attributes under these 
problematic circumstances leads to a compatibility between the female role and the leadership 
role, thus predicting a preference for female over male leaders. 
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Preliminary evidence for the think crisis-think female notion was found in Bruckmuller 
and Branscombe’s (2010) research. In a pre-study, participants rated the degree to which 50 
attributes were representative of a typical male leader and typical female leader, as well as the 
degree to which the attributes were needed in a leader of a successful company and a leader of a 
failing company. Results showed a strong association between the items rated as needed of a 
leader in a successful company and as typical of a male leader. Conversely, there was significant 
overlap between the attributes rated as necessary for a leader of a failing company and those 
rated as representative of a typical female leader.  
A similar set of studies was conducted by Ryan et al. (2011). The authors presented 
participants with a list of stereotypical traits of men and women in general. Participants were 
asked to rate how indicative each trait was of managers of companies in which performance has 
progressively increased (i.e. successful companies) and managers of companies in which 
performance has steadily decreased (i.e. unsuccessful companies) over the past few years (Study 
1). Results showed a significantly positive relationship between stereotypically male traits and 
traits of managers of successful companies. The relationship between stereotypically female 
traits and traits of managers of unsuccessful companies was positive, but not significant. As a 
follow-up, Ryan et al. (2011) instructed participants to indicate how desirable each attribute was 
for an ideal manager of either a successful or unsuccessful company (Study 2). A similar number 
of common characteristics was found between the traits rated as desirable for the ideal manager 
of a successful company and both stereotypically male and female traits. However, there was 
greater mutuality between the traits rated as desirable for the ideal manager of an unsuccessful 
company and stereotypically female, as compared to male, traits. The studies conducted by 
Bruckmuller and Branscombe (2010) and Ryan et al. (2011) provide initial support for the idea 
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that, in a poorly performing corporation, a think crisis-think female association may supplant the 
standard think manager-think male model.  
Based on this groundwork, subsequent research sought to more directly investigate the 
way in which these gendered stereotypes affect the repeated selection of women over men for 
risky leadership roles. Bruckmuller and Branscombe (2010) investigated the impact of 
stereotypic agentic and communal attributes on leader selection in times of crisis versus success, 
using the typical male and female characteristics identified in their study discussed above (Study 
2). Using a within-subject design, the authors presented participants with information about a 
company that was either thriving or failing, a soon to be vacant CEO position in that company, 
and descriptions of a male and female candidate. Participants were asked to assess the degree to 
which the candidates possessed each of the stereotypical attributes, gauge the candidates’ 
suitability for the leadership position, and choose one to fill in as CEO. As expected, company 
performance predicted leader selection in that participants favored the male candidate (over the 
female) when the company was doing well and the female candidate (over the male) when the 
company was not doing well. Further, their findings substantiate the think crisis-think female 
concept by revealing that the degree to which participants assigned stereotypically female 
characteristics to the candidates predicted selection in times of crisis while the degree to which 
participants assigned stereotypically male traits to the candidates did not. The agentic 
characteristics predicted leader selection in a thriving organization, but had no effect on leader 
selection in a failing organization. On the contrary, the communal characteristics predicted leader 
selection both in times of success and failure. As hypothesized, the communal attributes had a 
greater impact on leader selection in times of crisis and a lesser impact in times of success in 
comparison with the agentic attributes. Interestingly, in the declining organization condition, 
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participants viewed the male candidate as lacking in communal attributes. Tests of mediation 
showed that it was the perception that the male candidate did not possess the communal qualities 
needed for the position when the company was doing poorly that led to a decrease in the 
preference for and perceived suitability of the male candidate in this situation.   
 Building on Bruckmuller and Branscombe’s (2010) work, Rink et al. (2013) used a 
between-subjects design to examine the effects of nine leader attributes (five agentic and four 
communal) on anticipated leader effectiveness (Study 2).  These nine attributes had been 
previously rated as needed by leaders in both times of company success and failure (Ryan et al., 
2011). As predicted by think crisis-think female, the relationship between leader gender and 
effectiveness was mediated by communal characteristics when the organization was failing. 
Specifically, females were seen to be more communal than males, which led participants to 
anticipate that female leaders would be more effective under crisis circumstances.  
In a similar vein, Haslam and Ryan (2008) measured the degree of perceived 
stressfulness inherent in the leadership position (Study 3). While participants viewed the position 
to be similarly stressful in both times of organizational prosper and decline for male candidates, 
they perceived the leader position in a declining organization to be more stressful than in a 
prosperous organization for female candidates. Additionally, females were seen as substantially 
more suited to the position than males when company performance was poor. Notably, the 
perceived suitability of a female leader during company crisis was fully mediated by the 
perceived stressfulness of the leadership role. However, for male candidates, the only predictor 
of perceived suitability for the role was perceptions of leadership ability. These results indicate 
that women are specifically chosen for leadership roles in part because the roles are construed as 
more stressful. One possible interpretation of these results is that, in line with think crisis-think 
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female, women are believed to possess qualities that enable them to better handle stress, leading 
others to view them as particularly well-matched for the leadership job when a company is 
struggling.  
Ryan et al. (2011) raise the idea that the think crisis-think female model only applies in 
selective situations. In a twist to the typical glass cliff laboratory paradigm, Ryan et al. (2011) 
provided participants with one of five descriptions detailing the tasks involved in the vacant 
leadership role (Study 3). Participants were asked to rate the degree to which each of twelve 
characteristics (of which six were stereotypically female and six stereotypically male) was 
important for the new leader to possess. The authors found that feminine traits were rated as 
more desirable than masculine traits when the leader tasks involved guiding others through a 
crisis, taking on blame for the company’s declining performance, or passively enduring the 
organization’s failure. Conversely, when the leader tasks entailed appearing as company 
spokesperson or actively enhancing organizational performance, both feminine and masculine 
traits were judged as desirable. These results imply that female qualities are only seen as more 
important for a leadership role in organizational crisis when that role requires one to manage 
people or act as a scapegoat. However, Ryan et al. (2011) did not explicitly measure preference 
for a male or female leader in each condition nor did they test for mediation. Therefore, it is 
unclear as to which gender would be favored for leadership in each situation. It is also 
ambiguous as to whether the feminine and masculine attributes would respectively explain the 
relationship between poor company performance and preference for a female leader under 
certain circumstances and preference for a male leader under other circumstances. In addition, a 
leader’s duties often include a combination of these tasks (e.g. dealing with employees and 
striving to improve organizational performance) in real world conditions. Based on this study, it 
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is difficult to understand which gender would be favored and which traits would be seen as 
required for the leadership role in a real life environment. Furthermore, while, to some degree, 
these results show support for the think crisis-think female idea, this study also implies that 
additional mechanisms may exist that stimulate the decision to appoint women versus men to 
perilous leadership positions.  
Along these same lines, findings from a few studies jointly reveal that while females are 
consistently favored over males for perilous leadership positions, they are not consistently 
judged to be more suitable for leadership for these same perilous positions (Bruckmuller & 
Branscombe, 2010; Haslam & Ryan, 2008, Studies 1 and 2; Hunt-Earle, 2012). This pattern is 
different when male candidates are favored for leadership roles. Specifically, Bruckmuller and 
Brancombe (2010) showed that when male candidates were favored over female candidates 
during organizational success, the males were also evaluated as more suited to lead. This 
discrepancy between perceived suitability of male and female leaders in times of organizational 
achievement versus decline suggests that when women leaders are preferred for risky roles in 
times of crisis, it may not be because they are perceived as a good match for the job. It is 
imaginable that alternate explanations for the glass cliff effect exist. 
Evidence against the think crisis–think female explanation may be found in recent 
research considering the applicability of the glass cliff effect to the leadership trajectories of 
ethnic minorities. In two archival studies, Cook and Glass (2013, 2014a) demonstrated that 
ethnic minorities were more likely than white males to be appointed to CEO positions when 
organizational performance was declining versus improving (2014a), and to be promoted to head 
coach of a NCAA men’s basketball team when the team had a losing, rather than winning, record 
(2013). This work is consistent with the relationship between weak firm performance and the 
 UNDERSTANDING THE GLASS CLIFF   30 
 
appointment of “outsiders” to boards of directors in Japan established by Kaplan and Minton 
(1994). Moreover, Kulich, Ryan, and Haslam (2013) demonstrate that in the realm of politics, 
ethnic minorities are more likely to be selected for seats that have a lower “winnability” as 
compared to the seats for which white candidates are selected. Here, winnability was computed 
as the percentage margin by which the candidate’s political party had won or lost in the previous 
year’s election. These studies suggest that ethnic minorities, along with gender minorities, are 
favored for risky leadership roles. If ethnic minorities are also disproportionately selected for 
precarious leadership positions, this may indicate that the glass cliff effect is not driven by a 
perceived match between feminine qualities and qualities required for the leadership role. An 
alternative explanation is that different mechanisms underlie the favoring of women and ethnic 
minorities for perilous leadership positions.  
Think Crisis-Think Not Male  
 A think crisis-think female explanation implies that a compatibility exists between 
stereotypic female characteristics and the qualities needed for the leadership position. In contrast, 
a think crisis-think not male explanation suggests that the leadership position is viewed in 
conventional terms, as more compatible with stereotypic male characteristics. As per this 
explanation, women are promoted into these positions despite their perceived incompatibility 
because of a desire, on the part of the decision-makers, to protect male leaders from failure. 
When a company is performing poorly, the leadership role can be extremely arduous. Leaders 
are typically blamed for an organization’s weak performance, and an inability to turn the 
company around may be directly attributed to a lack of leadership competence (Bligh & Schyns, 
2007; Cameron et al., 1987; Hino & Aoki, 2011). If company performance continues to 
plummet, the leader may serve as a scapegoat forced to assume all culpability. Such a situation 
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can be extraordinarily detrimental and career-damaging for a leader. In line with think crisis-
think not male, women are thought of as more expendable, and so others are not as concerned 
about the consequences of failure for women as opposed to men.  
 Several theories regarding discrimination in the workplace help to elucidate the concept 
of think crisis-think not male. According to social identity theory (Tajfel, 1979), part of an 
individual’s sense of self is derived from the groups to which s/he belongs. A group to which an 
individual belongs is his or her ingroup and a group to which s/he does not belong is an 
outgroup. This demarcation is associated with feelings of greater liking and similarity among 
members of the ingroup, and feelings of dissimilarity towards members of the outgroup (Platow, 
McClintock, & Liebrand, 1990; Turner, Brown & Tajfel, 1979), which can lead to discrimination 
against or rejection of outgroup members (Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014; Hodson, Dovidio, & 
Esses, 2003).  
This ingroup/outgroup distinction has been used to explain the way in which women in 
the workplace are often excluded from important social networks and/or casual social gatherings 
amongst employees that may involve an informal exchange of information and social support 
(Lyness & Thompson, 2000). It is possible that due to the lack of information, resources, and 
social support that women are often subject to at work, female employees are not exposed to the 
appropriate information and guidance concerning vacant leadership roles. Male candidates, who 
are more likely to have powerful mentors (Lyness & Thompson, 2000; O’Neill, 2012) or access 
to crucial resources, may have a greater understanding of the peril involved in the available 
leadership position. Moreover, in the majority of these situations, the decision-makers promoting 
an individual into the leader role are male. Feelings of ingroup favoritism may stimulate the 
desire to protect men from dangerous positions, and instead, offer those positions to women. In 
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sum, it may be that males take on fewer risky positions compared to women because they have 
social and material resources that females do not have that protect them from being placed in 
positions that may threaten their careers.  
More directly, gender discrimination may underlie a think crisis-think not male mentality. 
Because those who discriminate against women would believe that it is more important for 
males, rather than females, to succeed, to them it is preferable to place women instead of men in 
positions in which the likelihood of failure is great. Additionally, women who do rise up the 
organization’s hierarchy may pose a threat to the status quo (Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & 
Nauts, 2012). Promoting these women into positions that are geared towards failure allow others 
to maintain the status quo with regard to gender and leadership, while hiding behind a veneer of 
pro equality and diversity. Ultimately, the consistent placement of women into precarious senior 
roles in which they will likely struggle allows others to maintain discriminatory ideas concerning 
women’s lack of leadership ability.  
These actions on the part of decision-makers may be purposeful, but they also may be 
unconsciously guided. Automatic, implicit stereotypes often impact information processing and 
decision-making, even when individuals do not explicitly express certain stereotypes (e.g. 
Devine, 1989). For example, in a study done by Rudman and Glick (2001), explicitly sexist 
views did not influence individuals’ perceptions of a female job applicant who displayed agentic 
traits. However, participants that possessed an implicit stereotype that women are nicer than men 
judged the agentic female as unlikeable and lacking in social skills. In that case, though 
participants did not outwardly subscribe to sexist beliefs, a subtler, underlying gender stereotype 
still influenced their negative evaluation of a woman acting in an agentic manner. Similarly, 
while Ashby et al. (2007) showed that those who endorsed blatantly sexist viewpoints were no 
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more likely to place women in glass cliff positions than those who did not endorse those 
viewpoints, it is still possible that subtler gender discrimination is at play. While decision-makers 
may not specifically be trying to filter out women from their organizations by regularly 
promoting them to dangerous positions, an implicit, negative bias towards women may impel 
others to continuously offer men superior positions and women substandard positions in which 
growth and success are unlikely. This notion, that women’s career growth may be stunted by the 
positions offered to them is supported by research. Lyness and Schrader (2006) revealed that 
even when women do receive promotions, their new jobs generally do not incorporate 
developmental opportunities and challenging assignments as compared to new jobs given to 
men. Women are more likely than men to be promoted to new positions that are extremely 
similar to their prior positions (Lyness & Schrader, 2006). Because developmental opportunities 
and stretch assignments are necessary to expand one’s skill set, if women are not exposed to 
these opportunities, they will be at a disadvantage. Likewise, the impetus to provide male 
employees, who may be tacitly more valued in the organization, with enhanced opportunities, 
and protect them from unfavorable situations in comparison to similarly talented and experienced 
female employees, may lead to the glass cliff effect. 
Unconscious gender stereotypes may be driven by those who have strong system 
justification motives as well as a high social dominance orientation. Those who have strong 
system justification motives attempt to preserve the validity of the existing, stable social order 
(Jost & Hunyady, 2002). Those high in social dominance orientation engage in attitudes and 
behaviors to sustain imbalanced relationships between hierarchy-based social groups (Sidanius & 
Pratto, 1999). Both system justification and social dominance orientation refer to the extent to 
which individuals embrace the current social hierarchy and advocate for supremacy of high over 
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low status groups (Jost & Burgess, 2000; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). 
Interestingly enough, individuals who belong to low-status groups are just as likely as high-status 
group members to exhibit system-justifying tendencies and seek to legitimize the status quo, thus 
validating their own disadvantaged position (Jost & Banaji, 1994). System justification motives 
and social dominance orientation may predict the endorsement of male leaders when 
organizational performance is stable and/or positive and female leaders when performance is 
negative, in that this pattern of endorsement would likely protect males from potentially career-
derailing leadership roles and serve to justify current gender disparities in leadership.  
Though there has not been any empirical support to directly authenticate the think crisis-
think not male explanation, some indirect experimental evidence exists. As previously discussed, 
female characteristics were judged to be desirable for leadership roles that expressly involved 
acting as a scapegoat or passively enduring a crisis situation (Ryan et al., 2011, Study 3). This 
research study was cited earlier in support of think crisis-think female because the findings do 
show that feminine versus masculine traits were perceived as desired for leaders to possess when 
organizations were performing unsuccessfully. Yet, the idea that feminine traits were only 
perceived as more desired under very specific conditions, namely when the organization needed 
an individual to blame for weakening company performance, implies that females may only be 
preferred as leaders over males in order to be held accountable in the event of company failure. 
In addition, several studies expound that women are favored for positions that have been plainly 
identified as precarious and in which the likelihood of failure has been recognized to be great 
(Ashby et al., 2007; Rink et al., 2013). Research showing that the favoring of women over men 
was stronger when organizational performance was suffering and social resources were 
unavailable versus available implies that the preference for female leaders is most powerful 
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when the leadership position is the most challenging (Rink et al., 2013). However, that 
preference is not as powerful when the leadership position is slightly more manageable (Rink et 
al., 2013). These results indicate that as the danger associated with the role increases, the 
tendency to choose female leaders increases as well. Accepting leadership responsibility for a 
poorly performing organization can prove to be a hazardous career strategy, as continued 
financial decline of the firm can negatively impact one’s probability of attaining a leadership role 
elsewhere (Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard, 2003). It is conceivable that this overall trend to 
select women for positions that are increasingly perilous reflects a motivation to keep men out of 
potentially career-damaging roles.  
Moreover, according to Haslam and Ryan (2008), the impact of failure after taking on a 
precarious leadership role is perceived to be more harmful to men than women, as women are 
considered to have less to lose in failure situations (Study 3). Consistent with this theme, in the 
study conducted by Ashby et al. (2007), participants reported that losing the high-risk legal case 
would be more detrimental for a male versus a female leader. For male candidates, participants 
rated the high-risk legal case as significantly riskier than the low-risk legal case. However, for 
female candidates, participants provided comparable risk ratings for the high-and low-risk legal 
cases. It is plausible that when thinking about female candidates, participants did not see the 
high-risk case as containing considerably greater risk because they viewed female failure as less 
of an issue than male failure in this context. Relatedly, it is possible to reinterpret the findings of 
Haslam and Ryan (2008) regarding the mediating role of perceived stress in the relationship 
between gender and anticipated leader suitability during poor company performance. Rather than 
the idea that females can better deal with stressful situations because of stereotypic female 
characteristics, it is conceivable that women are purposely placed in stressful positions instead of 
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men because others are less concerned with having a female leader deal with such a taxing job 
versus a male leader.   
Importantly, tangential support for crisis-think not male was provided by a study 
conducted by Brown et al. (2011; Study 4), in which the authors assigned participants to a threat 
or non-threat condition. In the threat condition, participants were instructed to describe the 
emotions aroused when they think about the terrorist attack of September 11th and to write down 
what happened that day as specifically as possible. In the non-threat condition, participants were 
instructed to describe emotions aroused when they think about watching television and write 
down how watching television affects them. After reviewing descriptions of either a male or 
female candidate for the House of Representatives, participants were asked to rate how likely 
they would be to support and vote for the candidate. Overall, findings demonstrated that under 
the threat condition, participants favored the female over the male candidate. Moreover, 
participants in the threat condition provided higher ratings of support for the female candidate as 
compared to participants in the control condition. Interestingly however, these researchers 
demonstrated that stated support for a female over a male leader under conditions of threat was 
moderated by those categorized as high system legitimizers, measured through both social 
dominance orientation (Pratto et al., 1994) and system justification (Kay & Jost, 2003). 
Specifically, whereas those highly legitimizing individuals were more likely to favor a female 
relative to a male candidate under threat, the female preference did not appear for those low in 
system legitimization. Brown et al. (2011) posit that those high in system legitimization maintain 
a strong desire to preserve the status quo and justify negative perceptions regarding gender and 
leadership. These results can be applied to glass cliff situations in which decision-makers who 
are high in system legitimization are under threat conditions resulting from weak company 
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performance, and are then likely to appoint a female rather than male as leader. In that way, these 
individuals can preserve a façade of support for diversity while strictly placing women in 
leadership roles that involve high risk and in which failure is expected. Hence, in the long run 
they are impeding women’s progress and upholding the existing sociopolitical state. The desire 
to keep men out of perilous leadership positions and push women into these same positions in 
order to reinforce the general idea that males make better leaders than females and keep males in 
power reflects a think crisis-think not male perspective.  
It is notable that no known research has expressly assessed think crisis-think not male as 
a mediator of the relationship between company performance and either preference for, or 
perceived suitability of, a female leader. For example, as discussed above, Ashby et al. (2007) 
explicitly showed that the legal case which was progressing poorly was perceived to involve 
higher risk than the legal case that was progressing well for male candidates, but not for female 
candidates. However, Ashby et al. (2007) did not investigate whether this difference in perceived 
riskiness of the position drove a preference for female over male candidates in the condition in 
which the legal case was not progressing well.  
Females as Signals of Change  
A third explanation for the glass cliff effect is based on the idea that companies who are 
not performing well wish to signal to all relevant stakeholders that they are making a significant 
change. As women symbolize a deviation from the standard leadership ideal, appointing a 
woman to a senior role is one way to send that message. In the qualitative study exploring 
explanations for the glass cliff (Ryan et al., 2007), participants first voiced the belief that 
appointing a female CEO represents a visible change that may be necessary as a final effort when 
disaster is imminent. By promoting a woman to a high-ranking position, the organization may be 
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attempting to indicate a break from the old, ineffective way of operating and show that a new 
system is underway. It may additionally be a way for companies to present themselves as 
progressive, egalitarian, and socially responsible (Brady, Isaacs, Reeves, Burroway, & Reynolds, 
2011).  
Research by Bruckmuller and Branscombe (2010) indirectly corroborates the females as 
signals of change explanation (Study 1). The authors suggest that whether the company’s history 
of leadership is predominantly male versus female may have some bearing on how the glass cliff 
effect plays out.  Theoretically, a male history of leadership should lead to a glass cliff effect. 
Poor organizational performance would indicate that a change from the standard is necessary, 
which would prompt an inclination towards a female leader. However, since choosing a female 
leader for an organization that has a female history of leadership would not represent a change, 
the glass cliff would not be expected to emerge under these circumstances. As predicted, 
Bruckmuller and Branscombe (2010) found that the glass cliff effect was attenuated when the 
leadership history of the company was primarily female but the effect was robust when the 
leadership history of the company was primarily male.  
The studies demonstrating the existence of the glass cliff effect with regard to minorities 
(Cook & Glass, 2014; Kulich, Ryan, & Haslam, 2013) can additionally lend some support to the 
concept that females are promoted under challenging conditions because they represent change. 
As the archetypal leader is not only male, but white as well (Rosette, Leonardelli, & Phillips, 
2008), ethnic minority leaders can also be considered a departure from the typical leadership 
paradigm. The joint findings that females are particularly favored over males and ethnic 
minorities are particularly favored over white males for precarious leadership roles imply that it 
is the company’s desire to convey change that drives these decisions.  
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Research that more directly examined females as signals of change was conducted by 
Brown et al. (2011). As previously discussed, in Study 3, Brown et al. (2011) found that male 
leaders were preferred over female leaders in non-threatening conditions, but that this preference 
disappeared in threatening conditions. In Study 4, the authors showed that female leaders were 
favored over male under conditions of threat, and that this effect was moderated by social 
dominance orientation. Brown and colleagues explain that the occurrence of threat portends that 
change is necessary and that the system will benefit from a fresh leadership direction which 
motivates individuals to prefer female leaders who are associated with the notion of change.  
They conducted two studies (Studies 1 and 2) that provide experimental support for this 
explanation. In Study 1, Brown et al. (2011) substantiated this notion by revealing that under 
conditions of threat, participants expressed an implicit preference for flexibility over stability. 
Further, Brown et al. (2011) demonstrated that female leaders are implicitly and explicitly 
associated with change, whereas male leaders are implicitly and explicitly associated with 
stability (Study 2). In Study 2a, participants responded to an online questionnaire that included 
questions regarding the probability of female and male leaders generating change or maintaining 
stability in organizations. As hypothesized, participants’ responses indicated explicit links 
between female leaders and change and male leaders and stability. Moreover, participants 
reported a stronger relationship between male leaders and stability rather than change, and a 
stronger relationship between female leaders and change rather than stability. In Study 2b, 
Brown et al. (2011) used the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 
1998) to demonstrate an implicit association between females and change and males and 
stability. Overall, the inclination towards change under threat conditions and the association 
between females and change provide authentication of the females as signals of change concept.  
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Underlying Assumptions of Glass Cliff Decision Processes 
When describing and testing each of the glass cliff explanations in the present 
dissertation, I make several assumptions regarding the glass cliff effect and the decision process. 
First, the glass cliff effect describing the idea that women are favored for leadership positions 
that are particularly precarious is not limited to the uppermost leadership roles. In past research, 
the reach of this effect has not been restricted to any specific leadership level. In fact, studies that 
have found evidence for the phenomenon range in the level of leadership that they examined. For 
instance, the glass cliff effect has been studied as it applies to females as board members (Ryan 
& Haslam, 2005), CEOs (Bruckmuller & Branscombe, 2010), senior management (Haslam & 
Ryan, 2008; Study 1), youth consultant positions (Haslam & Ryan, 2008; Study 2), and lawyer 
roles (Ashby et al., 2007). Relatedly, the amount of people involved in the candidate decision is 
likely to be impacted by the level of the leadership position. In reality, top level (e.g. CEO) 
leadership decisions are typically made by groups of decision-makers (Holcomb, 2011). 
However, it is possible that other leadership decisions (e.g. lawyers or mid-level managers) result 
from the evaluation of one or two individuals. It is important to note that Study 1 methodology 
reflects the latter situation in that a single person is asked to make assessments regarding the 
company and applicant, but does not reflect the reality of selection for the highest ranking 
leadership positions. Moreover, the categories of explanations discussed in the current study are 
meant to capture basic psychological processes that operate within each individual. From that 
perspective, while group dynamics feasibly play a role when choosing organizational elite, it is 
expected that these underlying processes occur, and are thus important to consider, both when 
individuals are making leadership decisions on their own or in a group.   
 UNDERSTANDING THE GLASS CLIFF   41 
 
 Furthermore, it is important to make clear that I do not expect any of these categories of 
explanations to trump leadership qualifications. When I propose that think crisis-think female, 
think crisis-think not male, or females as signals of change help us understand the glass cliff 
phenomenon, the underlying assumption is that the female being considered for the position is 
exceptionally skilled and competent. I do not expect a female to be favored over a male for a 
precarious leadership role if that female does not measure up to the male in terms of education, 
career background, and experience. The idea is that, qualifications being equivalent, these 
explanations may provide insight into why decision-makers may be swayed in the direction of 
the female candidate.  
 Within the current dissertation, I primarily focus on the decision-makers’ point of view in 
explaining the greater likelihood of females being appointed to precarious leadership positions. 
Self-selection, or the role of the male and female candidate in deciding whether or not to apply 
for and adopt these leadership positions, is certainly a worthy area of research that is not 
sufficiently addressed here. One of the explanations stemming from the comments offered by the 
participants in Ryan et al. (2007) focused on women’s choices. Participants suggested that 
women actively seek challenging positions because they do not think that they will be afforded 
better opportunities. Some research has shown that others do interpret riskier positions as better 
opportunities for women than men (Ashby et al., 2007; Haslam & Ryan, 2008). However, an 
experimental exploration of whether women were more strongly drawn to precarious positions 
revealed that men were actually more attracted to these positons than were women (Rink, Ryan, 
& Stoker, 2012). Furthermore, findings from studies on gender and risk taking support the idea 
that women tend to be more risk-averse than men (e.g. Charness & Gneezy, 2012). The notion 
that women are more risk-averse speaks against the claim that women actively seek out riskier 
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leadership positions. Though these more precarious positions do not necessarily appeal more to 
females as compared to males, it is still possible that women tend to adopt these precarious 
leadership roles because they do not think that they have other opportunities for advancement, 
while men tend to turn down these risky roles because they believe that they will find leadership 
opportunities elsewhere. In other words, a focus on the agency of male and female candidates 
may imply that it is not that women are more often offered or more actively seek these positions, 
but that they are still more likely than men to occupy these positions. In the current set of studies, 
I do not evaluate the explanation regarding women purposefully choosing to adopt more 
precarious positions as my emphasis remains on the part decision-makers play in the selection 
process.  
 A final point is that the glass cliff effect is assumed to underlie both internal and external 
decision appointments. In Study 1, I explicitly state that both candidates currently work at the 
company, i.e. are internal. In Study 2, I account for the internal/external dimension by 
controlling for whether the CEO was an internal or external hire. Prior research studying the 
glass cliff effect makes no distinction between internal and external candidates.  
Need for the Present Research  
While some support has been accumulated for each category of explanation discussed 
here, the empirical evidence is still somewhat inconclusive. Certain results discussed above can 
possibly be interpreted to support more than one of the proposed reasons for the glass cliff. For 
example, the finding that women were chosen to lead in crisis situations because the positon was 
seen to be stressful (Haslam & Ryan, 2008) can be understood as backing for either think crisis-
think female, or think crisis-think not male. Women may be preferred here because they are 
perceived to possess the qualities that would enable them to best deal with stressful situations or 
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because they are perceived to be less valuable than men and so others care less about placing 
women in more stressful posts. In addition, the study by Ryan et al. (2011) illustrated that female 
traits were only rated as more desirable for a precarious leadership position when the job 
involved a stereotypically feminine task (guiding others) or taking responsibility for 
organizational failure. This research may be construed as limited evidence for the think crisis-
think female explanation, in that female attributes were perceived to be needed for precarious 
leadership positions in very particular situations. However, subtle discrimination may also 
underlie these results. It is even possible that the perception of female suitability in these roles is 
operating in service of the think crisis-think not male concept. In other words, it may be that 
female qualities were judged to be more important for the leader to possess so that, in certain 
conditions, individuals could place women into and protect men from the precarious roles. 
Perhaps when a perilous position is undeniably associated with failure, females are evaluated as 
more suitable leaders in order to shelter males from those positions. Yet, if an opportunity for 
success or acclaim exists within the perilous role, maybe male leaders are then desired over 
female leaders.   
As per Ryan and Haslam (2007), the explanations that have been suggested for the glass 
cliff phenomenon are not mutually exclusive. In a discussion of the possible mediating 
mechanisms, these researchers endorse the idea that a multiplicity of processes simultaneously 
operate to cause glass cliff effects. To some degree, this is conceivable. It is possible that when 
an organization is in crisis, decision-makers perceive that a woman leader is a good choice 
because she possesses certain characteristics that will facilitate her leadership work and will 
convey a signal that the organization is undergoing change, with the added benefit that if the 
organization fails, at least the blame will fall on a female and not a more valuable male leader. 
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However, it is also imaginable that one of these explanations strongly outweighs the others. For 
example, it may be that a think crisis-think not male explanation has a slight influence on the 
glass cliff effect, but the major factor driving the decision to promote females under precarious 
circumstances is think crisis-think female.  
In the present research program, I aim to clarify the unanswered questions regarding the 
mediating factors of the glass cliff effect. The experimental and archival studies outlined below 
will be the first studies, to my knowledge, to concurrently examine the three possible 
explanations to better understand the unique effects of each.  In order to do so, as described 
below, I will measure several mediating variables that are meant to represent the mechanisms 
involved within each explanatory category. Moreover, as think crisis-think female is the only 
explanation for which tests of mediation have been conducted previously (Bruckmuller & 
Branscombe, 2010; Rink et al., 2013), the current studies will also be the first to explicitly 
measure whether each of the various factors explain the preference for female over male leaders 
when company performance is declining versus improving. In Study 1, I measure these variables 
by asking participants to respond to several questions regarding their perception of a leader 
candidate in the context of an online study, and in Study 2 I code for these variables in media 
articles written about male and female CEO appointments.  
Study 1: Hypotheses 
In Study 1, I followed the glass cliff laboratory framework as designed by Haslam and 
Ryan (2008) in which participants receive relevant materials describing company performance 
(improving vs. declining), a vacant leadership position, and qualifications of a male or female 
candidate. In order to measure the three mediating categories, participants were asked to respond 
to questions about their perceptions of the candidate and the position. In an attempt to further 
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disentangle the suggested mediating explanations, I included perceptions of leader suitability, 
leader qualifications, and anticipated effectiveness among the dependent variables. While past 
experimental research has consistently shown that female candidates tend to be chosen over male 
candidates when company performance is weak, previous evidence has been conflicting with 
regard to whether females are also evaluated as actually better suited for leadership in this 
circumstance (e.g. Haslam & Ryan, 2008; Bruckmuller & Branscombe, 2010; Rink et al., 2013). 
Relatedly, the majority of studies have not measured whether females in this context are 
anticipated to be more effective and appraised as more qualified than similar male candidates. In 
line with think crisis-think female, if a female is chosen because she is genuinely perceived to 
possess the needed attributes for success in the risky role, then she should be viewed as more 
suitable and qualified for the position, as well as anticipated to be a more effective leader than a 
male. On the other hand, a female chosen simply because she is seen as more expendable (think 
crisis-think not male) or because she embodies change (females as signals of change) will likely 
not be evaluated as more suitable and more qualified, or anticipated to be more effective. If the 
female candidate in the current study does not receive higher ratings with regard to suitability, 
qualifications, and anticipated effectiveness, this may indicate a lack of support for the think 
crisis-think female explanation.   
In line with traditional gender and leadership theory, I predict that male leaders will be 
preferred when an organization is performing well. In accordance with the glass cliff literature, I 
propose that females will be favored for precarious leadership positions. In other words:  
Hypothesis 1: Company performance interacts with candidate gender to predict leader 
endorsement ratings. Specifically, participants more strongly endorse the female versus 
male candidate when company performance is declining and the male versus female 
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candidate when company performance is improving. This hypothesis further predicts that 
participants more strongly endorse the female candidate in the declining as compared to 
the improving performance condition, and more strongly endorse the male candidate in 
the improving as compared to the declining performance condition. 
The proposed interaction effect is portrayed in Figure 1. 
One way to examine which of the three explanations described above most strongly 
drives this interaction effect is to assess mediating variables that should serve as proxies for the 
processes encapsulated by each perspective (think crisis-think female, think crisis-think not 
male, females as signals of change). As detailed below, I test several mediating variables, each of 
which represents one of these three perspectives. Given that, in keeping with prior work, my 
main focus is on comparing the favoring of female over male leaders in conditions of poor 
performance, I will explain below the way in which each of the mediating variables leads to the 
prediction of this comparison effect. Because it is plausible that the mediating variables operate 
concurrently, I do not predict that any of these variables fully account for the stronger 
endorsement of female over male leaders when company performance is declining. Therefore, in 
each of the theoretical models outlined below, I allow for the possibility that, aside from the 
mediating and moderating relationships that affect endorsement ratings delineated within each 
hypothesis, the interaction of gender and performance on endorsement is present as well. 
Think Crisis-Think Female 
Consistent with the think crisis-think female explanation, feminine qualities, as opposed 
to masculine qualities, are perceived as desirable for a leader to possess during times of crisis. If 
this is the case, participants should view feminine attributes as needed when organizational 
performance is declining, leading to the favoring of a female over male leader. Said otherwise, 
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perceptions that the new leader needs to be communicative, motivating, and cooperative, as well 
as function well in teams (i.e., feminine characteristics) in times of poor performance should 
drive the preference for a female leader.  
Hypothesis 2: The perceived need for communal attributes is stronger under conditions of 
decreasing versus increasing performance, and these stronger perceptions of need for 
communal attributes positively relate to endorsement of the female but not male 
candidate.  
Based on the logic of think crisis-think female, it is expected that females will be better 
leaders than males because of their possession of communal attributes. Hence, if this explanation 
holds true, it is likely that participants will not only more strongly endorse female candidates 
when company performance is poor, but they will also rate them as more suitable and better 
qualified for leadership as well as anticipate female candidates to be more effective leaders as 
compared to male candidates. That is: 
Hypothesis 3: Company performance interacts with candidate gender to predict ratings of 
leader a) suitability, b) qualifications, and c) anticipated effectiveness, such that when 
company performance is decreasing, participants provide stronger ratings for the female 
versus male candidate and when company performance is increasing, participants provide 
stronger ratings of the male versus female candidate.   
Furthermore, it is the notion that communal qualities are perceived as important for 
leaders to possess when organizations are struggling that should prompt perceptions that the 
female leader is more suited for leadership, more qualified, and will be more effective under 
these particular circumstances. Put differently, perceptions that the new leader needs to be 
possess these communal traits (e.g. be communicative, encouraging, understanding) when 
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performance is declining should lead to the assessment that a female would be better positioned 
to serve as a leader than a male.  
Hypothesis 4: Perceived need for a leader to possess communal attributes is stronger 
under conditions of decreasing versus increasing performance, and these stronger 
perceptions of the need for communal attributes positively relate to ratings of a) 
suitability, b) qualifications, and c) anticipated effectiveness for the female but not male 
candidate.    
Please refer to Figure 2, which illustrates the relationships delineated in Hypotheses 2 and 4a-c. 
Think Crisis-Think Not Male 
 According to think crisis-think not male, a female candidate may be preferred over a 
male candidate for a precarious position in an attempt to shield males from these dangerous 
posts. As such, the motivation to keep males out of these possibly career-damaging roles would 
not necessarily lead to higher ratings of females’ versus males’ perceived leadership suitability, 
anticipated effectiveness, or leader qualifications during times of crisis. Instead, decision-
makers’ desire (whether conscious or implicit) to shelter men from possibly harmful positions 
should lead to the stronger endorsement of the female candidate.      
It is expected that the leader position will be seen as riskier under conditions of poor 
company performance as opposed to successful performance. Further, if the think crisis-think not 
male explanation holds true, then, in line with Ashby et al. (2007), declining company 
performance will provoke others to perceive the leadership position as even riskier for the male, 
as compared to the female, candidate. The perception of increased riskiness of the position for 
males versus females is likely to occur because females’ careers are less valued than those of 
males according to this perspective. Since females are presumably thought to have less to lose 
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than males (Haslam & Ryan, 2008), they would not be sacrificing as much should their 
leadership attempt end in failure, which would lead to the perception that the position is not as 
risky for them. The idea that the leadership role in a struggling organization is less risky for 
females versus males would then drive the selection of a female over a male candidate. 
 Moreover, as female employees are valued less than their male counterparts, as indicated 
by think crisis-think not male, it is likely that the female candidate will be viewed as more 
dispensable than the male candidate in the declining performance condition. This differential 
perception of candidate value is expected because the context of weak performance will evoke 
the threat of possible failure. When a company is performing strongly and the likelihood of 
leader success is high, then considerations of candidate value are less relevant and others will be 
less likely to differentiate between male and female candidates on the basis of the degree of their 
value. However, in situations in which the company is performing poorly and the likelihood of 
leader success is low, then considerations of who might be the less valued and therefore more 
expendable candidate are more likely to come into play and influence the selection decision. This 
lower perceived value associated with the female as compared to male candidate in conditions of 
poor organizational performance will lead to the partiality for the female over male candidate for 
a leadership position under those circumstances.  
Lastly, it is probable that participants will view the open leader position as a good 
opportunity and therefore highly recommend that the male and female candidate accept it when 
company performance is improving. In contrast, it is expected that participants should be more 
likely to recommend that the female, but not the male, candidate accept the position when 
company performance is declining. The perception that the male candidate should instead abstain 
from the vacant position and wait for a better opportunity to arise should result in a higher 
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preference for the female versus the male candidate under conditions of organizational decline. 
Therefore, the perceived riskiness of the position, value of the candidate, and extent to which the 
candidate should hold out for a better opportunity, will lead to a favoring of the female, rather 
than the male, candidate in a declining organization. See Figures 3 – 5 for graphical 
representation of the expected differences between the male and female candidate in improving 
versus declining organizations with regard to perceptions of position riskiness, candidate value, 
and  recommended position acceptance.  
Hypothesis 5: Perceived a) riskiness of the position, b) candidate value, and c) extent to 
which the candidate should hold out for a better opportunity mediate the interaction effect 
of company performance and leader gender on leadership endorsement ratings. 
Specifically, when company performance is decreasing, there are stronger ratings of 
position riskiness for the male versus female candidate, lower ratings of candidate value 
for the female versus male candidate, and lower ratings of position recommendation for 
the male versus female candidate, leading to greater endorsement of the female over the 
male candidate. 
Please refer to Figure 6 for a graphical representation of the mediated moderation 
outlined in Hypothesis 5a-c.   
Females as Signals of Change  
As suggested by the notion of females as signals of change, females may be strongly 
endorsed for the leadership position during times of poor performance because they represent 
organizational change. Yet, if females are being promoted during firm decline simply because 
they signify a new leadership direction, then they would not necessarily be rated more highly 
than similarly qualified males with regard to leader suitability, qualifications, and anticipated 
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effectiveness. Decreasing organizational performance, as compared to improving performance, is 
likely to elicit beliefs that change in leadership and organizational direction is needed. As it has 
been demonstrated that female leaders are explicitly and implicitly associated with change while 
male leaders are explicitly and implicitly associated with stability (Brown et al., 2011), this 
notion that change is necessary should lead to the preference of a female over a male candidate 
for the vacant position when organizational performance is decreasing. In sum: 
Hypothesis 6: Perceived need for change is stronger under conditions of decreasing 
versus increasing performance, and these stronger perceptions of needed change 
positively relate to endorsement of the female but not male candidate.  
Please refer to Figure 7, as it portrays the predicted mediation and moderation pattern described 
in Hypothesis 6. 
Research Question 
Finally, I plan to explore which of the proposed mediators plays the strongest role in the 
interaction effect of company performance and leader gender on leader endorsement ratings. As 
per earlier discussions concerning the comparisons involved in the glass cliff effect, I am 
primarily interested in which mediating variable most strongly drives the relationship between 
weak company performance and favoring of female over male candidates. Here, I pose a 
research question rather than formal hypotheses because these explanations have never before 
been directly compared with one another. As such, there is no prior theoretical or empirical 
research upon which to use as the basis for predicting that any one explanation will most robustly 
account for why female candidates are preferred for precarious posts. Because there is no extant 
research to draw from, I ask the following research question: Which of the hypothesized 
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explanations most strongly explains the relationship between company performance and leader 
endorsement ratings when candidate gender comes into play?  
Method 
Participants and Design 
Participants were 185 individuals recruited via a Qualtrics Panel. The panel targeted a 
sample of full-time employees who had managerial experience and worked at organizations with 
over 50 employees. Additionally, participants had to be over the age of 18 to participate. Full-
time employees at larger organizations were specifically chosen because they are accustomed to 
the business environment and would presumably have a good understanding of the concepts 
presented in the study materials (regarding organizational performance, an available position, 
and applicant resumes). Moreover, the sample was limited to individuals with managerial 
experience because the main task in this study involves reviewing company and candidate 
materials, responding to questions concerning the organization, and appraising the candidate. It 
is probable that this would be a familiar undertaking to those with managerial experience. 
Additionally, this sample should enhance external validity as those with managerial experience 
are often the individuals in real-world settings who weigh in on candidate evaluations. Qualtrics 
participants are notified via email when they qualify for a particular study, and are invited to 
participate in exchange for a given incentive. They are provided with a link to follow should they 
wish to participate. 
Originally, the total sample size was 228 participants. After reviewing the data, 
participants who failed either of the two manipulation checks were eliminated. The two 
manipulation checks asked participants whether they received a female or male resume as well as 
whether company performance was improving or declining. As it was crucial to the study that 
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participants understood the information provided about candidate gender and company 
performance, it is logical to exclude data from participants who responded incorrectly to these 
questions from the main analyses. Twelve individuals failed the first manipulation check 
regarding candidate gender and 31 failed the second regarding company performance, leaving 
185 participants who answered both manipulation checks correctly.¹ Using t-tests, participants 
who failed the manipulation checks were compared with participants who answered these 
correctly. There were no systematic differences with regard to demographic variables between 
these two groups. A seven minute gap in average completion time was found between those who 
passed versus failed the checks, with those who failed the checks taking less time on average to 
complete the study, but this difference was not statistically significant. Results for analyses using 
the full data set are presented in a footnote in the Results section.  
The mean age of participants was 42.37 (SD = 10.98). The mean number of years worked 
was 20.72 (SD = 10.97) and the mean number of years as a manager was 11.77 (SD = 8.04). Of 
the participants, roughly half were male (48.1%) and half (51.9%) female. Regarding ethnicity, 
68.1% were White, 8.6% were Hispanic/Latino, 8.6% were Black, 4.3% were Asian, 1.1.% 
reported they were American Indian/Alaskan Native, .5% reported they were Native 
Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander, and 8.6% indicated that they belonged to multiple ethnic 
groups. Additionally, the majority of participants (97.3%) responded that English was their first 
language.   
 The study employed a 2 (company performance: improving vs. declining) by 2 
(candidate gender: female vs. male) between-subjects design.  
Materials and Procedure  
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Participants received a link to a website that contained all study materials. The key study 
materials included information about a fictional organization whose performance was improving 
or declining, a vacant senior leadership role in that organization, a company profile and 
organization chart, and background information on either a male or female candidate. These 
materials can be found in Appendix A. Upon starting the study, participants randomly received 
one of four versions (male candidate, improving performance; male candidate, declining 
performance; female candidate, improving performance; female candidate, declining 
performance) of the materials.  
Upon first arrival at the study website, participants were presented with an on-screen 
document of informed consent. Once they read the document and provided consent, they were 
brought to the main study materials. Importantly, participants were not told that the organization 
and candidate were fictitious. They were simply informed within the informed consent document 
that the purpose of the study was to examine decision-making in hiring and selection, and that 
they would be asked to review company as well as candidate materials, and answer a series of 
questions concerning both the company and candidate. Because participants were under the 
impression that they were being shown information about an actual organization, job, and 
applicant and that their assessments would therefore have real-world implications, they were 
more likely to invest the time and effort to carefully consider the materials and respond to 
questions in a way that reflects real-life decision-making processes.  
Participants were first shown a job description and company profile that included a chart 
of the organization’s senior leadership. The job description described a prestigious senior 
leadership position, the Senior Vice President (SVP) of Marketing, in a fictional company, called 
Premier Manufacturing, Inc. The position of SVP of Marketing was chosen because there is a 
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roughly equal distribution of men and women who work in the marketing industry (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, 2014). Therefore, it is less likely that, based on industry, participants would 
have preconceived notions regarding whether a male or female candidate would be a better fit for 
the role (Alksnis, Desmaris, & Curtis, 2008). The company profile provided participants with 
contextual information on the organization as well as demonstrated, through the organizational 
chart, that the SVP of Marketing position, formerly held by a male employee, was currently 
vacant. The decision to showcase that the vacant position was previously held by a male 
executive was purposeful as in the study conducted by Bruckmuller and Brancombe (2010), the 
glass cliff effect was only found when the company had a male (and not female) history of 
leadership. However, in other glass cliff studies conducted that found support for this 
phenomenon (e.g. Haslam & Ryan, 2008), the gender of the previous leader was not specified. 
Because the percentage of women in senior management roles generally is only 33% (Catalyst, 
2016) and there are so many more male leaders in general, it is probable that individuals 
participating in past studies assumed that the outgoing leader was male when gender was not 
indicated. The decision to explicitly state the previous leader’s male gender here was also meant 
to reflect real-world situations in which the departing leader is more likely to be male than 
female. Following Haslam and Ryan (2008), the company was described in a gender-neutral 
fashion, as a large, global firm that manufactures and distributes office supplies. It was explicitly 
stated that the company is a public, versus private, organization.  
Participants then read a newspaper article discussing the performance of Premier 
Manufacturing. Participants in the improving performance condition received an article entitled, 
“The Growth of a Company: Premier Manufacturing’s Stock Success.” The article described a 
company whose stock has been steadily increasing for a number of years and included an 
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illustrative graph depicting the rapid rise of the company’s stock. Participants in the declining 
performance condition received an article entitled, “A Company’s Decline: Premier 
Manufacturing’s Stock Flop.” The article described a company whose financial performance has 
been steadily decreasing and included a graph demonstrating the dramatic decline of the stock in 
recent years.  
Once participants reviewed these materials, they were asked to respond to several 
questions tapping into their perceptions regarding the type of leader currently needed by the 
organization. The questions presented at this point were meant to assess the proposed mediating 
variables that correspond to the categories of think crisis-think female and females as signals of 
change.  
Participants then reviewed information about a male or female candidate for the open job. 
The only difference between the male and female candidates’ resumes were the names at the top. 
As Kasof (1993) reported that the male and female name pair of Brian and Karen are similarly 
matched on key dimensions such as attractiveness, intellectual/competence connotation, age 
stereotype, and racial connotation), the name on the male candidate’s resume was Brian 
Anderson and the name on the female candidate’s resume was Karen Anderson. The candidate 
information included identical, comprehensive resumes detailing education, qualifications, job 
experience, and skills. It was explicitly stated that both candidates currently work at Premier 
Manufacturing.  
Before receiving the candidate resume, participants were told that fifteen candidate 
resumes were currently being considered. However, in the interest of quickly evaluating the 
various candidates, the resumes had been split up and the participant was only being asked to 
provide his or her perspective on one of the candidates. This information was included to 
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enhance the external validity of the experiment as, in real-life selection situations, decision-
makers are rarely given only one resume to review. While participants only viewed the one 
resume, they were at least under the impression that the study scenario mirrors a realistic hiring 
context in which multiple candidates are being evaluated.  
After participants read through the candidate resume, they were asked to answer a 
number of follow-up questions concerning the candidate and the available job in order to assess 
the dependent variables and remaining hypothesized mediating variables that correspond to think 
crisis-think not male. Once participants finished answering the questions, they were brought to 
an on-screen debriefing document.   
The questions were presented to participants in the order delineated above to parallel the 
order of the relationships described in the hypotheses. Specifically, the questions related to think 
crisis-think female and females as signals of change were posed following the performance 
manipulation and prior to the candidate gender manipulation. This sequence is based on the 
predictions that declining versus improving performance leads to greater perceptions that 
leadership communal attributes and need for change are each needed. At that point, candidate 
gender is predicted to interact with perceptions regarding communal attributes and change to 
drive stronger endorsement of the female over the male candidate. The questions related to think 
crisis-think not male are posed following the performance and candidate gender manipulation 
based on the predictions that performance and candidate gender interact to influence the think 
crisis-think not male variables, which subsequently lead to stronger endorsement ratings of the 
female versus male candidate.  
Measures 
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Candidate endorsement. To measure candidate endorsement (Appendix B), participants 
rated the degree to which they agreed that the candidate should be selected for the open 
leadership position, on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  
Candidate evaluation. Participants assessed the candidate further by rating statements 
concerning the candidate’s leadership suitability and qualifications. They also rated the extent to 
which they thought that the candidate would be effective once installed as company leader. The 
leader suitability and leader qualification items are from Haslam and Ryan (2008), with slight 
modifications made to the wording of the items in order to better fit the context of the current 
study. One of the anticipated effectiveness items (“S/He will be an effective leader) was used in 
Rink et al. (2013). The remaining items in the anticipated effectiveness scale were devised for 
the current study. All ratings were made on a 1 to 5 scale. Items are included in Appendix B. 
Internal consistency reliability was very high for all three measures, with alphas of .93 for 
suitability, .89 for qualifications, and .94 for anticipated effectiveness.  
Communal attributes. Participants rated the degree to which they perceived it to be 
important for the new leader to possess seven feminine attributes: communicative, motivating, 
cooperative, functions well in teams, encouraging, understanding, and tactful. These first four are 
communal attributes that have been previously identified as necessary for successful leadership 
(Bruckmuller & Branscombe, 2010; Rink et al., 2013). The last three were additionally included 
to create a broader scale of feminine traits. The scale ranged from 1 (not at all important) to 7 
(extremely important). The scores had high internal consistency reliability, at .85.  The 
communal attributes are included in Appendix C.  
Position riskiness. Participants were asked to evaluate the position itself. They were 
asked to rate their agreement with three statements concerning the position’s riskiness on a scale 
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from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Two of the items were taken from Ashby et al. 
(2007), with the wording changed to reflect the context of the current study. A third item (“The 
vacant leadership position is a risky one”) was created for this study. The statements can be 
found in Appendix D. Internal consistency reliability was satisfactory at .72. 
Candidate value. Participants completed three items designed to assess perceptions of 
the candidate’s value to the organization, found in Appendix D. They were asked to indicate 
their level of agreement with three statements. A sample item is, “As a current employee of the 
organization, this candidate is critical to the organization,” with a scale from 1 (is not at all 
critical) to 5 (is extremely critical).  These items were created for the current study, and are 
intended to capture the degree to which the candidate is perceived to be valued by the 
organization. Internal consistency reliability for the three items was .52. I examined the results 
for what the alpha would be if each item was deleted. Results indicated that the third item (“It 
will be easy for Premier Manufacturing to replace this candidate should the candidate fail in this 
leadership role” (reverse coded)) did not strongly correlate with the others, and that deleting this 
item would yield an alpha of .75. As an alpha of .75 was considerably higher than an alpha of 
.52, the third item was removed and the scale of candidate value was only comprised of the first 
two items.  
Position recommendation. Participants were also asked to provide their perspective on 
whether they thought that the candidate should accept this position if offered, or wait until a safer 
opportunity arose. They were again asked to rate their level of agreement with several items. An 
example item is: “This candidate should accept this leadership position if offered” with a 
response scale from 1 (do not at all agree) to 5 (completely agree).2 As this variable has not been 
tested previously within the glass cliff literature, these items were constructed for this study. The 
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internal consistency reliability was .65. However, results based on what the alpha would be if 
each item was deleted indicated that the third item (The candidate should wait for a future 
leadership opportunity to arise rather than taking this position (reverse coded)) was responsible 
for lowering the alpha, and that removing this item would cause the alpha to increase to a high 
value of .82. Therefore, the third item was eliminated and the final scale consisted of two items 
(shown in Appendix D).  
Change perceptions. Participants rated their level of agreement with several statements 
regarding the need for the organization to undergo a change. The first four items explicitly asked 
about change, with a scale from 1 (do not at all agree) to 5 (completely agree). The last two items 
asked about keeping the organization on the same track, and were reverse-coded. The scale for 
these items ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). These items were taken from 
Brown et al. (2011), with slight adjustments made to the wording to better fit the current 
experiment. For example, instead of, “Female leaders are more likely than male leaders to move 
organizations in a new direction” (Brown et al., 2011), the item included here reads, “The 
organization needs a leader who will move it in a new direction.” Internal consistency reliability 
analyses showed a high alpha of .84. These items are included in Appendix E.  
Exploratory measures: Agentic attributes. Participants were also asked to rate the 
degree to which they perceive it to be necessary for the new leader to possess seven masculine 
attributes (e.g. dominant, objective, independent; Appendix C). Response options ranged from 1 
(not at all important) to 7 (extremely important). Though I do not make any specific predictions 
with regard to the masculine attributes, it is interesting to examine, in an exploratory manner, 
under which conditions these characteristics are perceived to be necessary for the leader to 
possess. Are these masculine traits solely seen as desired for leadership when organizational 
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performance is improving? Or, are they seen as desired when organizational performance is 
declining as well, just less so than the feminine attributes?  
Pilot Study 
Hypotheses 2 and 6 respectively proposed that perceptions that the leader must possess 
feminine attributes and perceptions that the organization should undergo a change will each lead 
to the preference for the female over the male candidate in conditions of organizational decline 
versus success. These hypotheses imply that participants believe that the female candidate 
possesses these feminine attributes and represents change to a greater degree than the male 
candidate, ultimately motivating higher endorsement ratings of the female candidate over the 
male. These assumptions are based on theory and have been repeatedly supported by empirical 
evidence (Brown et al., 2011; Rudman & Phelan, 2008; Scott & Brown, 2006). However, in 
order to test that these assumptions hold true in the context of this experiment, I conducted a 
pilot test. Through the pilot test, I also checked the assumption that individuals do not associate a 
specific gender with the marketing industry.   
Participants were gathered using social media. Participants responded to posts on 
Facebook providing them with a link to the pilot study. The total sample was 32 individuals, with 
a mean age of 33.97 (SD = 10.66). The sample was composed of 7 males and 25 females. The 
large majority of the sample reported being White (93.8%), while 3.1% of the sample reported 
being Black and 3.1% reported being of two or more races. Years worked ranged from 0 to 49, 
with 10.66 as the average number of years worked (SD = 11.06). Fifty percent of the sample 
reported having had managerial experience. 
Participants were first asked several demographic questions. They were then asked about 
their perceptions regarding the typical sex of individuals who work in the field of Marketing. 
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Next, they were presented with some of the main study materials: Premier Manufacturing’s 
company profile, organizational chart, and job description. They were additionally shown the 
candidate profile and resume of either the male or female candidate. Lastly, they were asked to 
rate the degree to which they perceived the leader candidate to possess four feminine and five 
masculine attributes (Appendix F) as well as the extent to which they viewed the leader 
candidate as representative of change and stability for the organization (Appendix G).  
I compared mean ratings of participants’ perceptions regarding the degree to which male 
and female candidates possess communal attributes using a t-test. Results were significant (t = 
2.28, p < .05), showing that participants associated female candidates (M = 5.81, SD = .60) with 
communal attributes to a greater extent than male candidates (M = 5.23, SD = .81). This linkage 
is crucial to the proposition (within Hypothesis 2) that females are favored over males when 
organizational performance is poor because others believe that it is necessary for the leader to 
possess communal attributes in those conditions.  
A t-test was conducted in order to compare the mean ratings of participants’ perceptions 
regarding the degree to which male and female candidates represent change and stability. 
Perceptions of change did not significantly differ between participants in the male and female 
candidate conditions (t = -1.328, p > .05), but means were in the expected direction (female 
candidate M = 4.40, SD = 1.33; male candidate M = 3.85, SD = .99). Perceptions of stability did 
significantly differ between participants in the male and female candidate conditions (t = 2.227, p 
< .05), with perceptions of stability being greater for male (M = 4.75, SD = .86) versus female 
candidates (M = 3.94, SD = 1.18). Taken together, results indicate that male candidates were 
more likely than female candidates to be associated with stability and that the trend for the 
association between female candidates and change was in the anticipated direction.  
 UNDERSTANDING THE GLASS CLIFF   63 
 
Finally, in order to confirm that a marketing position is not specifically associated with 
either gender, I examined the response frequencies to the question regarding the typical sex of 
individuals in marketing. Over half of the sample (53.1%) chose the response option that read, 
“Neither male nor female; there is no typical sex in this industry”, while 21.9% chose the “Male” 
response option and 25% chose the “Female” response option. These frequencies suggest that 
overall, there is no strong linkage between the marketing industry and either males or females 
and that it would therefore be an appropriate industry to utilize within the context of the current 
study.  
Analyses 
 To test the interaction effect of company performance and candidate gender on leader 
endorsement ratings described in Hypothesis 1, I conducted a 2 (company performance: 
improving vs. declining) × 2 (candidate gender: male vs. female) between-participant ANOVA. I 
additionally conducted three 2 (company performance: improving vs. declining) × 2 (candidate 
gender: male vs. female) between-participant ANOVAs to examine the interaction effect of 
company performance and candidate gender on ratings of suitability, qualifications, and 
anticipated effectiveness (Hypotheses 3a-c).  
Hypotheses 2 and 6 respectively predicted that declining versus improving performance 
would lead to greater perceptions regarding the need for communal attributes in a leader and 
need for the organization to change, and that these perceptions would each result in stronger 
endorsement ratings for the female but not the male candidate. As recommended by numerous 
researchers (Preacher & Hayes, 2008; Williams & MacKinnon, 2008), a multiple mediation 
analysis is appropriate when multiple mediators are hypothesized. Because an interaction effect 
is included as well, a moderated multiple mediation analysis (PROCESS model, Model 15) was 
 UNDERSTANDING THE GLASS CLIFF   64 
 
performed by means of bootstrapping (Shrout & Bolger, 2002) using the percentile bootstrap 
confidence interval method with 5000 bootstrap samples discussed by Preacher and Hayes 
(2008). One advantage to this method is that there is no requirement that the indirect effects have 
a normal distribution, in comparison to the presence of this requirement in previously 
recommended mediation models, such as the Sobel (1982) test (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). 
Further, unlike the popular causal steps approach (Baron & Kenny, 1986) bootstrapping 
quantifies the intervening effect and allows for a test of significance regarding the indirect effects 
as well as a test of significance of the entire proposed model.  
Hypothesis 4 proposed that declining versus improving performance leads to greater 
perceptions regarding the need for communal attributes in a leader, and these perceptions in turn 
positively affect ratings of candidate suitability, qualifications, and anticipated effectiveness for 
the female, but not male, candidate. I tested the moderated mediation models using the 
bootstrapping method outlined above, conducting a separate analysis for each dependent 
variable.  
Hypotheses 5a-c proposed different mediators (position riskiness, candidate value, 
recommendations as to whether the candidate should take the position) of the interaction effect 
of company performance and candidate gender on endorsement ratings described in Hypothesis 
1. This mediated moderation model (PROCESS macro, Model 8) was tested through a 
bootstrapping technique as well, with the percentile bootstrap confidence interval method 
(Shrout & Bolger, 2002).  
For each hypothesis, using 5000 samples with replacement and 95% confidence intervals 
as recommended by Hayes (2009), I checked the direct effects to confirm that the criteria for 
mediation had been met and examined the indirect effects as to whether or not zero lay within 
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the 95% confidence interval. I first examined whether zero lay within the boundaries of the 
confidence intervals for each relationship within the model. If zero lay within the boundaries, I 
concluded that the relationship was not significantly different than zero. If zero was not included 
in the confidence interval, I concluded that the relationship was significantly different than zero. 
Lastly, I studied the index of moderated mediation to evaluate whether the model as a whole was 
supported. If the confidence interval for the index of moderated mediation did contain zero, this 
indicated a lack of evidence for the overall model. If the confidence interval for the index of 
moderated mediation did not contain zero, this indicated support for the overall model.  
When the results of the PROCESS models testing need for communal attributes and need 
for change indicated that an interaction effect was significant, I conducted hierarchical 
moderated regression analyses to further understand the interaction. When performing each of 
these, I centered the continuous independent variable (need for communal attributes and need for 
change, respectively) and created an interaction term by multiplying the centered variable by 
candidate gender. I entered candidate gender and the centered independent variable in Block 1 
and the interaction term in Block 2. I then ran separate analyses with the relevant dependent 
variable (e.g. endorsement, suitability, qualifications or anticipated effectiveness).  
Results 
Descriptive Statistics  
 Descriptive statistics were calculated for all variables. Means, standard deviations, and 
correlations among study variables are reported in Table 1. Correlations between the 
demographic variables and study variables are included as well. Importantly, because there is 
some qualitative evidence that males and females perceive the glass cliff effect differently (Ryan 
et al., 2007), there is a theoretical and empirical rationale for a relationship existing between 
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participant gender and the study variables. However, participant gender was not significantly 
correlated with any study variables and therefore was not included in the analyses. There is no 
strong theoretical or empirical rationale for including the other demographic variables in 
analyses, and therefore they were excluded from subsequent analyses.  
The study data was tested for assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity. With 
regard to the study variables, though many of the dependent variables were negatively skewed to 
some degree, the majority of them fell within acceptable ranges of skewness (-1 to +1) and 
kurtosis (-3 to +3). Only candidate endorsement, with a skew of -1.03, did not fall within the 
acceptable range of skewness (though kurtosis for this variable was acceptable, at .47). The 
endorsement variable was squared, which is a common method for normalizing a variable that is 
left skewed. After squaring the endorsement variable, both skewness (-.41) and kurtosis (-.62) 
fell within acceptable limits. Therefore, analyses proceeded using the squared endorsement 
variable.  
Residual scatterplots were created of each predictor and dependent variable combination 
to examine homoscedasticity. All scatterplots indicated homoscedasticity, as scores were 
randomly spread through the distribution.   
Tests of Hypotheses³  
Test of the glass cliff effect. Hypothesis 1 stated that company performance would 
interact with candidate gender to predict leader endorsement ratings, such that participants would 
more strongly endorse the female versus male candidate when performance was decreasing and 
the male versus female candidate when performance was increasing. It was further expected that 
participants would more strongly endorse the female candidate in the decreasing versus 
improving performance condition and the male candidate in the improving versus decreasing 
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condition. Results of a 2 x 2 ANOVA demonstrated that the interaction between candidate 
gender and company performance on leadership endorsement ratings was not significant, F(1, 
181) = .02, p > .05. The ANOVA showed a significant main effect of performance, F(1, 181) = 
14.62, p < .01, and no main effect of gender, F(1, 181) = .17, p > .05. Overall, results 
demonstrate that participants provided stronger endorsement ratings for both the male and female 
candidates in increasing as compared to decreasing performance conditions. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 1 was not supported. 
Think crisis-think female: Perceived need for communal attributes.  
Endorsement. Hypothesis 2 predicted that company performance would affect 
perceptions concerning the need for a leader to possess communal attributes and that perceived 
need for communal attributes would interact with candidate gender to predict candidate 
endorsement ratings. It was specifically expected that perceptions regarding the need for 
communality would be stronger under conditions of declining versus improving performance, 
and that these stronger perceptions would lead to the higher endorsement ratings of the female as 
compared to the male candidate. The bootstrapping procedure (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) using 
5000 bootstrap samples (Shrout & Bolger, 2002) via the SPSS PROCESS macro (Model 15; 
Hayes, 2012) was utilized to test this moderated mediation effect. As Figure 2 shows, this macro 
allowed for a test of the indirect effect of performance on endorsement through perceived need 
for communal attributes as moderated by candidate gender. The unstandardized coefficients and 
standard errors are displayed in Figure 8.  
In interpreting this, I break down each path within the model that is relevant to hypothesis 
testing and then discuss the overall moderated mediation effect. Contrary to predictions, the 
effect of company performance on the perceived need for communal attributes in a leader was 
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not significant, b = -.04, SE = .07, p > .05, 95% CI = [-.18, .11]. However, consistent with the 
hypothesis, the interaction of perceived need for communality and candidate gender on 
endorsement was significant, b = -8.63, SE = 3.65, p < .05, 95% CI = [-15.83, -1.44].  
A hierarchical moderated regression was done to further examine the nature of this 
significant interaction. Perceived need for communal attributes was centered and a product term 
of perceived need for communality and candidate gender was calculated. Results were consistent 
with expectations. A graphical representation of the results (Figure 9) shows that when a high 
degree of communality was perceived to be needed, female candidates received stronger 
endorsement ratings than male candidates. When perceived need for communality was low, male 
candidates received stronger endorsement ratings than female candidates. Further, for male 
candidates, perceptions of needed communality did not strongly impact endorsement. On the 
other hand, in the female candidate condition, perceptions of needed communality did strongly 
impact endorsement in that the greater the perceived need for communality in a leader, the 
stronger the endorsement ratings.  
In terms of the full moderated mediation model, the index of moderated mediation was 
not significant with regard to perceived need for communal attributes, 95% Boot CI = [-.91, 
2.14], suggesting that the interaction of perceived need for communal attributes and candidate 
gender did not mediate the relationship between performance and endorsement. Thus, 
Hypothesis 2 was not supported.   
To summarize, this hypothesis was not supported as there was no evidence for moderated 
mediation of the full model. It is worth noting however that part of the model was supported, in 
that candidate gender moderated the relationship between perceived need for communal 
attributes and endorsement, such that the relationship was stronger when the candidate was 
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female versus male. Thus, although there was no significant link with company performance, 
need for communal attributes plays a stronger role in determining endorsement of female than 
male candidates. 
Suitability, qualifications, and anticipated effectiveness. As stated by Hypothesis 3, it 
was expected that company performance would interact with candidate gender to predict ratings 
of leader a) suitability, b) qualifications, and c) anticipated effectiveness, such that female versus 
male candidates would receive higher ratings when performance was declining and male versus 
female candidates would receive higher ratings when performance was improving. Additionally, 
ratings of a) suitability, b) qualifications, and c) anticipated effectiveness were expected to be 
greater for the female candidate in declining versus improving performance conditions and for 
the male candidate in improving versus declining conditions. Results of three 2 x 2 ANOVAs 
showed that company performance and candidate gender did not significantly interact to affect 
suitability, F(1, 181) = .01, p > .05, qualifications, F(1, 181) = .53, p > .05, or anticipated 
effectiveness, F(1, 181) = .30, p > .05. Results of all ANOVAs showed similar patterns; ratings 
of suitability, qualifications, and anticipated effectiveness were greater under conditions of 
increasing versus decreasing performance for both male and female candidates. Therefore, 
Hypotheses 3a-c were not supported.  
 Hypothesis 4 predicted that perceived need for communal attributes in a leader would be 
stronger under conditions of decreasing versus improving performance, and these stronger 
perceptions of need for communal attributes would lead to higher ratings of a) suitability, b) 
qualifications, and c) anticipated effectiveness for the female over the male candidate. The SPSS 
macro (Model 15; Hayes, 2012) was used to test for the moderated mediation effects, and the 
model was run separately for each dependent variable. The macro allowed for tests of the 
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indirect effects of company performance on a) suitability, b) qualifications, and c) anticipated 
effectiveness through perceived need for communal attributes as moderated by candidate gender, 
shown in Figure 2. The unstandardized coefficients and standard errors for each dependent 
variable are displayed in Figures 10 through 12. 
Suitability. Contrary to Hypothesis 4a, the effect of performance on the perceived need 
for communal attributes in a leader was not significant, b = -.04, SE = .07, p >.05, 95% CI = [-
.18, .11] nor was the interaction of perceived need for communality and candidate gender on 
suitability, b = -.57, SE = .30, p > .05, 95% CI = [-1.15, .02]. Finally, the index of moderated 
mediation was not significant with regard to perceived need for communal attributes, 95% Boot 
CI = [-.06, .16], suggesting that the interaction of perceived need for communal attributes and 
candidate gender did not mediate the relationship between performance and suitability.  
As there is no support for the overall moderated mediation model, these results do not 
provide evidence for Hypothesis 4a.    
Qualifications. Unstandardized coefficients and standard errors are displayed in Figure 
11. Contrary to predictions, performance did not significantly impact perceived need for 
communal attributes, b = -.04, SE = .07, p > .05, 95% CI = [-.18, .11], and perceived need for 
communal attributes did not significantly interact with candidate gender to affect ratings of 
qualifications, b = -.43, SE = .26, p > .05, 95% CI = [-.94, .09].  
Results show that the index of moderated mediation was not significant, 95% Boot CI = 
[-.04, .12]. These findings provide a lack of support for the full model describing the relationship 
between performance and ratings of qualifications through the mediating variable of perceived 
need for communal attributes and the moderating effect of candidate gender. As no evidence was 
found for the moderated mediation model as a whole, Hypothesis 4b was not supported.     
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Anticipated Effectiveness. The relationship between performance and need for communal 
attributes has already been reported as not significant. However, in line with predictions, the 
interaction between perceived need for communal attributes and candidate gender on anticipated 
effectiveness was significant (Figure 12), b = -.58, SE = .29, p < .05, 95% CI = [-.1.14, -.01].  
A hierarchical moderated regression was conducted to understand this interaction further. 
Perceived need for communal attributes was centered and a product term of perceived need for 
communality and candidate gender was calculated. Figure 13 presents a graphical representation 
of the regression results. Consistent with expectations, when communality was perceived to be 
highly needed, female candidates received higher ratings of anticipated effectiveness as 
compared to male candidates. When communality was not perceived to be highly needed, the 
difference between anticipated effectiveness ratings for male and female candidates was 
negligible, with male candidates receiving slightly higher ratings. Overall, perceptions of needed 
communality more strongly impacted ratings of anticipated effectiveness for female versus male 
candidates.   
The index of moderated mediation was not significant, 95% Boot CI = [-.07, .15], 
indicating a lack of support for the overall moderated mediation model.  
Though Hypothesis 4c was not supported because there was no evidence found for the 
moderated mediation of the full model, as with the endorsement findings, candidate gender did 
moderate the relationship between perceived need for communality and ratings of anticipated 
effectiveness. As discussed, the relationship between perceived need for communal attributes 
and anticipated effectiveness was stronger for female as compared to male candidates, 
demonstrating the stronger role that communal attributes plays in evaluating anticipated 
effectiveness for female over male candidates.  
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Think crisis-think not male: Position riskiness, candidate value, and position 
recommendation. Hypothesis 5 predicted that perceptions of a) position riskiness, b) candidate 
value, and c) position recommendation (i.e. extent to which the candidate should hold out for a 
better position) would mediate the interaction effect of company performance and candidate 
gender on endorsement ratings. Explicitly, declining company performance was predicted to 
yield stronger ratings of position riskiness for the male versus female candidate, lower ratings of 
candidate value for the female versus male candidate, and lower ratings of position 
recommendation for the male versus female, all leading to greater endorsement of the female as 
compared to the male candidate.⁴ The SPSS PROCESS macro (Model 8; Hayes, 2012) was run 
to test the mediated moderation effect. The theoretical model tested is shown in Figure 6.  
Position riskiness. The unstandardized coefficients and standard errors for the 
moderation effect as mediated by position riskiness are displayed in Figure 14. Contrary to 
Hypothesis 5a, the interaction between candidate gender and company performance on 
perceptions of position riskiness (b = .07, SE = .39, p > .05, 95% CI [-.69, .83]) as well as the 
relationship between riskiness and endorsement (b = -.76, SE = .54, p > .05, 95% CI [-1.82 .31]) 
were, respectively, not significant.  
Further, the index of moderated mediation was not significant, 95% Boot CI [-1.09, .46], 
indicating that perceptions of riskiness did not mediate the moderation effect of performance and 
candidate gender on endorsement. These findings show an overall lack of support for Hypothesis 
5a.  
Candidate value. Figure 15 shows the unstandardized coefficients and standard errors for 
the mediated moderation model, with perceptions of candidate value as the mediator. Contrary to 
expectations, performance and candidate gender did not significantly interact to impact 
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perceptions of candidate value, b = -.02, SE = .30, p > .05, 95% CI [-.61, .56]. Additionally, 
inconsistent with predictions, perceptions of value positively predicted endorsement ratings, b = 
6.18, SE = .85, p < .01, 95% CI [4.50, 7.87]. Here it was expected that the lower value associated 
with females would lead to greater endorsement of the female over the male candidate in times 
of declining performance.  
The index of moderated mediation was not significant, 95% Boot CI [-3.97, 3.59]), 
providing a lack of overall support for candidate value mediating the interaction effect of 
performance and candidate gender on endorsement ratings. Hence, support was not found for 
Hypothesis 5b.  
Position recommendation. Unstandardized coefficients and standard errors are presented 
in Figure 16. The interaction of company performance and candidate gender on position 
recommendation was not significant, b = -.01, SE = .27, p > .05, 95% CI [-.54, .52]. However, as 
expected, the relationship between position recommendation and endorsement was significant 
and positive, b = 4.71, SE = .95, p < .01, 95% CI [2.84, 6.59].  
The overall index of moderated mediation was not significant, 95% Boot CI [-2.70, 
2.69]), suggesting that the interaction of company performance and candidate gender was not 
mediated by position recommendation to impact endorsement. Therefore, the full model as 
presented in Hypothesis 5c was not supported.  
Females as signals of change: Perceived need for change. Hypothesis 6 stated that a 
stronger need for change would be perceived under conditions of declining versus improving 
company performance, producing higher endorsement ratings for the female but not the male 
candidate. The PROCESS macro (Model 15; Hayes, 2012) assessed the moderated mediation 
effect, allowing for a test of the indirect effect of performance on endorsement through perceived 
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need for change as moderated by candidate gender. Figure 17 presents the unstandardized 
coefficients and standard errors. As predicted, the relationship between company performance 
and perceived need for change was negative, b =-1.62, SE = .13, p < .01, 95% CI [-1.87, -1.36] 
and the interaction of perceived need for change and candidate gender on endorsement was 
significant, b =-4.91, SE = 2.08, p < .05, 95% CI [-9.02, -.80].  
In order to parse the results further, a hierarchical moderated regression was performed in 
which perceived need for change was centered and a product term of perceived need for change 
and candidate gender was computed. Results (shown in Figure 18) were in line with this 
hypothesis. When a high degree of change was perceived to be needed, female candidates 
received stronger endorsement ratings than male candidates. When a low degree change was 
perceived to be needed, male as compared to female candidates received stronger endorsement 
ratings. Overall, both male and female candidates received stronger endorsement ratings when a 
low versus high degree of change was perceived as needed.  
Notably, the index of moderated mediation was significant, 95% Boot CI = [1.02, 15.24], 
providing support for the impact of performance on endorsement through the interaction of 
perceived need for change and candidate gender. In other words, as predicted, when performance 
was decreasing versus increasing, a greater degree of change was perceived to be needed, leading 
to stronger endorsement ratings for the female as compared to the male candidate. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 6 was supported.  
Research Question  
 I presented a research question asking which of the proposed explanations would most 
strongly explain the relationship between company performance and leader endorsement ratings 
when candidate gender is taken into account. As described, significant findings emerged for the 
 UNDERSTANDING THE GLASS CLIFF   75 
 
females as signals of change notion but not for the think crisis-think female or think crisis-think 
not male perspectives. Therefore, I can conclude that in the current study, the females as change 
signals idea most strongly explained the relationship between company performance and 
endorsement ratings when applicant gender was considered.  
Exploratory Analyses  
 I was interested in investigating whether similar mechanisms impacted assessments of 
male and female candidates regardless of company performance. In order to examine the 
processes driving these evaluations, data for the male and female candidates were separated. 
Separate linear regressions were performed with the four dependent variables of endorsement, 
suitability, qualifications and anticipated effectiveness. For all regressions, the predictor 
variables entered were perceptions of need for communal attributes, need for agentic attributes, 
need for change, position riskiness, candidate value and position recommendation. These 
analyses tested whether the different predictors impacted the dependent variables, while 
controlling for the other predictors. Results are shown in Table 2.  
For both the male and female data sets, perceptions of candidate value and position 
recommendation significantly related to ratings of endorsement and anticipated effectiveness. 
However, in the female data set only, endorsement and anticipated effectiveness were also 
impacted by perceptions regarding the riskiness of the position.  
When qualification ratings were entered as the dependent variable, perceptions of 
candidate value and position recommendation emerged as significant predictors for both the male 
and female data sets. For the female data set, need for change and position riskiness impacted 
ratings of qualifications as well. Candidate value and position recommendation were also 
significant predictors of suitability ratings for both male and female candidates. Female 
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candidate suitability was additionally affected by position riskiness. Moreover, evaluations of 
male candidate suitability were driven by perceptions regarding the need for agentic attributes in 
that male candidates were seen as more suitable as the perceived need for leader possession of 
agentic attributes increased. 
These exploratory results demonstrate that, taken together, perceptions of candidate value 
and position recommendation strongly related to both male and female candidate evaluations. 
Position riskiness emerged as a strong predictor of female, but not male, candidate evaluations. 
Overall, when participants perceived there to be a great amount of position riskiness, they 
provided lower ratings of the female candidate.  
To understand if agentic attributes were perceived to be more highly needed in situations 
of organization success versus failure, the relationship between company performance and need 
for agentic attributes was examined through a t-test. Results showed that company performance 
did not impact the perceived need for agentic attributes in a leader, t = 1.15, p > .05.  
Please refer to Table 3 for a summary of the results.  
Study 1: Discussion 
The results of Study 1 did not support the existence of the glass cliff effect as described 
in Hypothesis 1.Rather, male and female candidates received similar ratings of endorsement 
when performance was improving as well as decreasing. Correspondingly, the predicted glass 
cliff effect with the dependent variables of suitability, qualifications, and anticipated 
effectiveness did not emerge. Again, equivalent ratings were provided to male and female 
candidates when performance was improving as well as decreasing.  
Results of this study provide some interesting insight into the previously proposed 
explanations for the glass cliff effect. First, with regard to think crisis-think female, results 
 UNDERSTANDING THE GLASS CLIFF   77 
 
demonstrated that participants were more likely to provide stronger ratings of endorsement and 
anticipated effectiveness to female candidates when participants perceived a high versus low 
need for the newly appointed leader to possess communal attributes. On the other hand, 
perceived need for communal attributes did not affect the endorsement and anticipated 
effectiveness ratings of male candidates. These findings suggest that the perceived need for 
communal attributes does in part drive evaluations of female, but not male, leaders.  
Unexpectedly though, results did not demonstrate a relationship between company 
performance and need for communal attributes in a leader. Overall, need for communal attributes 
was rated very highly, with a mean of 4.49 and standard deviation of .50 on a response scale 
from 1 to 5. Put differently, participants perceived leader communality to be needed regardless of 
company performance. It is logical that when choosing a leader, decision-makers would ascribe 
great importance to leader possession of the communal qualities included in this study, such as 
communication, motivation, and working well with others. These are qualities that are typically 
desired in a leader no matter what the circumstances. Nevertheless, based on the rationale of 
think crisis–think female, it was anticipated that the need for such qualities would be more 
pronounced under conditions of weak versus strong company performance. It is possible that this 
was not the case in the current study because the performance conditions were not salient enough 
to imitate real-life conditions of company performance incline and decline. A second aspect to 
consider is that, though the participants in this sample were managers, they may not have had 
experience dealing with selection of the highest level leadership. It is conceivable that those 
typically charged with making top leadership decisions would have a different perspective on the 
attributes needed for leadership when a company is doing well or struggling. These more senior 
individuals are more accustomed to understanding the business environment and subsequently 
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choosing a leader who can meet the needs of the environment. However, mid-level managers 
may not have the strategic and tactical mentality to glean needed leader qualities from the 
business context. Therefore, it is feasible that the difference in need for communal attributes 
based on company performance level may have shown up more strongly if the sample was 
composed of the organizational elite, those managers who do normally make top leadership 
selection decisions.   
Summing up results for the think crisis-think female perspective, it seems that perceived 
need for communal attributes is certainly used as a barometer when evaluating female 
candidates. Further research may be needed to answer the question as to whether this equally 
occurs when companies are performing poorly or well, or if the impact of need for communality 
on evaluations of female candidates is more powerful when performance is weak rather than 
strong. Perhaps a stronger manipulation of company performance would help to resolve this open 
question. Going forwards, simply providing participants with less material to review would 
likely help to increase the salience of the company performance manipulation. If participants 
were able to focus on the piece of information pertaining to company performance rather than 
needing to digest all relevant materials provided to them, then the prominence of the 
performance manipulation would potentially be increased in their minds. Additionally, the 
decline of the company could be made more compelling by showing sharper decreases in the 
graph depicting company stock value rather than showing a gradual decrease as was done here. 
Conceivably, displaying a more severe descent would convey to participants that the 
organization is in a dire situation and the leadership positions are indeed precarious.  
Second, there was little support for the think crisis-think not male explanation. Contrary 
to what was predicted, there were no significant differences with regard to ratings of position 
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riskiness, candidate value, or position recommendation based on the interaction between 
company performance and candidate gender. Additional lack of support for think crisis-think not 
male can be taken from results showing that participants not only endorsed the female candidate, 
but also evaluated her highly on all dependent variables (suitability, qualifications, and 
anticipated effectiveness). If participants were attempting to place females in these precarious 
leadership positions simply so that females rather than males would suffer the consequences 
should failure occur, then participants would likely have strongly endorsed the female candidate 
for the role without providing such high ratings of suitability, qualifications, and anticipated 
effectiveness. However, the high ratings provided for the female candidate on all measures imply 
that not only did participants endorse her for the position but they also viewed her as a 
formidable candidate.   
Notably, results provide strong corroboration for the females as signals of change idea, an 
explanation that has not received much attention in prior studies. As reported, participants were 
more likely to respond that the need for change was greater when company performance was 
decreasing versus increasing. Furthermore, candidate gender interacted with perceived need for 
change to impact endorsement ratings such that participants provided stronger endorsement 
ratings of female versus male candidates when a high degree of change was perceived to be 
needed.  
It is interesting that, according to the exploratory analyses, position riskiness strongly 
influenced evaluations of the female candidate in that greater perceived riskiness led to lower 
ratings of candidate endorsement, suitability, qualifications, and anticipated effectiveness.  There 
are a few possible alternate explanations for this result. It is plausible that participants did not 
think that the female candidate could handle a position that was perceived to be highly risky, and 
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therefore provided lower ratings. On the flip side, it is conceivable that (in direct contradiction to 
the think crisis-think not male perspective) participants were protecting the female candidate, 
and specifically did not want to place her in a risky position wherein there seemed to be a high 
likelihood of failure. The findings that participants provided lower ratings of suitability, 
qualifications, and anticipated effectiveness in addition to endorsement for the female candidate 
when greater riskiness was perceived indicate that participants did not view the female candidate 
as particularly able in this situation, suggesting seeming support for the former over the latter 
explanation. Future research is needed to further disentangle these possible explanations. A first 
step in investigating these different explanations would be to conduct a pared down version of 
the current study in which all participants receive information about a declining organization 
with an open leadership position, and half the participants review female candidate applicant 
materials while the other half review male candidate applicant materials. Participants would be 
asked to respond to questions about the riskiness of the position, the candidate’s ability to handle 
the role, and whether or not the candidate should be given the role. An open-ended component 
would be included asking, “Given the riskiness of the position, why do you think the candidate 
should or should not take on this position?”. The comments made in the open-ended section 
should begin to reveal participants’ motivations for providing lower endorsement ratings to 
females when positions are perceived to be highly risky.  
Limitations 
One possible limitation of Study 1 is that the resumes and profiles of the candidates 
positioned them as extremely competent, leading to universally high ratings with regard to 
endorsement, suitability, qualifications and anticipated effectiveness. As these candidates were 
hypothetically applying to a top leadership position in a prestigious company, it was appropriate 
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for their applicant materials to be impressive. However, as all of the dependent variables were 
negatively skewed, there were some limits in variability, potentially resulting in ceiling effects. 
Additionally, participants were presented with a large amount of material including 
information about the company, company performance, the job position, and the candidate. It is 
possible that participants did not pay attention to all of the information presented to them, or 
experienced fatigue towards the end of the online study. Responses may have been affected by 
lack of attentiveness or study weariness. Some evidence of inattentiveness and fatigue can be 
found in responses to the manipulation checks. At the end of the study, participants were asked 
whether the resume they reviewed was from a male or female candidate, and whether company 
performance has been increasing or decreasing over the past five years. Twelve participants 
incorrectly responded to the candidate gender question, and 31 participants incorrectly responded 
to the company performance question. As discussed earlier, these participants were not included 
in the main analyses reported. However, as 18.7% of total participants answered these basic 
questions regarding the information presented to them erroneously, this may indicate that the 
amount of material provided was generally overwhelming to participants which may have 
limited their ability to keep track of all the information presented to them. 
The fact that 31 individuals failed the manipulation check asking about company 
performance may suggest that this manipulation was not powerful enough. Suggestions as to 
how to increase the power of this manipulation in future research were put forth above. This 
number is surprising however, given that in a pilot test done with 100 participants, only three 
individuals answered this question incorrectly. Therefore, perhaps the previous explanation 
regarding fatigue due to the volume of materials presented more reasonably accounts for the 
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large number of individuals who wrongly answered this question than the salience of the 
manipulation. 
The particular sample used in this study was deliberately chosen for their understanding 
of the business world and familiarity with hiring processes, as described in the Method section. 
However, when hiring a senior company leader, those in power often look beyond the resume to 
take into account the business context as well as big-picture, strategic implications of the 
decision. Whether the individual’s beliefs and values are compatible with those of the other 
senior leaders and the impact of the hiring decision on the company’s reputation are examples of 
two elements that are likely to be considered by the current top leadership when hiring someone 
to join their ranks. It is possible that some of the managers who participated in the current study 
only had experience with the hiring and selection of lower level employees, rather than top 
company leaders, and therefore, did not think about the candidate endorsement decision in as 
comprehensive a manner as one would who is part of the senior leader suite. I already mentioned 
that this possible difference in mindset may have affected the way participants responded to the 
questions regarding need for the leader to possess communal attributes. However, I do not 
believe that the pattern of results regarding change would have been affected if senior managers 
participated instead of the present sample. The participants here clearly picked up on the state of 
the firm and company business needs, as they were more likely to respond that greater change 
was needed when company performance was decreasing versus increasing. Additionally, the 
linkage of females with change (and thus the higher endorsement of females over males in 
situations of decline) is a general psychological association that is expected to emerge amongst 
any individual, whether s/he is a top, mid, or low level manager. 
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It is possible that the questions utilized to assess think crisis-think not male did not 
wholly encapsulate this explanatory category. Because participants are unlikely to explicitly 
respond that they would prefer a female versus a male to fail at a position or that they are driven 
to protect males but not females from taking on precarious positions, the questions employed 
within the current study attempted to measure think crisis-think not male in a more subtle 
manner, through questions related to perceptions of candidate value, riskiness of the position, 
and whether or not participants would recommend to the candidate that s/he take on the position. 
However, perhaps the questions employed were too subtle to fully capture the concept of think 
crisis-think not male. As discussed in the literature review, think crisis-think not male could be 
driven by blatant sexism, unconscious gender stereotypes, and/or the personality traits of system 
justification and social dominance orientation. Future research should include measurements of 
these variables when studying the glass cliff effect. It is feasible that these variables would 
moderate the glass cliff effect, in that female leaders would be preferred over male leaders for 
precarious positions only by individuals who are high in sexism, who automatically endorse 
gender stereotypes, and who are high in system justification and social dominance orientation. 
Seeing how these relationships play out would provide additional insight into the think crisis-
think not male notion. 
Participants were only asked to review one candidate profile, of either a male or female. 
This procedure limits external validity, as in real-life scenarios decision-makers often sift 
through and review application materials from numerous candidates. This design was intentional 
for a number of reasons. Participants were already receiving a large amount of material to 
consider, and introducing resumes and profiles of multiple other candidates may have placed 
undue burden on participants, leading to even more inattention and fatigue. It was also thought 
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that simultaneously providing participants with resumes of one male and one female candidate 
would have caused participants to assume that a main purpose of the study was to compare 
between genders. Moreover, in an attempt to buffer this limit on external validity, participants 
were told that fifteen applicants were being considered for the available Senior Vice President of 
Marketing position, but they were only being asked to review the profile and resume of one of 
the candidates.  
While Study 1 provided insight into the underlying mechanisms of the glass cliff effect in 
a controlled, online setting, Study 2 focused on drivers of the glass cliff effect in a real-world 
environment. 
Study 2: Hypotheses 
In Study 2, I identified a matched sample of 84 male and female Fortune 500 CEOs 
appointed in the period of 1995 – 2014. I then measured the three categories of explanatory 
variables through reasons provided for the CEO appointments in published media discussing 
these events.  
I chose to study the glass cliff effect as it plays out at the CEO level rather than a senior 
management level more broadly for reasons that are theoretical as well as practical. Firstly, the 
few glass cliff studies that have focused on CEO appointment in the U.S. have produced 
somewhat conflicting results (Cook & Glass, 2014a, Cook & Glass, 2014b, Adams et al., 2009). 
Therefore, further research at the CEO level incorporating multiple measures of company 
performance is warranted. Secondly, the major objective of the current study is to content 
analyze media reports for public perceptions concerning the reasons underlying the leader 
appointment. While it is likely that media reports will include such discussions with regard to 
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CEO selection of Fortune 500 companies, it is unlikely that media reports will include such 
discussions with regard to the selection of company senior managers.    
I first attempt to document the existence of the glass cliff effect among CEOs in the U.S.  
Following Cook & Glass (2014a), I focus my comparison on the probability that women are 
more likely than men to be appointed CEO when company performance is poor. As such, I 
predict: 
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of female versus male CEOs being appointed is greater 
when performance is decreasing but not increasing.  
Think crisis – think female  
 Based on the literature reviewed above, I expect that others will perceive communal, 
feminine attributes as necessary for a leader to possess when a company is struggling, which 
should influence the greater likelihood of women rather than men being selected as CEO in such 
difficult times (think crisis-think female). This means that within news articles describing newly 
promoted CEOs, the possession of communal traits will be emphasized in reference to female 
CEOs who were appointed during time of company decline but not in reference to female CEOs 
appointed during times of company improvement or in reference to male CEOs appointed during 
times of decline or improvement. In other words, I expect that when discussing the appointment 
of a new CEO, news articles will highlight the communal attributes of female CEOs, but only 
when company performance preceding the appointment was decreasing.  
Hypothesis 2: The proportion of media reports discussing CEO possession of communal 
traits differs based on the interaction between company performance and CEO gender. 
The proportion of media reports regarding communal attributes are greater in discussions 
concerning the appointment of a female CEO to a company whose performance is 
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declining in comparison to discussions concerning the appointment of: a female CEO to a 
company whose performance is improving, a male CEO to a company whose 
performance is declining, and a male CEO to a company whose performance is 
improving.  
Think crisis – think not male  
If the think crisis-think not male perspective holds true, then females are more likely to 
be exposed to riskier roles because they are considered to be more expendable in comparison to 
males. However, the perceived risk is likely to be greater for males versus females appointed to 
companies in decline. Ashby et al. (2007) showed that participants tended to view a high-risk 
legal case as significantly riskier than a low-risk case for males. Yet, for females, participants 
tended to perceive the level of risk to be similar across the high- and low-risk cases. Based on 
think crisis-think not male, precarious positions are perceived to be more high-risk for males but 
not females because there is greater value placed on the careers of males over females. Males are 
consequently viewed as having more to lose than females should failure occur. Therefore, the 
proportion of media reports concerning the position riskiness should be greater when discussing 
the appointment of a male as compared to a female CEO under conditions of poor organizational 
performance, as well as when discussing the appointment of a male CEO under conditions of 
weak versus strong organizational performance.  
Hypothesis 3: The proportion of media reports discussing position riskiness differs based 
on the interaction between company performance and CEO gender. Company 
performance affects the proportion of media reports regarding position riskiness more 
strongly for male versus female CEOs. Under conditions of declining as compared to 
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improving performance, there is a greater proportion of position riskiness codes for male, 
but not female, CEOs. 
Similarly, if think crisis-think not male is a driving mechanism of the glass cliff effect, 
then there should be greater apprehension surrounding a male becoming CEO of a poorly 
performing organization in terms of possible harm to his career as compared to any other 
condition. That is, media reports should be more likely to question this career move or express 
uncertainty as to whether or not the individual should have accepted such a precarious role when 
discussing the appointment of male CEOs under conditions of declining performance versus 
female CEOs under conditions of declining performance, as well as female and male CEOs 
under conditions of improving performance.  
Hypothesis 4: The proportion of media reports discussing apprehension surrounding the 
position differs based on the interaction between company performance and CEO gender. 
The proportion of media reports regarding apprehension surrounding the position is 
greater in discussions concerning the appointment of a male CEO to a company whose 
performance is declining in comparison to discussions concerning the appointment of: a 
male CEO to a company whose performance is improving, a female CEO to a company 
whose performance is declining, and a female CEO to a company whose performance is 
improving.  
Females as Signals of Change  
As indicated by the females as signals of change perspective, a company’s desire to make 
a change when performance is suffering should influence the selection of a female rather than a 
male leader under those circumstances. As a result, it is more likely that media accounts will 
report on the company attempting to make a change as explanation for the promotion of a female 
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into a CEO position of a company whose performance has been weak, rather than as explanation 
for the promotion of a female CEO of a company whose performance has been strong, or the 
promotion of a male CEO of a company whose performance has been weak or strong.  
Hypothesis 5: The proportion of media reports discussing organizational desire for 
change differs based on the interaction between company performance and CEO gender. 
The proportion of media reports regarding organizational desire for change is greater in 
discussions concerning the appointment of a female as compared to a male CEO to a 
company whose performance is declining, but not improving.  
 Though organizational change can come in various forms, there has been no mention in 
the literature about differential effects for specific types of change. The concept of appointing a 
female to a struggling organization as a way to promote change broadly suggests that it is just 
change in general that should matter. However, it seems important to test different types of 
change in addition to overall change in order to get a more detailed picture of these relationships.  
Hypothesis 6: The occurrence of media reports regarding organizational desire for a) 
financial, b) leadership, c) company image, and d) and culture change differs based on 
the interaction between company performance and CEO gender. Media reports regarding 
each type of change are more likely to occur in discussions concerning the appointment 
of a female as compared to a male CEO to a company experiencing declining, but not 
improving, performance.  
Research Question 
 Lastly, I explore the strength of each perspective in explaining the overall preference for 
female candidates in cases of weak organizational performance. As with Study 1, I pose a 
research question here rather than proposing formal hypotheses because the question of which 
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perspective most strongly explains the tendency to select women for precarious leadership roles 
has not been previously addressed. Therefore, I ask: which perspective will receive the strongest 
support when looking at the interactions between company performance and CEO gender on the 
proportions of the various media reports? 
Method 
Data and Procedure 
I compiled a dataset of 84 Fortune 500 male and female CEOs in office in the 1995 – 
2014 time period. The list of CEOs included in this study can be found in Appendix H. 
Following Cook and Glass (2014a, 2014b) I first created a list of all Fortune 500 companies from 
1995 – 2014 using the CNN money website (money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500). I 
gathered relevant information such as CEO name, gender, and date of appointment from 
company websites, as well as other related sources, such as the websites for Businessweek and 
Forbes. I then assembled a list of all females who acted as CEOs in the 19 year period, using the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) government website as well as 
Catalyst.com. Lastly, I constructed a corresponding sample of males appointed to CEO positions. 
The sample was matched based on company size, operationalized as 2014 revenue and industry 
(using the four digit SIC code). The initial sample was comprised of 100 CEOs (50 male and 50 
female). However, I was unable to locate media articles for eight CEOs, and therefore had to 
exclude those CEOs as well as their matches from the overall sample.  
I next obtained information about company performance preceding the CEO 
appointment. Performance was measured by shareholder returns, return on equity (ROE), return 
on assets (ROA), and the spread between return on invested capital (ROIC) and the weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC). Though the studies of U.S. CEOs using stock-based measures 
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to assess performance did not yield results in support of the glass cliff effect (e.g. Adams et al., 
2009), I still calculated shareholder return as one measure of performance since prior research 
has recommended including both market- and accounting-based operationalizations of 
performance (e.g. Cook & Glass, 2014a; Haslam et al., 2010). Additionally, if results show that 
shareholder return does not relate to gender of CEO selected while accounting-based measures 
do, this will provide further substantiation that among U.S. samples the glass cliff effect only 
plays out when objective measures of firm performance are considered. With regard to the 
accounting-based measures, while previous studies have only looked at ROA and ROE as 
accounting-based performance measures, I analyzed the spread between ROIC and WACC as 
well. ROIC is considered a very accurate measure of company performance because it is not 
impacted by non-operating items (as is ROA) or the company’s capital structure (as is ROE). As 
ROIC signifies how efficiently a company is employing its capital, looking at ROIC compared to 
WACC, which represents the minimum return on capital that a company must earn for its 
stakeholders, yields an estimate of how value is either being created or destroyed for its 
stakeholders. I collected these financial measures through the CRSP (Center for Research in 
Security Prices), EDGAR Online, and Compustat databases. 
In exploring the three categories of possible explanations for the glass cliff effect, I 
identified news articles discussing the CEO appointment. I searched for articles on the 
appointment of each CEO in my sample using Factiva and ABI-Inform databases, as well as 
Google News. I searched within key national publications, such as The New York Times, 
Financial Times, Reuters, Fortune, The Wall Street Journal, Fortune, Forbes, Business Week, 
and USA Today. My search additionally included major regional publications, such as New York 
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Post, and The Washington Post. Lastly, I included major trade journals (e.g. just-food) in my 
search as well. For each CEO, I collected anywhere between 2 and 160 articles.    
The media both reflects common public beliefs, and legitimizes those beliefs through 
transmitting and emphasizing particular information (Dixon-Fowler, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 2013; 
Lee & James, 2007). The objective of this selection process was to garner a comprehensive and 
reliable portrayal of public perceptions concerning the reasons for the CEO appointment. To this 
aim, I restricted the inclusion of media sources to those that are generally considered to maintain 
reporting integrity (Lee & James, 2007). The array of trusted and credible media outlets that I 
detailed above should provide a faithful representation of broader societal perceptions. I content-
analyzed the news sources and coded for each of the three categories of explanations. Analyzing 
how frequently these categories of explanations emerge in the media should serve as a proxy for 
organizational motives in promoting male or female CEOs to companies experiencing either 
declining or improving performance. I examined repetitive patterns of information in media 
outlets that are credible and widely circulated. That these repetitive and consistent patterns were 
regularly generated by multiple media establishments provide a stronger case that the media 
content reflects some underlying organizational reality (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996).  
Coding Procedures and Categories 
 According to Smith (2000), the content analysis process involves defining certain units. 
Those definitions then provide guidelines for breaking down and analyzing the relevant material. 
The text unit (called the sampling unit elsewhere; Krippendorf, 2004) is the body of material 
gathered to be included in the analysis. In the current study, each news article represents one text 
unit. The coding, or recording, unit is defined as the specific part of text that is categorized. The 
coding unit can be the entire text unit, or it can be broken down into smaller components, such as 
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a sentence, a descriptive phrase, or a paragraph (Krippendorf, 2004; Smith, 2000). Smith (2000) 
explains that rather than being syntactic, the coding units can be thematic. In this case, the 
researcher identifies the coding unit as the articulation of a certain idea or an assertion 
concerning a particular topic (which may be communicated in one sentence, several sentences, a 
paragraph, etc.). In the current study, the use of themes as the coding unit, rather than 
specification of a linguistic unit, provides a more accurate analysis of the data. The classification 
categories are defined as the variables that are being measured. Below, specific variables are 
described that act as classification categories, and represent each possible explanation previously 
discussed for the glass cliff effect (think crisis-think female, think crisis- think not male, females 
as signals of change). 
Four industrial/organizational psychology Masters students were recruited as coders. 
Each media article was coded by two raters, blind to the hypotheses.⁵ An explicit, detailed 
coding book, developed for this study was used to train the coders. The codebook outlined rules 
and guidelines, defined relevant variables, and provided illustrative examples (Adam, Berkel, 
Firmstone, Gray, Koopmans, Pfetsch, & Statham, 2002; Di Gregorio, Price, Saunders, & 
Brockhaus, 2013; Kolt, 1996). The codebook can be found in Appendix I. I met with coders for 
an initial orientation meeting in which we reviewed the codebook, the spreadsheet containing the 
media articles for each CEO, and the spreadsheet format they would use to record their coding. 
During the initial meeting, the coders practiced coding several articles. They coded each article 
by themselves, and then we regrouped to discuss the codes that they had assigned. As 
recommended by Hruschka et al. (2004), following the first meeting, the coders coded a small 
subset of the articles. We then met to discuss this coding subsection, clarify any ambiguity in the 
coding variables, and resolve any discrepancies. I met with the coders several times over the 
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coding process, in order to assess progress, continue to refine coding guidelines as well as coding 
variables, and discuss outstanding issues. Aside from these meetings, I periodically emailed my 
coders to check in, reviewed and provided feedback on their coding spreadsheets, and 
encouraged them to reach out should they have any difficulties or concerns. As there were a 
large number of codes and a great deal of text to be coded, it was not feasible to negotiate each 
coding discrepancy until agreement was reached between coders. Therefore when a coding 
discrepancy was not resolved during our meetings, I made the final decision as to whether the 
code should be included. 
To assess agreement and interrater reliability, I calculated percent agreement as well as 
Cohen’s Kappa (Cohen, 1960) between each pair of raters. To do so, I randomly selected five 
articles from each of 10 CEOs that had been coded by a coder pair and input the codes into 
SPSS, with a column representing each rater’s coding. This yielded roughly 1400 variable points. 
For coders 1 and 2, percent agreement was 93% and kappa was .62, indicating substantial 
agreement (Viera & Garrett, 2005). Percent agreement between coders 1 and 3 was 92%, with a 
kappa demonstrating substantial agreement at .61 (Viera & Garrett, 2005). Coders 2 and 3 had a 
percent agreement of 92% and a kappa of .55, indicating moderate agreement (Viera & Garrett, 
2005). There was 92% agreement between coders 2 and 4, with a kappa of .52, showing 
moderate agreement (Viera & Garrett, 2005). Lastly, coders 3 and 4 demonstrated 91% 
agreement, with a kappa of .56 indicating moderate agreement (Viera & Garrett, 2005).6  
Measures 
In testing the existence of the glass cliff effect, the dependent variable was gender of the 
appointed CEO, with females coded as 1 and males coded as 0. I measured company 
performance using several different indicators. I utilized ROA, ROE, and the spread between 
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ROIC and WACC as the accounting-based measures, and shareholder return as the market-based 
measure. I computed ROA, ROE, and the spread between ROIC and WACC based on the 
financial data gathered from Compustat and Edgar Online. To calculate ROA, I divided net 
income by total assets. To calculate ROE, I divided net income by total equity. To calculate 
ROIC, I divided net operating profit after tax by invested capital in core business operations. 
WACC was calculated by multiplying the percentage of financing that is equity by the cost of 
equity and the percent of financing that is debt by the cost of debt. This numbers were added 
together and then multiplied by the corporate tax rate subtracted from 1. I then computed the 
difference between ROIC and WACC as the performance measure. Finally, I evaluated 
shareholder return using stock price and dividend data from the CRSP database. To calculate 
shareholder return, I first subtracted the previous year’s from the current year’s stock price.  
Next, I added the dividends from the previous year. To finish, I divided the sum of these 
numbers by the stock price from the previous year. I calculated all performance measures for 
four years, three years, two years, and one year prior to the CEO appointment, as well as for the 
year of the appointment.  
When looking at company performance prior to CEO appointment, I chose to examine 
each performance measure in four different ways: 1) the difference in performance from 4 years 
prior to the CEO appointment to 1 year prior to the appointment, 2) the difference in 
performance from 4 years prior to the CEO appointment to the year of the appointment, 3) the 
difference in performance from 3 years prior to the CEO appointment to 1 year prior to the 
appointment, and 4) the difference in performance from 3 years prior to the appointment to the 
year of the appointment. I chose to look at the difference in performance from three and four 
years prior to the selection to the year before and the year of the selection, because it seemed that 
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looking at a window of a few years (rather than simply a year or two) with regard to previous 
performance would give a better, broader overview of the state of the company leading up to the 
CEO nomination.  
In analyzing the glass cliff effect, performance data was determined in two ways. The 
first was through a dichotomization of the data, in which each company was coded as having 
decreasing (coded as 0) or increasing (coded as 1) performance prior to the CEO appointment. 
This involved subtracting the earlier year’s performance (i.e. four and three years prior to the 
appointment, respectively) from the later year’s performance (i.e. one year prior to and the year 
of the appointment, respectively). A negative number indicated decreasing performance and a 
positive number indicated increasing performance. The second was as a continuous variable on a 
percentage basis, in order to understand the relative increase or decrease in performance in a way 
that would allow for comparisons across companies. Percentages were calculated by subtracting 
the earlier year’s performance from the later year’s performance, and then dividing by the earlier 
year’s performance (e.g. (year four prior to the appointment – year of the appointment)/year four 
prior to the appointment), with negative numbers indicating declining performance and positive 
numbers indicating improving performance.  
In certain cases, the company performance numbers for the earlier and later years were 
identical and the difference between them was zero. At these times, dichotomous performance 
data for the company were not included (as the company could not be categorized as increasing 
or decreasing), but continuous performance data were included. In other instances, performance 
data were not available for the earlier year (four or three years prior to the CEO appointment), 
but were available for the later year (one year prior to or the year of the appointment). In these 
instances, I computed dichotomous performance data by taking the sign of the later year’s 
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performance, with a negative number indicating decreasing performance and a positive number 
indicating increasing performance. However, continuous performance data were not included in 
these situations, as I could not calculate continuous performance measures when information 
regarding performance for one of the years was missing. Therefore, the total numbers for the 
dichotomous and continuous performance measures did not always perfectly align.   
Communal attributes. With regard to think crisis-think female, coders were given an 
inclusive list, provided in the codebook (Appendix I), of communal attributes. To create this list, 
I first compiled all of the communal attributes studied in prior glass cliff research (Bruckmuller 
& Branscombe, 2010; Rink et al., 2013; Ryan et al., 2011). I then supplemented this list by 
adding attributes included in other articles that provide in-depth accounts of communal and 
agentic attributes (e.g. Eagly & Karau, 2002; Eagly et al., 1992; Koenig et al., 2011). Lastly, I 
used a thesaurus to come up with a number of synonyms of the attributes already compiled. 
Coders were instructed to record all instances in which these attributes were mentioned in 
reference to the CEO. Though this measure is not as direct as recording a specific mention of 
these attributes as the reason for the CEO appointment, it is possible that, due to a sense of 
political and/or social correctness, a news articles would not state outright that a female CEO 
was selected because she has certain feminine traits. However, a female CEO may still be 
alluded to in feminine terms, with the suggestion that these traits impacted the selection decision. 
An example in which communal attributes were directly mentioned as part of the reason that the 
CEO was hired can be found in a 2013 Dow Jones Newswires article discussing the appointment 
of Lauralee Martin to HCP in 2013. The article states, “Mr. McKee said the board realized it had 
lost confidence in Mr. Flaherty's leadership and style over a number of months and said Ms. 
Martin, who has been a director for five years, "checked all the boxes" the board was looking for 
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in a leader, particularly in regards to her relationship-building skills” (Tadena, 2013). Another 
example in which communal attributes are stressed but not directly mentioned as the reason for 
the appointment can be found in an article from The Wall Street Journal concerning the 2014 
appointment of Satya Nadella to Microsoft, stating, “But people who have worked with Mr. 
Nadella say his greatest asset is an affable, collaborative style that stands out at a company 
known for big egos and heated arguments” (Clark, Langley, & Ovide, 2014). These examples 
refer to relationship-building skills and collaboration, qualities which can be classified as 
communal attributes.   
Coders coded for each time communal attributes were referenced in each article, whether 
they were mentioned in conjunction with the CEO’s qualities, traits, skills, or abilities. For each 
CEO, I calculated a ratio of the number of comments counted as communal attributes across all 
articles written about that CEO by the total word count across articles. Calculating a ratio helped 
prevent measurement issues that would have arose if raw counts were used given that some 
CEOs simply received more press than the others. This ratio served as the outcome variable in 
Hypothesis 2.  
Position riskiness. One measure of think crisis-think not male is position riskiness. 
When discussing the CEO selection, a news article may highlight the riskiness of a CEO position 
by emphasizing the challenges involved or describing the role as unsecure and untenable. For 
example, a Star Tribune article discussing the appointment of Hubert Joly as the CEO of Best 
Buy stated that, “Best Buy CEO-in-waiting Hubert Joly is about to take center stage in the most 
challenging performance of his professional life” (Phelps, 2012). A Times Colonist article added 
to this in writing, “The clock is ticking on this one. He doesn't have the liberty of taking time to 
get to know the business model intimately, said Stacey Widlitz, president of consulting firm SW 
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Retail Advisors, referring to Joly. ‘Investors are impatient, and the last thing you want to do is 
make vendors impatient.’” These examples underline the risk, uncertainty, and challenge 
perceived to be part of this role for Joly.  
Coders recorded any descriptions in the media in which the CEO position was described 
as risky. Ratios were computed as the number of codes accounting for position riskiness across 
articles per CEO divided by the total word count across articles for each CEO. This ratio was 
tested as the outcome variable in Hypothesis 3. The codebook provides a detailed account of 
what is encompassed within the position riskiness variable (see Appendix I).   
Apprehension. A second measure of think crisis-think not male is position apprehension, 
which refers to apprehension surrounding the possible career implications of accepting the CEO 
position. As described in the codebook (Appendix I), coders kept track of all statements referring 
to the possible negative impact that accepting this position may have on the individual’s career. 
An example of this code can be found in an article written about Marissa Mayer’s 2012 
appointment to Yahoo!. O’Dell (2012) wrote, “As we published news of Mayer’s move, we were 
bombarded with criticisms of her decision. The Internet in general lambasted the executive’s 
choice, claiming that Yahoo was an inferior company and Mayer was making a fool’s bargain to 
choose Yahoo over Google.” This comment emphasizes the public perception that it was not a 
good career move on the part of Mayer to move from Google and take on the CEO role at 
Yahoo!. A second example came from USA Today when discussing the promotion of Patricia 
Russo to CEO of Lucent. "This is a make-or-break job," wrote Backover (2002), "If you take on 
this task and the market continues to deteriorate or Lucent continues to flounder, you will be left 
without significant employability." This statement accentuates the possible negative career 
implications involved with taking on this CEO position.  
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The ratio of coded comments regarding position apprehension divided by the total article 
word count for each CEO served as the outcome variable in Hypothesis 4.  
Need for change. To evaluate females as signals of change, coders noted any content 
regarding the company’s desire to promote change. For example, an article in The New York 
Times discussing Carol Bartz’s promotion to CEO of Yahoo! stated, “With the appointment of 
Ms. Bartz, the board appears to be signaling that Yahoo may finally undergo the kind of drastic 
change that many investors have been clamoring for” (Helft, 2009). 
Coder instructions for coding this variable can be found in Appendix I. As with the other 
variables, a ratio was calculated with number of codes representing desire for change as the 
numerator and total word count across articles as the denominator. This ratio was analyzed as the 
outcome variable in Hypothesis 5.  
In instances in which a change code was recorded, coders were additionally asked to code 
for type of change. The change categories included were financial change, leadership change, 
internal culture change, and company image change. An example in which financial change was 
underscored in the media is as follows. In reference to the appointment of Claire Brabowski to 
CEO at Radioshack, a 2006 USA Today article wrote, “For now, it will be Babrowski's job to 
lead a turnaround that begins with closing 400 to 700 stores and two distribution centers as part 
of a campaign to fix its financial performance”.  
With regard to leadership change, a direct example comes from a report in Dow Jones 
Newswires regarding the appointment of Lauralee Martin to HCP and stating that, “HCP Inc. 
(HCP) fired James Flaherty as its chief executive and chairman after a decade at the helm of the 
real-estate investment trust, pointing to a loss in confidence in his leadership style amid a slew of 
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executive turnover” (Tadena, 2013). Tadena (2013) continued to declare, “This is not about a 
new direction or a new strategy, but it's about leadership.”   
An example in which company image change was pronounced came from an article in 
The Motley Fool discussing the promotion of Lynn Good to Duke Energy in which Polson 
(2013) stated, “CEO's are more than a strategic brain or salary drain. They are a symbol of a 
company and, in this case, Rogers' departure is a necessary step to separate controversial history 
from future frontiers. As an inside woman, Good knows the ins and outs of the company. But she 
also provides a new face to turn regulatory foes into friends, a much-needed makeover for Duke 
Energy stock.” 
Lastly, an example representing company culture change can be found in a Reuters article 
about the hiring of Carly Fiorina to Hewlett-Packard in 1999. Orr (1999) made a direct link 
between the CEO appointment and culture change by asserting, “Hewlett-Packard Co. Monday 
named Carly Fiorina, a top executive from Lucent Technologies Inc., as its new president and 
chief executive officer in a clear signal it wants to shake up its conservative corporate culture.” 
The occurrence of each type of change code was recorded to be used as dependent 
variables in Hypotheses 6a-d.  
Control variables. Following previous research (Cook & Glass, 2014a), I collected 
information about company revenue in billions, whether the CEO was an internal or external 
hire, percentage of female executives in the industry (Catalyst, 2013), and the year that the CEO 
was appointed as potential control variables in tests of the glass cliff effect.  
I coded for whether the article was a press release. While articles written by journalists 
are likely to represent public perceptions, press releases may convey information in order to 
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influence public perceptions to some degree. I additionally collected data on the gender of the 
journalists in order to examine if journalist gender influences the results.  
Exploratory measures. 
CEO ethnicity. Ethnicity of the appointed CEOs was coded as well. It is possible that 
minority group members are also preferred over  majority group members (i.e. White 
individuals) when company performance is declining. As discussed earlier, the females as signals 
of change idea posits that females are promoted to precarious positions because struggling 
organizations may wish to make and convey change, and females represent that change. Because 
minority individuals would likely represent change as well, company performance may 
additionally influence the probability of minority CEO appointment.    
Agentic attributes. Coders were also asked to record all instances in which agentic 
attributes were mentioned in reference to the CEO. Coders were provided with a thorough list of 
agentic attributes through the codebook, found in Appendix I. As with the list of communal 
attributes, this list was generated based on agentic attributes utilized in previous glass cliff 
research studies (Bruckmuller & Branscombe, 2010; Rink et al., 2013; Ryan et al., 2011) as well 
as agentic attributes provided in other research articles focused on communal and agentic 
attributes (e.g. Eagly & Karau, 2002; Eagly et al., 1992; Koenig et al., 2011). 
While I do not posit any hypotheses that involve agentic attributes, I included coding of 
this variable so that it could be examined in an exploratory fashion. Specifically, it is interesting 
to investigate whether there is an equal emphasis on agentic attributes for male CEOs when 
organizational performance is declining and improving. It is possible that agentic attributes will 
be perceived as less relevant when discussing the appointment of a CEO to an organization 
whose performance is weak rather than strong. On the other hand, it is possible that agentic 
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attributes will receive equal emphasis in both situations of performance improvement and 
decline, and it is only perceptions of communal attribute relevance that will be affected by 
company performance.  
As with communal attributes, a ratio of the number of comments coded as agentic 
attributes was divided by the total word count across articles for each CEO.  
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Means and correlations of study and control variables are shown in Tables 4 and 5. The 
proportion data were not normally distributed, with skewness and kurtosis out of the bounds of 
acceptable normality (as is typical of proportion data). As all of the proportion variables 
contained a considerable number of data points that were zero and the proportions themselves 
were very low numbers (e.g. all below .006), each variable was extremely positively skewed. 
Therefore, the data was transformed used square root transformations, a commonly 
recommended method of normalizing proportion data under .20 (Horsley, 2007; Parsad, 2004). 
Following the transformations, the majority of the proportion variables demonstrated acceptable 
ranges of skewness (-1 to +1) and kurtosis (-3 to +3).  
However, the variables representing the sub-categories of change still exhibited skewness 
and kurtosis that were not within the acceptable limits. In examining the data for these variables 
more closely it became clear that there were fewer than 25 non-zero data points for each sub-
category of change (out of the sample of 84), indicating that these codes had not been assigned 
very frequently. Because of the rarity with which these codes had been used, it seemed logical to 
compute these variables as binary (0 = no codes entered for this variable, 1 = codes entered for 
this variable) as the meaningfulness of these variables lay in whether or not a code had been 
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recorded.  In analyses going forward, I use the transformed proportion data as my dependent 
variables in all cases except for the different categories of change variables, which I treat as 
binary.   
Tests of Hypotheses  
I tested Hypothesis 1, the association between company performance and CEO gender, 
using 16 chi-square analyses. The independent variables were the gender of the CEO and 
whether the company was declining or improving for a given performance variable. The 
performance variables were ROA, ROE, ROIC-WACC, and shareholder return, each examined 
in four different ways: 1) the difference in performance from 4 years prior to the CEO 
appointment to 1 year prior to the appointment, 2) the difference in performance from 4 years 
prior to the CEO appointment to the year of the appointment, 3) the difference in performance 
from 3 years prior to the CEO appointment to 1 year prior to the appointment, and 4) the 
difference in performance from 3 years prior to the appointment to the year of the appointment. 
As indicated in the method, whether performance was declining or improving was determined 
based on the sign of the difference score. The frequency variables were the number of CEOs that 
fell into each of the four cells (male/improving, male/declining, female/improving, 
female/declining). None of the chi-square analyses were significant (Table 6).  
As company performance was also measured continuously, I performed 16 separate 
binary logistic regression analyses with the relative change in performance in percentages as the 
independent variable and CEO gender as the dependent variable. Company revenue in billions, 
whether the CEO was an internal or external hire, percentage of female executives in the 
industry, and year CEO was appointed (dummy coded) were included as control variables. CEO 
gender was significantly impacted by the relative change in shareholder return from four years to 
 UNDERSTANDING THE GLASS CLIFF   104 
 
one year prior to the CEO appointment (B = -.28, Exp(B) = .76, p < .05). Consistent with 
Hypothesis 1, the negative relationship indicates that as relative shareholder return decreased, 
females were more likely to be promoted to CEO positions. The remaining regression results 
were not significant, in line with the chi-square analyses. All results are displayed in Tables 7-10. 
Therefore, partial support was found for Hypothesis 1. 7 
Hypotheses 2 –5predicted that CEO gender and company performance would interact to 
affect each of the dependent variables: proportion of media reports discussing communal 
attributes, position riskiness, apprehension surrounding the position, and organizational desire 
for change. A series of 2 (company performance leading up to CEO appointment: decreasing vs. 
increasing) × 2 (CEO gender: male vs. female) ANCOVAs were conducted. Because company 
performance was operationalized in 16 ways, this analysis was conducted 16 times for each 
dependent variable using each different metric to calculate the company performance variable. 
The proportion of media articles written by males, the proportion of media articles written by 
females8, and the proportion of articles that were press releases were included as covariates. I 
additionally conducted a series of 16 hierarchical moderated regression analyses to test the 
interaction of CEO gender with each of the continuous measures of performance. I centered the 
continuous measures, and created product terms of CEO gender with each of the 16 metrics of 
company performance. For each analysis, control variables were entered in Block 1, CEO gender 
and company performance measures were entered in Block 2, and the product term was entered 
in Block 3. 
According to Hypothesis 2, the proportion of media reports regarding communal 
attributes would be greater when discussing the appointment of a female CEO to a declining 
company in comparison to all other conditions. None of the 16 ANCOVAs testing the 
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interactions between CEO gender and company performance were significant (see Tables 11-14). 
One of the hierarchical moderated regression analyses was significant, in that CEO gender 
interacted with the relative change in shareholder return from three years prior to and the year of 
the CEO appointment to affect the proportion of communal attributes (B = .001, β = .31, p < .05). 
As these regression analyses were performed on transformed data, the significant interactions 
were graphed by squaring the calculated regression equations to back-transform the plotted 
points (“Transformations to achieve linearity”, n.d.). Multiple data points were calculated in 
order to examine the graphical curves across the range of relative performance incline and 
decline. As shown in Figure 19, the curve for male CEOs is relatively flat across the range of 
performance increase and decrease. The curve for female CEOs is steeper than the male CEO 
curve when performance decreases, indicating that the proportion of communal attribute codes 
increased at a faster rate for female versus male CEOs with decreasing performance. However, 
unexpectedly, this pattern was even more pronounced when performance was increasing, leading 
to a greater proportion of communal attribute codes for female CEOs when performance was 
increasing as compared to all other situations. Thus, this significant interaction did not provide 
evidence for Hypothesis 2.  
The rest of the hierarchical moderated regression analyses looking at the proportion of 
communal attributes as the dependent variable were not significant. Regression results are shown 
in Tables 15-18. Overall, results did not support Hypothesis 2.   
Hypothesis 3 stated that the proportion of media reports discussing riskiness of the 
position would be greater in discussions of CEOs being appointed to poorly versus strongly 
performing organizations for male, but not female, CEOs. The ANCOVA testing the interaction 
effect of CEO gender and the difference in ROE between three years prior to and the year of the 
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CEO appointment on the proportion of media reports discussing riskiness was significant, F (1, 
72) = 5.17, p <.05. In line with expectations, the proportion of media reports regarding positon 
riskiness codes was greater for male CEO appointees when performance was down versus up 
(Figure 20). The opposite pattern was found for female CEO appointees. Further, the proportion 
of position riskiness codes was greater for male as compared to female CEOs when performance 
was down. None of the other ANCOVA analyses were significant, as shown in Tables 19-22.  
The regression analyses (Tables 23-26) produced one significant result. In agreement 
with the ANCOVA results, CEO gender significantly interacted with the change in ROE between 
three years prior to and the year of the CEO appointment (B = .004, β = -.62, p < .05) to affect 
proportion of position riskiness codes. Figure 21 demonstrates a nearly flat line for female CEOs, 
indicating almost no effect of performance on position riskiness codes for female CEOs. The 
curve is steeper for male CEOs as performance is decreasing as well as increasing, suggesting a 
stronger impact of performance on position riskiness codes for male as compared to female CEO 
appointees. Specifically, in accordance with the hypothesis, the proportion of position riskiness 
codes is greater for male, but not female, CEOs appointed to organizations experiencing 
decreasing relative to increasing performance. Taken together, these results provide some 
support for Hypothesis 3.  
Hypothesis 4 proposed that the proportion of media reports discussing apprehension 
surrounding the position would be greater when discussing the appointment of male CEOs to 
declining firms in comparison to all other conditions. ANCOVA results showed that the 
proportion of media reports discussing apprehension was not significantly affected by the 
interaction of CEO gender with any of the company performance measures (Tables 27-30). 
Consistent with these findings, none of the regression analyses testing the interactions between 
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CEO gender and the continuous measures of performance on proportion of apprehension codes 
were significant, as shown in Tables 31-34. Thus, no support was provided for Hypothesis 4.  
Hypothesis 5 purported that the proportion of media reports regarding organizational 
desire for change would be greater when talking about female versus male CEOs appointed to 
companies performing poorly, but not to companies performing well. According to the 
ANCOVA analyses, CEO gender interacted with the difference in ROE from four years prior to 
and the year of the CEO appointment to affect the proportion of media reports concerning 
general organizational desire for change (F (1, 72) = 5.07, p <.05). In accordance with 
predictions, the proportion of media reports regarding change was greater in discussions of 
female, relative to male, CEOs appointed to organizations with decreasing, but not increasing, 
performance (Figure 22). None of the results from the other ANCOVA analyses were significant. 
All ANCOVA results are displayed in Tables 35-38. 
The regression analyses demonstrated several significant findings (Tables 39-42). CEO 
gender significantly interacted with the relative change in ROA from four years prior to and the 
year of the CEO appointment (B = -.01, β = -.47, p < .05) and the relative change in ROE from 
four years prior to and the year of the CEO appointment (B = -.01, β = -.41, p < .05) to affect the 
proportion of change codes in similar ways. The interactions are displayed in Figures 23 and 24 
respectively. Both figures reveal a downward curve for male CEOs and a steadily increasing line 
for female CEOs as performance decreased. As such, the proportion of change codes is greater 
for female as compared to male CEOs when performance is decreasing, but not increasing. 
Therefore, these significant results provide evidence for Hypothesis 5.  
Additional evidence for Hypothesis 5 was provided by the significant interaction of CEO 
gender and relative change in ROE from three years prior to and the year of the CEO 
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appointment (B = -.01, β = -.41, p < .05) on the proportion of general change codes. Figure 25 
exhibits a downward curve for male CEOs and a slight upward curve for female CEOs as 
performance decreases. As expected, the proportion of general change codes is shown to be 
greater for female than male CEOs as performance decreases, but not as performance increases.    
Lastly, the proportion of change codes was significantly impacted by the interaction of 
CEO gender and relative change in ROIC-WACC from three years prior to and the year of the 
CEO appointment, B = -.002, β = -.53, p < .05). This interaction (presented in Figure 26) 
demonstrates a downward curve for male CEOs and a steep upward curve for female CEOs as 
performance decreases. Consistent with predictions, this pattern results in a greater proportion of 
change codes for female relative to male CEOs when performance is declining, but not when it is 
improving. As group, the significant findings regarding general change codes provide strong 
support for Hypothesis 5.  
To further tease apart any effects on media reports regarding change, Hypotheses 6a-d 
specified different types of change, which were each tested separately. Hypotheses 6a-d 
predicted that media reports regarding organizational desire for financial change (H6a), 
leadership change (H6b), company image change (H6c), and culture change (H6d) would be 
more likely to occur in discussions of the appointment of female versus male CEOs to struggling 
organizations. As the sub-categories of change variables were binary, logistic regression analyses 
were conducted. Because there were 16 dichotomous performance metrics and 16 continuous 
performance metrics, 32 different binary logistic regression analyses were performed with each 
of the change categories as separate dependent variables. Each analysis respectively tested the 
interaction between CEO gender and each of the dichotomous and continuous performance 
measures on the likelihood of the occurrence of codes for each sub-type of change.  
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The coefficients provided by logistic regression analyses are log-odds. Therefore, to plot 
the significant interaction effects, the calculated regression analyses were transformed in order to 
interpret the likelihood of each dependent variable based on the interaction of CEO gender and 
each performance indicator (Burns & Burns, 2008; Jaccard, 2001; Newsom, 2015; Osbourne, 
2012; “Deciphering interactions in logistic regression”, n.d.). Each regression equation was 
computed using the following formula: y = (exp(β0 + β1*x1+ β2*x2 + β3*x1*x2))/(1 + exp(β0 
+ β1*x1+ β2*x2 + β3*x1*x2)). 
Some support was found for Hypotheses 6a-d. With regard to Hypothesis 6a, several of 
the logistic regression analyses examining the interaction effects of CEO gender and 
dichotomized company performance on financial change were significant. CEO gender 
respectively interacted with the difference in: ROA between four year prior to and the year of the 
CEO appointment (B = -2.36, Exp(B) = .10, p < .05), ROA between three years and one year 
prior to the CEO appointment (B = -2.77, Exp(B) = .06, p < .05), ROE between three years and 
one year prior to the CEO appointment (B = -2.79, Exp(B) = .06, p < .05), and ROE between 
three years prior to and the year of the CEO appointment (B = -2.67, Exp(B) = .07, p < .05) to 
significantly impact the likelihood of financial change codes. (See Tables 43-46 for the full 
logistic regression results testing the interactions of CEO gender and dichotomized performance 
measures on the likelihood of financial change codes occurring.) 
With regard to the logistic regression analyses testing the interactions of CEO gender 
with each of the continuous measures of performance (shown in Tables 47-50), one significant 
result was found. The interaction of CEO gender and the relative change in ROIC-WACC 
between three years prior to and the year of the CEO appointment affected the likelihood of the 
occurrence of financial change codes (B = -.56, Exp(B) = .57, p < .05).  All of these significant 
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interactions demonstrate a similar pattern of results (Figures 27-31).  As predicted, there was a 
greater likelihood of financial change codes occurring within media discussions of female as 
compared to male CEOs who were appointed to companies with decreasing performance. With 
regard to the significant ANCOVA results,, the likelihood of financial change code occurrence 
was similar in discussions of male and female CEOs when performance was increasing. With 
regard to the interaction of CEO gender with relative change in ROIC-WACC between three 
years prior to and the year of the appointment, the likelihood of financial change code occurrence 
was noticeably greater for male versus female CEOs when performance was increasing.  
When CEO gender was crossed with each of the dichotomized versions of performance 
to examine the effects on leadership change codes (Hypothesis 6b), results show that CEO 
gender interacted with change in ROE between three years and one year prior to the CEO 
appointment to significantly influence the occurrence of leadership change codes (B = -2.47, 
Exp(B) = .09, p < .05). Figure 32 demonstrates that when company performance was decreasing 
but not increasing, the likelihood of leadership change codes was greater in discussions of the 
appointment of female versus male CEOs. Results of all logistic regression analyses testing the 
interactions effects of CEO gender with each dichotomous performance measure on the 
likelihood of the occurrence of leadership change codes are shown in Tables 51-54.  
Additional support was found for Hypothesis 6b based on the findings from the logistic 
regression analyses investigating the interactions of CEO gender and the continuous measures of 
performance on leadership change codes (Tables 55-58). CEO gender was found to interact with 
the relative change in ROE from three years prior and the year of the CEO appointment to affect 
the occurrence of leadership change codes, B = -.94, Exp(B) = .39, p < .05. As expected, the 
occurrence of leadership change codes was more likely in media reports concerning female 
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versus male CEO appointees to companies who experienced declining, but not improving, 
performance (Figure 33).  
Evidence was provided for Hypothesis 6c based on the logistic regression analyses that 
respectively included the interaction effect of CEO gender with each dichotomous measure of 
performance on company image change. Results are shown in Tables 59-62. The occurrence of 
company image change codes was significantly affected by the interaction of CEO gender and 
the difference in shareholder return between four years prior to and the year of the CEO 
appointment (B = -3.69, Exp(B) = 0.03, p < .05). Based on the logistic regression analyses 
examining the interaction effects of CEO gender with each continuous measure of performance 
(Tables 63-66), CEO gender interacted significantly with the relative change in ROE from three 
years prior to one year prior to the CEO appointment, B = -1.08, Exp(B) = 0.34, p < .05, to affect 
the likelihood of company image change codes occurring. Displayed in Figures 34-35, both 
interactions reveal that the likelihood of company image change codes occurring was greater for 
female, as compared to male, CEOs when performance was decreasing but not increasing.  
None of the logistic regression analyses testing the interactions of CEO gender with each 
dichotomous performance measure (Tables 67-70) or the logistic regression analyses testing the 
interactions of CEO gender with each continuous performance measure (Tables 71-74) on the 
likelihood of company culture change codes were significant. Therefore, no support was found 
for Hypothesis 6d.  
A summary of all results related to the hypotheses is presented in Table 75.  
Research Question  
 I posed a research question regarding which perspective would receive the most support 
when testing the various interaction effects of CEO gender and performance. Based on the 
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significant findings already reported, I can conclude that the most support was received for the 
idea that media reports regarding organizational desire for change are more likely to be 
highlighted for female rather than male CEO appointees when relative performance is 
decreasing, but not increasing. Additionally, across different performance measures, 
organizational desire for different types of change (financial, leadership, and company image) is 
emphasized to a greater degree when females rather than males are promoted as leaders to 
companies experiencing declining, but not improving, performance. Overall, greater evidence 
was provided for the females as signals of change proposition, in comparison to the think crisis-
think female or think crisis-think not male perspectives.  
Exploratory Analyses  
Agentic attributes. ANCOVAs were conducted to examine the interaction effects of 
CEO gender and company performance on the proportion of media reports discussing agentic 
attributes, while controlling for the proportion of media reports written by males, the proportion 
of media reports written by females, and the proportion of media reports that were press releases 
(Tables 76-79). Three significant interactions emerged, shown in Figures 36-37. CEO gender 
interacted with the difference in ROE from three years prior to one year prior to the appointment 
(F (1, 72) = 4.14, p <.05) and the difference in ROIC-WACC from three years prior to one year 
prior to the appointment (F (1, 63) = 7.52, p <.05) to significantly impact the proportion of 
agentic attributes discussed in the media reports. These results demonstrate that for male CEOs, 
there was a greater proportion of media reports discussing agentic attributes when performance 
was increasing versus decreasing. For female CEOs, there was a greater proportion of agentic 
attributes codes when company performance was decreasing versus increasing.  
 UNDERSTANDING THE GLASS CLIFF   113 
 
There was also a significant interaction between CEO gender and the difference in 
shareholder return from four years prior to the year of the CEO appointment (F (1, 70) = 6.69, p 
<.05) on the proportion of agentic attribute codes, however this result showed the opposite 
patterns (see Figure 38) of the interactions described above.   
Hierarchical moderated regression analyses were also performed to examine the 
interaction effect of CEO gender with each continuous measure of performance on the 
proportion of agentic attributes (Tables 80-83). CEO gender significantly interacted with the 
relative change in ROIC-WACC from four years prior to one year prior to the CEO appointment 
(B = -.001, β = -.28, p < .05) to affect the proportion of agentic attribute codes in media reports. 
Figure 39 shows a flat, nearly zero line for male CEOs, indicating that the extremely low levels 
of agentic attribute codes are virtually unchanged for male CEOs across the range of 
performance. There is steeper curve for female versus male CEOs as performance increases and 
decreases, showing a greater proportion of agentic attribute codes for female as compared to 
male CEO appointees as performance increases as well as decreases.     
CEO gender interacted with the relative change in shareholder return from three years 
prior to and the year of the CEO appointment (B = .001, β = .33, p < .05) as well to impact the 
proportion of agentic attributes in media reports. The downward curve for female CEOs and the 
upward curve for male CEOs as performance decreases (Figure 40) shows that the proportion of 
agentic attributes is greater for male versus female CEOs as performance decreases and greater 
for female versus male CEOs as performance increases. Further, the female CEO curve is steeper 
than the male CEO curve, suggesting that performance more strongly impacts the proportion of 
agentic attribute codes for female as compared to male CEOs.  
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In sum, the analyses examining the interaction effects of CEO gender with the various 
performance measures measure on the proportion of agentic attributes codes produced mixed 
results. 
Test of the glass cliff with ethnic minorities. I additionally investigated whether or not 
the glass cliff effect was supported when looking at the appointment of ethnic minority versus 
White CEOs. As the matched sample had been constructed based on gender, and not ethnicity, 
there were only seven CEOs categorized as ethnic minorities. When looking at the difference in 
ROE from four years prior to one year prior to the appointment, there was a greater proportion of 
minority CEOs appointed when performance was decreasing versus increasing as shown by the 
chi-square analysis (χ² (1) = 5.51, p < .05). Specifically, 100% of the minority CEOs were 
appointed when company performance was decreasing. Though the chi-square results were not 
significant, results demonstrated that when looking at the other measures of ROE (difference in 
performance from four years prior to the appointment to the year of the appointment, difference 
in performance from three years prior to one year prior to the appointment, and the difference in 
performance from three years prior to the year of the appointment), five out of the seven ethnic 
minority CEOs were appointed when performance was decreasing versus increasing. Binary 
logistic regression analyses with relative change in performance as the independent variable and 
CEO ethnicity as the dependent variable were conducted as well, and no significant results were 
found.  
Study 2: Discussion 
The Glass Cliff Effect 
The results of Study 2 provided some support for the association between decreasing 
performance and the appointment of female CEOs (Hypothesis 1, i.e., the glass cliff effect). 
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Specifically, when relationships between each continuous measure of performance and CEO 
gender were investigated, a relative decrease in shareholder return over a three year period 
leading up to the year before the CEO appointment (from four years prior to one year prior to the 
appointment) was related to an increased likelihood of female CEOs being appointed. The 
remaining regression analyses did not produce significant results, nor did the chi-square analyses 
exploring associations between the dichotomous performance measures and CEO gender. First, it 
is notable that these relationships only emerged when a continuous measure of performance was 
taken into account. This implies that it is the degree to which relative shareholder return 
decreases, and not just whether shareholder return decreases at all, that affects the likelihood of 
females being hired to CEO positions. The original dichotomization of the performance 
measures used in the chi-square analyses was based on whether there was any increase or 
decrease in performance over the range of years being considered. In other words, small 
performance decreases were grouped together with large decreases, and small increases were 
grouped together with large increases. It is possible that results were not significant when these 
dichotomous measures were explored because no differentiation was made between levels of 
performance decrease. It is logical that the glass cliff effect would not necessarily occur when 
performance declines very slightly, as more minor decreases in performance would not be 
enough to create a situation in which the CEO position is seen as precarious. Essentially, looking 
into relative performance decrease in a continuous way may allow for a better understanding of 
how the likelihood of male and female CEO appointment is affected as performance decreases 
progress.  
 Second, even among the continuous performance measures, only the relative change in 
shareholder return yielded significant results for the glass cliff effect. It is important to point out 
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that while the other measures of performance (ROA, ROE, and ROIC-WACC) represent 
accounting-based measures, shareholder return represents a market-based measure. Put 
differently, shareholder return reflects the perception of the market regarding performance versus 
the actual accounting numbers. These findings denote that it may be that the glass cliff effect 
only occurs when the market’s perception of performance, but not actual performance, is 
decreasing. It is reasonable to imagine that a position might be evaluated as more precarious 
when shareholder return is dropping as compared to when accounting-based measures of 
performance are decreasing. One critical way that shareholder return differs from the accounting-
based measures is that it is strongly impacted by investor perceptions of future performance. 
Therefore, it includes a forward-looking assessment of the company, while the accounting-based 
measures purely represent past performance. It is plausible to assume that taking the helm as 
CEO at a company that is not doing well and has a poor prospective outlook is considerably 
more precarious than taking on a CEO position at a company that is not doing well but investor 
expectations are that the company will improve in the future. Hence, it is possible that the 
precariousness of the CEO role is better represented by a company experiencing relative 
decreasing shareholder return rather than a company experiencing relative decreasing 
accounting-based performance measures. Conceivably, the glass cliff effect revealed here with 
regard to relative decreasing shareholder return could be driven by the notion that precariousness 
of the CEO position is emphasized in companies going through a period of relative shareholder 
return decline. 
These findings conflict with previous studies of the glass cliff effect that focused on 
female and male CEOs in the U.S. Cook and Glass (2014a) found support for the glass cliff 
effect for females and racial/ethnic minorities when considering ROE, but not when considering 
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a market-based measure. Cook and Glass (2014b) included both accounting- and market-based 
measures in their analyses and did not find evidence for the glass cliff effect when investigating a 
matched sample of male and female CEOs, though the trends for ROE were in the anticipated 
direction. Adams et al. (2009) only examined market-based measures, and found no significant 
results. However, there are important differences between the prior studies and the current one. 
First, for all performance measures, Cook and Glass (2014a, 2014b) studied the one, two, and 
three year average leading up to the CEO appointment. Therefore, they did not measure upward 
and downward trends in performance prior to the CEO appointment as is done here. In this study, 
I assessed all performance measures across four different time periods, and computed each one 
to understand the relative increase or decrease of ROA, ROE, ROIC-WACC, and shareholder 
return in a metric comparable across organizations, allowing me to consider each company’s 
positive or negative operating momentum. In evaluating the two and three year average of ROA 
and ROE leading up to the CEO appointment, these authors attempted to evaluate general health 
of the firm leading up to the appointment. However, they did not benchmark their data nor did 
they provide any context as to what the numbers mean. This information is needed, because 
these figures can be interpreted very differently depending on industry, product line, and 
business type (Burger, 2016).  For example, an average ROA considered to be excellent in the 
banking industry average would be 2%, whereas an average ROA considered to be excellent in 
the food industry would be 40%. Using just these numbers as a basis of comparison does not 
give a real frame of reference as to which company is doing well versus poorly. This makes it 
difficult to understand how conclusions were drawn from their study. Second, unlike the current 
study, Cook and Glass (2014a) tested a non-matched sample of White males and minority CEOs. 
The researchers grouped female and racial/ethnic minority CEOs together when examining the 
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glass cliff effect. This is an extremely relevant difference, as the present study merely focused on 
female as compared to male CEOs. Third, Cook and Glass (2014a), Cook and Glass (2014b) and 
Adams et al. (2009) explored CEO samples that were appointed across a slightly different time 
range than the one studied here. (Cook and Glass (2014a) studied CEOs appointed between 1996 
and 2010, Cook and Glass (2014b) studied CEOs appointed between 1990 and 2011, and Adams 
et al. (2009) studied CEOs appointed between 1992 and 2004).  
Finally, important to mention is that Adams et al. (2009) only evaluated a small window 
of time leading up to the CEO appointment (120 days). It is logical to conclude that this 
relatively short time frame is not long enough to get a real sense of the state of the company prior 
to the CEO appointment and how performance might be affecting CEO choices. This inference is 
supported by results from the current study demonstrating that glass cliff results were significant 
when performance was assessed beginning from four years prior to the CEO appointment. When 
studying the glass cliff effect, it may be necessary to take into account performance over a 
number of years in order to get a more accurate picture of the company’s condition as well as 
understand when the glass cliff occurs.  
Think Crisis-Think Female, Think Crisis-Think Not Male, and Females as Signals of 
Change  
Support was not found for think crisis-think female. Relative change in performance (i.e. 
relative change in shareholder return from three years prior to and the year of CEO appointment) 
interacted with CEO gender to impact the proportion of media reports discussing communal 
attributes more strongly for female versus male CEOs. However, the interaction suggested a 
greater proportion of media reports regarding communal attributes when discussing female 
CEOs appointed to companies with increasing performance in comparison to all other 
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circumstances. As, based on think crisis-think female, it was expected that communal attributes 
would be most strongly emphasized when discussing female CEO appointments to struggling 
organizations, this interaction did not show support for the think crisis-think female perspective.  
The think crisis-think not male explanation received partial substantiation. No support 
was found for the predictions concerning proportion of apprehension codes. The significant 
ANCOVA and regression results both demonstrated support for the hypothesis concerning 
position riskiness in that company performance (change in ROE from three years prior to and the 
year of the CEO appointment) more strongly impacted the proportion of media reports regarding 
position riskiness for male versus female CEOs. Specifically, there was a greater proportion of 
media reports regarding position riskiness for male, but not female, CEOs appointed to 
companies experiencing decline versus incline. 
The bulk of the evidence was found for the females as signals of change explanation. 
When investigating organizational desire for change in general, several significant results 
demonstrated overall that the proportion of media reports regarding change increased for female 
CEOs and decreased for male CEOs as performance weakened. Altogether, in support of the 
females as signals of change idea, media reports tended to accentuate organizational desire for 
change when discussing the appointment of female, as compared to male, CEOs to companies 
experiencing declining, but not improving, performance.  
Across a number of the performance measures, the likelihood of media reports occurring 
regarding organizational desire for different types of change was greater in articles that focused 
on the appointment of female versus male CEOs to organizations with decreasing performance. 
These results applied to media reports discussing financial change, leadership change, and 
company image change. Surprisingly, the only category of change for which results were not 
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significant was company culture change. To a large degree, culture is influenced by top 
organizational leadership and the way in which these leaders express and disseminate their 
values (e.g. Schein, 2010). Based on this idea and assuming that previous leadership is male, it is 
probable that a female leader, who would likely represent a contrasting figure with the outgoing 
CEO, would be more strongly associated with culture change than a male leader, who would 
likely appear more similar to the outgoing CEO. Therefore, it was reasonable to posit that in 
times of decreasing performance, the public perception would be that organizations would 
promote a female over a male CEO when a culture change was desired.   
Interestingly, the significant findings regarding financial change and leadership change 
mainly arose when accounting-based measures were employed as performance metrics. On the 
other hand, the findings regarding company image change were due to the interaction of CEO 
gender with stock-based measures, i.e. shareholder return (as well as with accounting-based 
measures, i.e. ROE). This may indicate that public perception concerning the kind of change that 
a struggling company wishes to convey when hiring a female CEO may be different depending 
on the performance category in which the company is experiencing decline. Specifically, when a 
company is perceived negatively, as represented by the relative decrease in shareholder return, 
public opinion as reflected by the media reports may be that organizations are specifically hiring 
female CEOs as way to revamp the company’s image, and positively influence the market’s view 
of the company. However, when companies are performing poorly as represented by accounting-
based measures, public opinion may be that organizations are specifically hiring female CEOs as 
a way to create financial and leadership change in order to address the performance issues. 
Future research is needed to assess these ideas.   
Exploratory Analyses  
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As for the exploratory analyses, when examining the interaction of CEO gender and 
company performance on proportion of media reports regarding agentic attributes, opposing 
patterns of data were found. Here, I focus on the results as they relate to male CEOs across 
improving and declining performance. In one pattern of results, a greater proportion of agentic 
attributes were ascribed to male CEOs when performance (ROE and ROIC-WACC from three 
years prior to one year prior to the appointment, measured dichotomously) was up versus down. 
In the second pattern of findings, the opposite results came out in that a greater proportion of 
agentic attributes was ascribed to male CEOs when performance (the difference in shareholder 
return from four years prior to and the year of the appointment measured dichotomously and the 
relative change in shareholder return from three years prior to and the year of the appointment 
measured continuously) was decreasing versus increasing. This conflicting pattern of results is 
feasibly due to the different performance measures studied here. It is possible that in situations in 
which companies promote male CEOs and shareholder return is decreasing, organizational 
decision-makers are motivated to appoint a male who possesses strong agentic qualities and fits 
the model of “think manager-think male” (e.g. Schein, 1973) to affect investor perceptions and 
convey to the market that they are bringing in a strong and effective leader. However, in 
situations in which companies promote male CEOs and ROE or ROIC-WACC is decreasing, 
then presumably, the focus would be on hiring a new leader to fix organizational issues and raise 
performance on those accounting-based indicators. Because the focus of the hire would not 
necessarily be on impressing investors, then organizational decision-makers would not be driven 
by the need to hire someone who embodies those agentic attributes and fits the “think manager-
think male” mold.  
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That results provided some initial support for the glass cliff as it applies to ethnic 
minorities when examining dichotomous measures of performance is noteworthy, though only 
seven ethnic minorities were included in the analyses. It is clear that future studies are needed to 
focus on the glass cliff effect for ethnic minorities.  
Limitations  
Study 2 was constrained in a few different ways. First, the sample size was limited due to 
the small number of female CEOs in the U.S. Second, as the data was provided through coding, 
it is possible that coder errors occurred, such as accidentally entering a wrong code or copying 
and pasting text meant for one code into a different slot. I attempted to guard against such human 
errors by having two coders code each article and spot checking each spreadsheet that the coders 
submitted.  
Additionally, while I took recommended measures to enhance coder reliability 
throughout the coding process (i.e. coder meetings to discuss codes, refining of coding 
variables), coder reliability still fell in the moderate to substantial agreement category rather than 
in the almost perfect agreement category (i.e., above .80, Viera & Garrett, 2005). As mentioned 
earlier, the coders were all working towards their masters in Industrial/Organizational 
Psychology as well as working part-time jobs. Each of them coded roughly 60 CEOs, with an 
average of 19 articles per CEO (with a range of 2 to 160 articles per CEO). Further, the 
codebook was fairly complex and included a large number of codes, and the coding process 
demanded an extensive amount of energy and concentration. To add to the complexity, though 
many of the articles covered similar information about the CEO appointment, the coders had to 
attempt to review each one with fresh eyes. Overall, the coding task presented an extraordinarily 
large cognitive load, which the coders had to bear above the cognitive effort they were already 
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extending to school and work. Campbell, Quincy, Osserman, and Pederson (2013) point out that 
the cognitive difficulty of the coding and likelihood of coding errors increase along with the 
number of codes that coders need to simultaneously monitor as well as the possibility of 
applying several codes to one portion of text, as was the case in the current study. Additionally, 
coding is made even more challenging when the codable units are not defined by a specific 
length (Campbell et al., 2013). In other words, in the present study, the coded units of text could 
be a phrase, a sentence, a few sentences, or even a full paragraph. The need to pay attention to 
each word as a possible code exacerbates the possibility of coders failing to spot codable text. 
Over and above conceivable human errors discussed previously (such as accidentally entering a 
code in the wrong place), it is likely that coder fatigue and the heavy cognitive burden involved 
in coding caused coders to overlook codes or misinterpret the text and categorize it wrongly at 
certain times. All in all, the intricacy of the codes and involvedness that the coding procedure 
required likely resulted in decreased levels of coder reliability. Future research should take care 
to simplify coding structures when feasible in order to enhance reliability.  
It is important to note that the media articles were meant to reflect public perceptions 
regarding why the CEO was appointed. While this is an interesting perspective, the information 
provided in these articles may or may not align with the true reasons that decision-makers chose 
to promote these individuals. Therefore, the study cannot provide evidence of real causality, i.e. 
that the themes discussed in the media reports are the actual driving forces behind the promotion 
of these CEOs. It does however provide a general sense of how the public views the appointment 
of male and female CEOs in situations where companies are improving and deteriorating, and 
the motives for these appointments. 
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Another limitation to address is that the sub-categories of change were evaluated as 
binary dependent variables rather than as proportions. In compressing these variables into binary 
forms, I lost some valuable information regarding the actual number of codes recorded for each 
CEO relative to the article total word count. However, as mentioned in the results, these sub-
change codes came up relatively infrequently across CEOs. As it was a rare event when these 
codes came up at all, it seemed logical to assess them in a binary manner. Further, even after 
statistically transforming the data for the change codes, these variables did not meet the 
requirements for normality with regard to skewness and kurtosis. Therefore, including them as 
proportions would have violated assumptions for statistical testing.  
Lastly, as the continuous company performance data used here reflected real-world 
upward and downward movements in company performance, the range of relative increase and 
decrease for the various measures differed from one to the other. Moreover, in certain cases, the 
negative performance range was narrower as compared to the positive range and in other cases, 
the positive range was narrower as compared to the negative range. These different range 
restrictions, particularly on the negative side, may have limited our ability to fully understand 
and interpret the effects.  
General Discussion 
This set of studies advances our understanding of the glass cliff effect and the 
mechanisms underlying this phenomenon. In the present investigation, I integrate the glass cliff 
literature by being the first known researcher to organize previously suggested explanations for 
the glass cliff into a coherent framework and test these simultaneously in an empirical manner. 
Overall, results from Study 1 did not provide evidence for the glass cliff effect. Results from 
Study 2 showed some support for the glass cliff effect in that relative decreasing shareholder 
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return over a three year period leading up to the CEO appointment positively affected the 
likelihood of female CEOs being appointed. Support was not provided for the glass cliff effect 
when the other performance measures were evaluated. Importantly, both studies demonstrated 
the most support for the females as change signals proposal, as well as no support for the think 
crisis-think female explanation. The only point in which the two studies diverged was that Study 
1 did not find any support for think crisis-think not male, while Study 2 found partial support for 
this perspective. Several of these findings bear discussion. 
Lack of Support Found for the Glass Cliff Effect 
 That the glass cliff effect received a lack of support in Study 1 and only partial support in 
Study 2 is troubling. Nevertheless, there are a number of possible ways to understand these 
findings. In Study 1 unexpectedly, male and female candidates received comparable ratings 
when performance was improving as well as decreasing. These unforeseen results may be 
explained through the shifting standards model of competence (Biernat & Fuegen, 2001). 
According to the shifting standards model, individuals are inclined to make in-group rather than 
across-group evaluations on subjective ratings scales, such as judgements of competence with 
Likert-style response options. For example, when assessing a female leader, individuals tend to 
evaluate her relative to other females, and when assessing a male leader, individuals tend to 
evaluate him relative to other males. Research shows that individuals are likely to have lower 
minimum standards and expectations for females versus males when it comes to leadership 
(Biernat & Kobrynowicz, 1997). Due to these lower minimal standards driven by conventional 
stereotypes concerning gender and leadership, within-group evaluations often lead others to 
judge an individual woman who has performed well and shown leadership ability as an 
extraordinarily capable leader. However, due to higher standards for males and leadership, 
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within-group evaluations of an individual man who has performed well and shown leadership 
ability would only lead others to judge him as a moderate or average leader. These within-group 
appraisals may result in women receiving equivalent or superior ratings to men on subjective 
scales. It is conceivable that in the current study, when participants received information 
detailing the excellent skills and qualifications of the female candidate, a within-group judgment 
occurred in which they compared her to their perceptions of a stereotypical female. Viewing the 
credentials of a strong female leader may have led participants to see this candidate as 
exceptionally superior. This may have caused the equivalent ratings of endorsement, suitability, 
qualifications, and anticipated effectiveness that participants provided to the female and the male 
candidate.  
 Many of the previous studies conducted on the glass cliff effect used a within-subject 
design in which participants were presented with both male and female candidates and asked to 
rank these candidates (Bruckmuller & Branscombe, 2010, Haslam & Ryan, 2008 (Study 2); 
Ryan et al., 2013). According to the shifting standards model, rankings, as well as other zero-
sum decisions, force individuals to evaluate candidates in a way that makes across-group, rather 
than within-group, assessments (Biernat, Vescio, & Manis, 1998). These different designs could 
have accounted for the discrepant findings in the present study compared to previous research. It 
is possible that the glass cliff effect only emerges when people exit the within-gender 
comparison mindset to make direct comparisons between male and female leaders.  
 A between-subject design, in which participants received information about a male or 
female candidate, was purposely chosen for the current study. It was expected that presenting 
participants with both a male and female resume would lead participants to conclude that the 
study purpose had to do with evaluations of male versus female applicants, and that a between-
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subject design would resolve that issue. However, it is possible that the between-subject design 
caused shifting standards thinking in candidate evaluations, producing the unexpected results 
found here.  
In terms of Study 2, it is important to note that there have only been three prior studies 
that have investigated the glass cliff effect in the U.S. among CEOs (Adams et al., 2009; Cook & 
Glass, 2014a) and only one of these (Cook & Glass, 2014a) found support for the glass cliff 
effect. As mentioned in the Study 2 discussion, the results of the current study are somewhat at 
odds with results found by Cook and Glass (2014a). Specifically, Cook and Glass (2014a) 
demonstrated evidence of the glass cliff effect only when accounting-based, rather than stock-
based, measures were used to represent company performance. In the current study, evidence of 
the glass cliff effect was only found when stock-based, rather than accounting-based, measures 
were used to represent company performance. I have previously discussed possible reasons to 
account for the divergence in findings amongst these studies (see Study 2: Discussion). These 
mixed results suggest that continued research on the glass cliff effect in the U.S. is justified. It 
would be worthwhile to replicate this study using a sample not limited to the matched sample of 
male and female CEOs utilized here. (Cook and Glass (2014a) studied a non-matched sample but 
examined the appointment of CEOs over a different set of years than the one utilized in the 
current study and categorized gender and racial/ethnic minorities together when assessing the 
glass cliff effect.) Additionally, testing the glass cliff effect amongst female leaders in the U.S. 
below the CEO role would be interesting as well.  
Ryan et al. (2016) speak directly to the mixed results found for the glass cliff effect in 
their most recent review of the glass cliff literature, stating that, rather than invalidating the 
phenomenon, studies that do not provide evidence for the glass cliff raise important questions as 
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to the boundary conditions of this effect. In other words, important to our understanding of this 
complex, multi-determined phenomenon is clarification as to when and where the glass cliff 
pattern occurs. For example, a previously discussed moderator of the glass cliff effect is gender 
of previous company leadership. Bruckmuller and Branscombe (2010) found strong effects for 
the glass cliff when previous leadership was male and weakened effects when previous 
leadership was female. In a recent study, Kulich, Lorenzi-Cioldi, Iacoviello, Faniko and Ryan 
(2016) demonstrated that the reason attributed to previous organizational performance is another 
key moderator of the effect. Their results revealed that males were preferred over females when 
organizations were performing well and females were preferred over males when organizations 
were performing poorly, but only when earlier organizational performance was seen as 
controllable and due to previous leadership behaviors. When past organizational performance 
was attributed to uncontrollable global or economic factors, there was no significant preference 
for male or female leaders under conditions of organizational decline or incline. The authors 
explained that when others specifically think that organizational failure is due to past leadership 
decisions and actions, they are incentivized to make a leadership change, which occurs in the 
form of favoring a female as the new leader.  
I argued earlier that findings in support of the glass cliff effect may have only emerged 
when relative shareholder return, and not the other performance measures, was investigated 
because a company experiencing relative decreasing shareholder return perhaps better represents 
a situation in which the CEO role would be precarious as compared to companies experiencing 
relative declining ROA, ROE, and ROIC-WACC. However, another possibility is that in the 
current set of studies, the null results with regard to ROA, ROE, and ROIC-WACC were found 
because the proper boundary conditions were not known, and therefore not taken into account. 
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For instance, there was no differentiation made in the current studies between poor 
organizational performance caused by previous management versus global and economic 
powers. (As the paper by Kulich and colleagues (2016) was not yet published when the current 
study was designed, controllability of previous organizational performance was not considered.) 
Future studies should account for the general state of the industry and economy in an effort to 
speak to whether declines in previous performance were more likely due to global, 
uncontrollable factors as opposed to managerial, controllable factors. Overall, in line with the 
sentiments expressed by Ryan et al. (2016), results of the current research underscore the 
significance of further identifying other moderators that may be impacting these important 
effects.  
Operationalization of position precariousness. An equally critical point is that results 
will depend on how the glass cliff is operationalized. A closer look may need to be taken at the 
way the precariousness aspect is measured. According to the glass cliff concept, females are 
more likely to be favored for top leadership positions when those roles are precarious. The most 
common way that precariousness has been represented is through decreasing company 
performance. However, I have already discussed that the type of company performance may 
have some bearing on the degree of precariousness associated with a leadership role, and hence, 
whether substantiation is found for the glass cliff effect.  
When looking at real-world occurrences, it is possible that there are other, possibly better, 
ways to capture position precariousness. For example, it may be interesting to operationalize 
position precariousness as leadership roles in companies who have recently experienced a major 
scandal. Some preliminary evidence for this idea can be found in recent work done by Brady, 
Isaacs, Reeves, Burroway, and Reynolds (2011). Brady et al. (2011) investigated the effects of a 
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number of firm characteristics on the gender of executive office holders in Fortune 500 
companies and found that companies that recently experienced scandals, measured by scandal-
related articles in The New York Times, were more likely to have females holding executive 
positions. This cannot be taken as direct corroboration of the glass cliff effect as the study did not 
examine whether or not females were more likely to be appointed following these scandals; it 
simply looked at the number of female executive leaders currently in office in companies that 
experienced a scandal versus did not experience a scandal. However, the findings do suggest 
some association between company scandals and females in office. It would be valuable to take 
this research a step further to investigate directionality in exploring the relationship between 
company scandals and number of female executives subsequently appointed to those companies.  
In line with the notion that position precariousness can be indexed in multiple ways, 
Glass and Cook (2016) conducted a study in which they evaluated the state of the company 
through media articles written at the time of the CEO appointment. They considered the 
leadership position to be precarious when organizations were struggling as indicated by articles 
discussing companies experiencing scandals, a phase of sales decline, general industry downturn, 
slow growth, or any recent recognition of major issues. This operationalization departs from the 
traditional perspective of determining company performance strictly through stock- and 
accounting-based measures, and expands the way in which the glass cliff can be explored. 
Looking at a matched sample of 104 male and female CEOs appointed to Fortune 500 
companies, Glass and Cook found support for the glass cliff effect. Results showed that the 
percentage of female versus male appointed CEOs was greater when companies were struggling 
and the percentage of male versus female appointed CEO was greater when companies were not 
struggling. Notably, Glass and Cook provide evidence for the glass cliff using a similar sample 
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to the one employed in the current study. This suggests that the glass cliff effect may be revealed 
when the state of the company and correspondingly, the precariousness of the CEO position, is 
represented more broadly than financial indicators. Moreover, perhaps the glass cliff effect 
occurs when the widespread public perception (as indicated by the media) is that the company is 
going through a turbulent time, rather than when just the numbers denote that performance is 
declining.  
Furthermore, in the majority of previous research, the precariousness of a leadership 
position was assumed based on the organization’s condition. However, even when an 
organization is doing well overall, there may still be some leadership positions within the 
organization that would be considered precarious for multiple reasons. For example, a CEO 
position could be considered precarious if the individual does not have the full support of the 
board of directors. An executive position (other than the CEO role) could be considered 
precarious if one’s immediate superior is known to be an extremely challenging boss. A job as 
head of a department could be considered precarious if that department is consistently not 
meeting their set goals (though the rest of the company may be flourishing). Future research 
should refine the measure of position precariousness depending on the context of the study. 
Research should also continue to utilize company status as a proxy for position precariousness, 
both through financial figures as well as through other means, as shown by Glass and Cook 
(2016). This research agenda would help us understand the way in which glass cliff effects 
emerge under different representations of precariousness.  
Along these same lines, there are many ways that those in top leadership roles can impact 
company performance, particularly in the short-term. Put differently, it is possible for leaders to 
make decisions so that a company profits in the short-term at the expense of long-term 
 UNDERSTANDING THE GLASS CLIFF   132 
 
performance. This is especially likely if a leader knows that s/he will be leaving the company 
shortly. It is conceivable that a present leader could orchestrate performance results to look as if 
the organization is doing well while s/he is in charge. In other words, companies may be moving 
in a negative direction behind the scenes, but appear to be performing positively based on 
popular measures of performance. This may also provide some explanation for the lack of 
support of the glass cliff effect found here when accounting-based values were considered. It is 
feasible that organizations were headed downhill, but that they appointed female leaders before 
the state of these organizations was publicly known. In this case, females may have been put in 
office just prior to the company downfall or a performance downturn. This would be a glass cliff 
type of situation, as it would be up to the new female leader to keep the “sinking ship” afloat. 
Because it is possible for measures of company performance to be manipulated or to not 
necessarily reflect an organization’s true condition, then looking at the glass cliff effect using 
performance measures as the predictor variables may not yield significant results. In fact, there is 
a considerable amount of anecdotal data that speaks to this idea. Mary Barra, Marissa Meyer, and 
Anne Mulcahy are all instances in which female CEOs were appointed to companies that were 
on the brink of severe crises, though company performance figures may not have revealed these 
major organizational issues prior to the appointment. To give one specific example, Mary Barra 
was appointed CEO to General Motors shortly before 1.6 million cars were recalled for having 
electrical defects, which were supposedly related to a number of deaths. The news of the faulty 
products came out immediately after Ms. Barra’s appointment and Ms. Barra was called upon to 
answer for them at congressional hearings. There are multiple indicators that the imminent recall 
was known to organizational decision-makers prior to the CEO appointment. This pattern may 
clarify the insignificant results found in Study 2.  
 UNDERSTANDING THE GLASS CLIFF   133 
 
Notably, the finding that the glass cliff effect may only occur when a forward-looking, 
market metric (relative decreasing shareholder return) is employed as the performance indicator 
somewhat speaks to the idea that females may be more likely to be hired when companies’ 
prospects are poor and future failure is expected, even if the accounting-based numbers do not 
show poor performance. I conducted exploratory analyses that also address this idea to some 
degree. I computed the difference in performance from the year of the CEO appointment to one 
year after the appointment and dichotomized the values as increasing versus decreasing. Using 
chi-square analyses, I then examined whether a greater proportion of females were in office 
when company performance was increasing versus decreasing. I found that, when looking at 
ROA and ROE, chi-square results were significant, showing that a greater proportion of women 
were in office when performance decreased rather than increased from the year of their 
appointment to one year after their appointment. While it is possible to interpret these significant 
results in a number of different ways, it is conceivable that this pattern reflects the idea that 
females are put into office on the precipice of organizational decline. However, there is no real 
way to gain hard evidence of this idea. Following the example set by Glass and Cook (2016), the 
best set of action to shed insight into this theory would be to come up with other predictor 
variables to assess the company’s condition prior to the appointment and study the glass cliff 
effect using these as predictor variables.  
Think Crisis-Think Not Male: Discrepant Findings in Studies 1 and 2 
The different findings regarding think crisis-think not male in Studies 1 and 2 may be due 
to the fact that investigation of the variables in each study occurred at different phases in the 
CEO selection process. Theoretically, proponents of the think crisis-think not male position 
argue that when deciding who to select for a CEO appointment, decision-makers consider the 
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riskiness of the position and how that would affect a candidate’s career. However, due to the 
nature of available media data, Study 2 actually used explanations provided following the 
selection process. Results of Study 2 demonstrated that media reports regarding position 
riskiness were more prominent in discussions of male, but not female, CEOs as performance was 
decreasing versus increasing. In other words, following the promotion, media reports were more 
likely to highlight the inherent riskiness of the role when discussing male rather than female 
CEOs. Although this is related to the ideas underlying think crisis-think not male, it is not 
exactly the same reasoning, as these media statements were made after rather than prior to 
selection. It is unclear if it is this difference in timing in the process that was tested between 
Study 1 and Study 2, the different methodologies, or some other factors that account for the 
discrepant findings. Replication and future research is needed to provide insight into this 
question.  
Glass Cliff Explanations and Leadership Contingency Theories 
It is interesting to note that according to contingency theories of leadership the extent to 
which a particular leader will be effective is dependent on the situation. Fiedler (1978) explicated 
that individuals have different leadership styles, which are more or less effective as a result of 
the situation, defined by the relationship between the leader and the group, the degree of 
structure in the task, and the amount of power that the leader wields. The general notion that 
leader effectiveness is determined by the situation can be applied to some of the glass cliff 
explanations discussed here. Specifically, the notions of think crisis-think female and females as 
signals of change can both be understood under the umbrella of contingency leadership theory. 
(The think crisis-think not male mentality essentially describes bias against females, and cannot 
be understood through contingency theory.) Both think crisis-think female and females as signals 
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of change suggest that the situation calls for a particular type of leader (either one that possesses 
communal attributes or one that represents change) and decision-makers therefore opt to choose 
females as they are more strongly associated with both communality and change.   
However, as past research has expressly pointed out these categories of explanations as 
possible ways to understand the glass cliff effect, it was the goal of the present dissertation to 
theoretically and empirically examine each one separately. Collapsing these individual 
explanations into general contingency theories of leadership would undermine our ability to 
understand the differences between them and pinpoint the degree to which each drives glass cliff 
decisions.  
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
From a theoretical perspective, the current set of studies makes a number of significant 
contributions. To begin with, with regard to the glass cliff phenomenon, these studies highlight 
the need to explore and better define the boundary conditions of this effect as well as the 
operationalization of precariousness as discussed above.  
Furthermore, the previously proposed explanations for the glass cliff effect are brought 
together in a cohesive manner and empirically examined in tandem through these studies using 
very different methodologies. Both studies provide convincing evidence that the females as 
signals of change idea is the strongest driver of the glass cliff effect out of the mechanisms 
previously proposed as explanations for this phenomenon. Study 2 further suggests that 
organizations may wish to communicate different types of change in hiring a female leader to a 
precarious position, an idea that has not been previously considered in the glass cliff literature. 
The notion that females are being promoted in precarious situations to signal change aligns with 
prior studies that extended the glass cliff effect to ethnic minority groups (Cook & Glass, 2014; 
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Kulich, Ryan, & Haslam, 2013). As a member of any minority group would represent a 
departure from the typical White male model of leadership (Rosette, Leonardelli, & Phillips, 
2008), promoting a minority member in precarious situations would communicate that a 
significant change is being made in the organization.  
The idea that women are specifically being promoted as a way to signify organizational 
change, particularly when organizations are struggling, raises a number of important points. 
First, this adds to previous literature focusing on the idea that men and women primarily follow 
very different pathways in ascending organizational hierarchies (e.g. Lyness & Thompson, 
2000). The opportunities provided to males and females as well as the conditions under which 
individuals of either gender are promoted are clearly dissimilar. Female leaders, striving to move 
upwards in company ranks, should be well aware that opportunities are more likely to arise when 
a precarious position is available and organizational change is desired. Though this does speak to 
the limited nature of prospects for female leaders, it can also be helpful to women in identifying 
the leadership opportunities for which they are likely to be favored. In other words, female 
employees can utilize this finding in mapping out their options for career development and 
organizational advancement. In addition, female employees should be prepared for the 
possibility that they are being offered positions specifically when those positions are precarious 
and the organization wishes to convey change. Female leaders might not be aware that they are 
being presented with precarious roles, particularly because females often do not have access to 
the same social resources (mentors, sponsors, social networks with organizational elite) that are 
available to their male counterparts and therefore are more likely to miss out on important 
information regarding available positions (Lyness & Thompson, 2000). For that reason, females 
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should do their best to figure out the conditions surrounding the position as well as the nature of 
the role itself so that they fully understand what they are adopting.    
Going further, it is possible that when females would like to be considered for a 
leadership position, they would have a greater chance of being approved for the promotion if 
they make the case to decision-makers that the position is precarious and that change is needed. 
Extending this idea to racial minorities, it can be argued that President Obama employed this 
tactic in the 2008 election against John McCain, with his campaign to promote change.  
Second, a critical question is if women are being hired to enact true change or if they are 
simply being propped up as a change symbol. Results from Study 2 denote that when women are 
appointed to declining companies, the organization’s desire for change in general, and 
specifically for financial change, leadership change, and public image change, is emphasized in 
media reports. However, based on my data, there was no real way to parse out if organizations 
are simply aiming to signify change in these areas, or if they truly expect female leaders to help 
bring about those changes. Kulich et al. (2016) found that perceptions regarding a female 
leader’s ability to promote change did not mediate the preference for a female candidate in a 
weak versus strong company but perceptions regarding the degree to which a female leader 
symbolizes change did mediate this relationship. If promotion into precarious positions is purely 
about sending a message of change, then this calls into question any real progress females can 
make in the leadership realm. This would indicate that females are only selected in these 
situations because internal and external stakeholders would view the appointment as emblematic 
of change and not necessarily because these female leaders are expected to be effective leaders, 
accomplish initiatives, and improve the organization. On the other hand, if promotion into 
precarious positions is both about sending a change message as well as accomplishing true 
 UNDERSTANDING THE GLASS CLIFF   138 
 
change, then the possibility of progress towards gender equality in leadership does not seem as 
bleak.  
Future research should continue the work here as well as the research by Kulich et al. 
(2016) to examine whether female leaders are employed under these circumstances to simply 
represent, or to also actually endorse, change. It would also be interesting to expand on the initial 
research in Study 2 that took into account different types of change. Worth researching would be 
whether there is a specific type of change that female leaders are hired to symbolize and/or 
create. These ideas could be tested in a classic glass cliff paradigm in which participants are 
provided with information about a precarious or non-precarious senior leader position that is 
available within an organization and male or female applicant materials. Participants would be 
asked about the degree to which the applicants symbolize change as well as the degree to which 
the candidates would be expected to enact the various types of change. Alternatively, participants 
could be provided with information about a precarious position available in an organization, with 
the type of change needed as the experimental condition (e.g. financial change vs. leadership 
style change vs. culture change vs. company image change). Participants would then be asked to 
evaluate the male and/or female candidate (depending on the whether the study was a between or 
within subject design). These studies would shed some light as to degree to which female leaders 
are perceived to be change symbols versus change agents as well as whether females are more 
likely to be promoted in precarious situations when a specific kind of change is needed in the 
organization.  
Another option would be to conduct a coding study, similar to the one done in Study 2, in 
which type of change needed in an organization would be coded for in articles written about the 
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company prior to a CEO change for a matched sample of male and female CEOs. Relationships 
between type of change needed and appointment of female CEOs could then be assessed. 
From an organizational perspective, organizations need to maintain awareness of the 
circumstances under which female and male leaders are being promoted. If organizational 
decision-makers understand that female employees are primarily being appointed only under 
very specific (and perhaps not ideal) conditions, it is possible that they would make more of an 
effort to expand the opportunities offered to females. By restricting women to particular 
pathways in which they are appointed to precarious positons to convey change, organizations 
will not reap the full benefits of what their female talent pool can offer. While organizations may 
be partially driven to appoint female leaders because of legal and/or socially responsible 
motivations, they should carefully consider whether the types of leadership positions being 
extended to female employees are truly allowing the organization to take advantage of their 
skilled and qualified female talent.  
Furthermore, decision-makers should strive to ensure that in cases in which females are 
being appointed as a way to show change, they are also given the relevant resources needed in 
order to actually be able to create that change. For example, organizations can take action to 
provide female leaders with social support, a factor important to leadership success which is 
often withheld from female leaders (e.g. Ibarra, 1993). In a CEO appointment, this might take the 
form of support from the board (Glass & Cook, 2016). In a lower level leadership appointment, 
this might take the form of helping to strengthen the individual’s social network with other 
organizational leaders. In this way, even if the move to select a female leader is mainly to 
showcase change, female leaders are at least given the chance to make an actual difference 
within the organization.   
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It has been repeatedly demonstrated that a greater number of women in top leadership 
roles eases the path upwards for lower level female employees as this means a stronger presence 
of female role models, greater possibility of females having a same gender mentor and/or 
sponsor, and more of a likelihood of females establishing social and professional ties with 
organizational elite (Linehan & Scullion, 2008; Sabattini, 2008). Put simply, consistent success 
of female leaders will go a long way towards narrowing the gender disparity in leadership. 
Therefore, it is not only critical that women are given opportunities to be leaders but that they are 
additionally provided with the appropriate tools for success in every situation.   
Future Research  
Future research should continue to investigate the presence of the glass cliff effect. 
Continued exploration into the glass cliff effect among U.S. CEOs is needed, particularly in 
order to further investigate possible differences in the effect when accounting-based versus 
market-based measures are utilized. The impact of these different performance measures can also 
be studied experimentally, in which different participant conditions are created based on each 
performance measure as a way to represent position precariousness and participants are asked to 
evaluate male and female leader candidates. As stated earlier, it would be beneficial to examine 
the glass cliff effect in the U.S. in leadership positions other than the CEO role, such as women 
as board members (following the seminal work by Ryan and Haslam, 2005) as well as females in 
various other executive positions. As mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, there are multiple 
avenues future research could take in regard to the way in which the shape and direction of the 
organization and the precariousness of the leadership position is operationalized.  
Additional research is also needed on the glass cliff effect as it applies to ethnic 
minorities. The results of Study 2 accord with previous research showing that a greater 
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proportion of ethnic minority CEOs were appointed to companies who were not performing well 
as compared to companies performing well. Support for the females as signals of change idea, 
found in both studies, also speaks to the possible applicability of the glass cliff effect to ethnic 
minorities. Additional studies should be conducted that specifically focus on the extension of this 
theory beyond gender.   
Moreover, continued research into the “why” behind the glass cliff effect is warranted. 
While results of both studies make clear that females are commonly favored as leaders in 
precarious situations when change is perceived to be needed, the extent to which the think crisis-
think female and think crisis-think not male explanations drive a female preference is still 
unclear. In terms of both of these explanations, there were possible limits in the current studies, 
previously discussed, that may have led to the lack of support found. Redressing those limits, for 
example, measuring the need for communal attributes in an experimental setting in a way that 
would increase response variability, could potentially shed more light into whether the think 
crisis-think female rationale impacts decision-makers during times of company crisis. As the 
think crisis-think female explanation has received support in a number of other studies 
(Bruckmuller & Branscombe, 2010; Ryan et al., 2012), additional research investigating this 
explanation is merited. Also, future studies are needed to better understand the mixed results 
found in the current set of studies regarding the think crisis-think not male perspective.   In 
research regarding the glass cliff effect thus far, the possible influence of whether the individual 
is an internal or external hire has not been discussed. However, it is conceivable that whether the 
candidate is internal or external could influence the way in which these leadership decisions are 
made. The internal/external dimension seems most relevant when considering the females as 
signals of change notion. Specifically, if the position is precarious and organizational change is 
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needed, would an internal female candidate be preferred over an external male candidate? The 
internal female candidate would represent change by nature of her gender, while the external 
male candidate would represent change by nature of his externality. Going forwards, research 
studies should consider whether the internal/external distinction generally moderates the glass 
cliff effect and/or specifically changes our understanding of the different explanations for the 
glass cliff effect.  
Another critical direction for glass cliff research is to further examine the female and 
male motivation for accepting and declining such positions. While most of the literature focuses 
on the part decision-makers play in favoring females or males for particular leadership roles, less 
attention is paid to the part the candidate plays in taking on or turning down such roles. Work by 
Rink et al. (2012) demonstrated that women do not more strongly prefer these precarious 
positions than men, suggesting that females do not actively seek to take on these roles. However, 
the question of whether women feel as if they are afforded fewer opportunities than men and do 
not have the luxury of turning down positions when offered has not been fully answered. There 
has been some suggestion in the literature that precarious positions are viewed as “golden 
opportunities” for women but “poisoned chalices” for men (e.g. Ashby et al., 2007). In other 
words, men, who are more likely in general to receive leadership offers, should shy away from 
the jobs with a high risk of failure. However, women, less likely to receive these offers, should 
consider such a high-risk job to be a wonderful opportunity. Some preliminary evidence for the 
idea that women think that they must take on these positions when proffered can be gleaned from 
Glass and Cook (2016). These authors conducted twelve semi-structured interviews with women 
in high-powered executive positions. Interview data suggested that these women all took on 
challenging, precarious appointments at some point, regardless of the knowledge that failure in 
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these positions could derail their career. According to the interviews, these women did so 
because they were offered these roles by influential individuals and it would have been an even 
riskier career move to turn them down and/or because they saw these roles as being a way for 
them to achieve visibility, mobility, and credibility. In other words, not having the same 
opportunities that men do to achieve visibility, credibility and mobility through more traditional 
means of performing well, receiving support through social networks, and/or being backed by a 
successful sponsor, women turn to these less than ideal job openings. The study by Glass and 
Cook (2016) interviewed women, but did not include a similar sample of high-powered men. 
Additional work studying men and women, using both experimental and interview methods, is 
needed to further discern whether significant differences exist in the reasons men and women 
have for undertaking or rejecting precarious positions.  
As selection decisions, particularly those pertaining to C-Suite positions, are determined 
by groups of individuals, the role of the group is important to our understanding of the glass cliff 
effect. An unexplored research area is whether and how group dynamics affect the way in which 
each of the explanations for the glass cliff effect operates. For instance, it is possible that group 
discussions amplify shared stereotypes and bias, or that certain group members serve as a check 
against shared stereotypes and bias. On one hand, shared gender stereotypes may manifest more 
strongly than individually held stereotypes (Klein, Tindale, & Brauer, 2008) and therefore steer a 
group of decision-makers towards a female versus male candidate for a precarious position 
because of the stereotypical associations between females and communality (think crisis-think 
female) as well as between female leaders and change (females as signals of change). On the 
other hand, group discussions may lead the group to look beyond stereotypes or implicit bias 
towards women so that elements such as communal attributes and female career expendability 
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are specifically not emphasized in the selection decision. Future studies should attempt to resolve 
these open questions by taking group dynamics into account when studying the glass cliff and 
relevant explanations at top-tier leadership levels.   
A last, significant research area concerning the glass cliff effect is to explore the 
aftereffects of glass cliff appointments. As the entire field of research is relatively new, little 
attention has been paid to consequences of the glass cliff effect. Cook and Glass (2014a, 2014b) 
present some initial insight into this research area. Their work demonstrates that when 
organizational performance decreases while female or non-White individuals serve as CEOs, 
these minority CEOs are likely to be supplanted by White men, a phenomenon which they have 
dubbed the “savior effect.” However the authors did not investigate why this may be the case. 
Once females and minorities are put in a position of power, are they given a shorter window than 
White men to turn the company around following failure? Are others awaiting a misstep as 
substantiation of incompetence? What reasons are provided when racial or gender minorities 
versus White men are asked to step down from leadership positions in cases where company 
performance continues to go south?  
Although studies have been devoted to how and why women achieve positions of power, 
little is known about how leaders are evaluated following company performance once these 
positions are achieved. There is a considerable body of work that more generally focuses on the 
way in which male versus female leaders are appraised (Eagly & Karau, 1995; 2002; Eagly, 
Makhijani, & Klonsky, 1992; Heilman, 1983; Foschi, 2000; Vecchio, 2002), but this work has 
not been extended to understand how male and female leaders are appraised explicitly following 
company decline or improvement. One theory that speaks broadly to leader attributions 
following company performance is romance of leadership (Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985). 
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According to the notion of romance of leadership, others are likely to over-attribute causality for 
both company success and failure to individual leaders, rather than other possible factors such as 
economic or industry forces (Meindl et al., 1985; Pillai & Meindl, 1998). However, there has 
been minimal research regarding whether romance of leadership applies similarly across genders. 
In addition, looking at leadership perceptions when the organization continues to do poorly or 
starts to do well specifically after the leader has been promoted into a precarious position 
creates a unique situation that has not been previously explored. In order to understand the total 
picture regarding the implications of the glass cliff both for individual women in leadership and 
more general perceptions regarding gender and leadership, it is imperative to explore the 
repercussions of glass cliff appointments. This is both with regard to the time and resources men 
and women are allotted to battle deteriorating companies back from decline once they are placed 
into precarious positions as well as perceptions others form of these men and women concerning 
competence, ability, and responsibility for negative performance if the company continues to 
fail.   
Conclusion 
 The glass cliff phenomenon is a vitally important topic to study as it suggests that the 
conditions surrounding leadership positions that are offered to males and females are markedly 
different. The notion that females are more likely to be favored as leaders when company 
performance is negative creates a situation in which female leaders are consistently being asked 
to take on more stressful roles in which they have to fight an uphill battle. Not only is it likely 
that female leaders in these positions will experience greater anxiety and burnout, but it is also 
more likely that others will draw associations between deteriorating performance and the 
presence of female leaders at a company (even when poor performance precedes female 
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appointments) and arrive at biased perceptions regarding females and their leadership capacities. 
In thinking about gender gaps in the leadership domain, it is not enough to consider numbers of 
men and women at the top. Rather, it is just as critical to take into account the type of leadership 
positions and the context surrounding the positions that individuals of each gender are being 
offered.   
The current set of studies test the glass cliff effect using experimental and real-world 
data. Aside from providing some support for the glass cliff in Study 2, these studies offer 
important implications with regard to the boundary conditions of the phenomenon and the way in 
which measurement of position precariousness can influence how the glass cliff plays out.  
Additionally, beyond understanding when and where the glass cliff effect is likely to 
occur, it is equally imperative to understand why females are likely to be endorsed for precarious 
positions. Without any insight into the reasons behind these appointments, it is impossible to 
rectify the issues for females and leadership that the glass cliff effect presents. In the current 
studies, I explored possible explanations for why females tend be hired into these precarious 
posts, extending the glass cliff laboratory paradigm in novel ways in Study 1 and coding for 
these categories of explanations in media articles about the appointment of male and female 
CEOs in Study 2.  
Across both studies, the most support was found for the idea that females are more likely 
to be hired to precarious roles because organizations wish to convey change (females as change 
signals). This initial insight provides a first step towards both organizations and female 
employees being able to address the problems for females’ careers that may occur as a result of 
the glass cliff, and consequently enable female leaders to make real progress in the leadership 
realm.   
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Footnotes 
 ¹ Results of a pilot test showed that out of an N of 100, only one participant did not 
answer the manipulation check regarding candidate gender correctly and only three participants 
did not answer the check concerning company performance correctly. Therefore, it was 
somewhat surprising to see such a high number of participants respond incorrectly to the 
manipulation checks in the main study.  
² Initially, all variables for which participants were asked to indicate the extent of their 
agreement were presented on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale. However, 
following a pilot test, some of the scales were adjusted in an attempt to increase response 
variability. Specifically, an attempt was made to focus the measure on response options in the 
higher range of the scale, resulting in a 5 point scale ranging from 1 (do not at all agree) to 5 
(completely agree) for certain variables.  
3 Analyses were also conducted on the full data set, including participants who answered 
the manipulation check questions incorrectly. While the results were primarily the same as the 
results of the analyses excluding those participants who failed the manipulation checks, two 
differences are noted here. Unlike the main results reported, the interaction of need for 
communal attributes and candidate gender did not significantly predict endorsement (b = -.53, 
SE = .34, p > .05, 95% CI [-1.20, .15]) or anticipated effectiveness (b = -.28, SE = .25, p > .05, 
95% CI [-.78, .22]) meaning that the need for communal attributes did not more strongly impact 
evaluations of the female over the male candidate when the full data set was considered. 
With regard to the think crisis-think not male variables (position riskiness, candidate 
value and position recommendation) there were no differences from the results reported. Results 
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from the full data set were also no different than results reported when examining need for 
change as the mediator in the moderated mediation model.   
4 Though predictions were not made for the way in which suitability, qualifications, and 
anticipated effectiveness ratings would be affected when taking into account perceptions 
regarding the need for change or the think crisis-think not male variables, additional PROCESS 
models were run to examine possible relationships. Overall, the relationships found when 
analyses were conducted paralleled those found when endorsement was entered as the dependent 
variable in the models.  
5 Initially, there were three coders and they all coded each media article. However, 
because of the immense work load, I had a great deal of coder turnover in the beginning. 
Additionally, once I believed all three coders to be set, one of the coders dropped out after about 
a quarter of the coding was completed and had to be replaced. At this juncture, I switched the 
procedure to each article being coded by two rather than three coders. Aside from the turnover, 
coding times were taking much longer than expected. It therefore seemed prudent to have only 
two coders code each article in order to reduce the workload. This way not every coder would 
have to code all of the articles collected about each of the 84 CEOs.  
6 As Coder 4 replaced Coder 1, there was no overlap in coding between these individuals. 
Therefore, interrater reliability between Coders 1 and 4 could not be calculated. 
7 Chi-square and binary logistic regression analyses were additionally conducted looking 
at performance differences between two and one year prior to the appointment, as well as 
between two years prior to and the year of the appointment. No significant results were found for 
the chi-square analyses. Regression analyses showed that relative change in shareholder return 
from two years to one year prior to the CEO appointment affected the likelihood of females 
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being appointed as CEO (B = -.36, Exp(B) = .70, p < .05). Consistent with expectations, the 
negative coefficient indicates that decreases in performance yield an increased likelihood of 
females being appointed CEO.  
8 Certain articles were attributed to a “staff writer” and no name was provided. Because 
the proportion of articles written by males and females do not add to 100, the proportion of 
media articles written by journalists of either gender were included as separate covariates. 
9 There were a number of codes that the coders were instructed to keep track of that were 
not included in the hypotheses and therefore not discussed in this paper. These codes were 
primarily gathered in an exploratory manner. Coders were also responsible for recording whether 
coded text units had appeared in other articles, or were unique. Taken together, this created a 
fairly arduous coding process. 
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Figure 1. Expected interaction effect between company performance and candidate gender on 
leader endorsement ratings. 
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Figure 2. Graphical representation of the theoretical model of moderated mediation proposed in 
Hypotheses 2 and 4, showing the relationship of performance on endorsement, suitability, 
qualifications, and anticipated effectiveness through perceived need for communal attributes as 
moderated by candidate gender.   
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Figure 3. Expected pattern of perceived position riskiness for male and female candidates under 
conditions of improving and declining company performance.  
  
Decreasing Performance Increasing Performance
Males Females
 UNDERSTANDING THE GLASS CLIFF   153 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Expected pattern of candidate value perceptions for male and female candidates under 
conditions of improving and declining company performance.  
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Figure 5. Expected pattern of degree to which participants recommend position acceptance for 
male and female candidates under conditions of improving and declining company performance.  
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Figure 6. Graphical representation of the theoretical model of mediated moderation, showing the 
hypothesized interaction effect (Hypotheses 5a-c) of performance and candidate gender on 
endorsement via the mediators of position riskiness, candidate value, and position 
recommendation.  
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Figure 7. Graphical representation of the theoretical model of moderated mediation proposed in 
Hypothesis 6, showing the relationship of performance on endorsement through perceived need 
for change as moderated by candidate gender.   
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Figure 8. Results of Hypothesis 2 showing the unstandardized coefficients and standard errors as 
produced by the PROCESS analyses.   
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Figure 9.  Graphical representation of hierarchical regression results showing the interaction 
effect of perceived need for communal attributes in a leader and candidate gender condition on 
endorsement ratings. 
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Figure 10. Results of Hypothesis 4a showing the unstandardized coefficients and standard errors 
as produced by the PROCESS analyses.   
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Figure 11. Results of Hypothesis 4b showing the unstandardized coefficients and standard errors 
as produced by the PROCESS analyses.   
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Figure 12. Results of Hypothesis 4c showing the unstandardized coefficients and standard errors 
as produced by the PROCESS analyses.   
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Figure 13. Graphical representation of hierarchical regression results showing the interaction 
effect of perceived need for communal attributes in a leader and candidate gender condition on 
ratings of anticipated effectiveness.  
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Figure 14. Results of Hypothesis 5a showing the unstandardized coefficients and standard errors 
as produced by the PROCESS analyses, with position riskiness mediating the interaction effect 
of performance and candidate gender on endorsement.    
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Figure 15. Results of Hypothesis 5b showing the unstandardized coefficients and standard errors 
as produced by the PROCESS analyses, with candidate value mediating the interaction effect of 
performance and candidate gender on endorsement.   
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Figure 16. Results of Hypothesis 5c showing the unstandardized coefficients and standard errors 
as produced by the PROCESS analyses, with position recommendation mediating the interaction 
effect of performance and candidate gender on endorsement.   
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Figure 17. Results of Hypothesis 6 showing the unstandardized coefficients and standard errors 
as produced by the PROCESS model of moderated mediation.    
  
Endorsement  
Candidate 
Gender  
Company 
Performance  
Perceived Need for 
Change  
 
2.05 (1.55) 
 -1.62** (.13)  
 -9.75 (4.95) 
 
p<.05*, p<.01** 
11.46** (.39) 
-4.91* (2.08) 
 
 UNDERSTANDING THE GLASS CLIFF   167 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Graphical representation of hierarchical regression results showing the interaction 
effect of perceived need for change and candidate gender condition on leader endorsement 
ratings. 
  
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Low Perceived Need for
Change
High Perceived Need for
Change
E
n
d
o
rs
em
en
t 
(s
q
u
ar
ed
) 
Female Candidate
Male Candidate
 UNDERSTANDING THE GLASS CLIFF   168 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Regression results showing the interaction effect of CEO gender and the relative 
change in shareholder return between three years prior to and the year of the CEO appointment 
(continuous) on the proportion of media reports discussing communal attributes. The 
performance range along which the curves are plotted represents -2 to +2 standard deviations 
from the mean. 
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Figure 20. ANCOVA results showing the interaction effect of CEO gender and the difference in 
ROE between three years prior to and the year of the CEO appointment (dichotomous) on the 
proportion of media reports discussing position riskiness. 
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Figure 21. Regression results showing the interaction effect of CEO gender and the relative 
change in ROE between three years prior to and the year of the CEO appointment (continuous) 
on the proportion of media reports discussing position riskiness. The performance range along 
which the curves are plotted represents -2 to +2 standard deviations from the mean. 
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Figure 22. ANCOVA results showing the interaction effect of CEO gender and the difference in 
ROE between four years prior to and the year of the CEO appointment (dichotomous) on the 
proportion of media reports discussing general change. 
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Figure 23. Regression results showing the interaction effect of CEO gender and the relative 
change in ROA between four years prior to and the year of the appointment (continuous) on the 
proportion of media reports discussing general change. The performance range along which the 
curves are plotted represents -2 to +2 standard deviations from the mean.  
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Figure 24. Regression results showing the interaction effect of CEO gender and the relative 
change in ROE between four years prior to and the year of the CEO appointment (continuous) on 
the proportion of media reports discussing general change. The performance range along which 
the curves are plotted represents -2 to +2 standard deviations from the mean. 
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Figure 25. Regression results showing the interaction effect of CEO gender and the relative 
change in ROE three years prior to and the year of the appointment (continuous) on the 
proportion of media reports discussing general change. The performance range along which the 
curves are plotted represents -2 to +2 standard deviations from the mean. 
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Figure 26. Regression results showing the interaction effect of CEO gender and the relative 
change in ROIC-WACC between three years prior to and the year of the CEO appointment 
(continuous) on the proportion of media reports discussing general change. The performance 
range along which the curves are plotted represents -2 to +2 standard deviations from the mean. 
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Figure 27. Logistic regression results showing the interaction effect of CEO gender and change 
in ROA between four years prior to and the year of the CEO appointment (dichotomous) on the 
likelihood of the occurrence of financial change codes.  
  
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Decreasing Performance Increasing Performance
Male Female
L
ik
el
ih
o
o
d
 o
f 
o
cc
u
rr
en
ce
 o
f:
 
F
in
an
ci
al
 C
h
an
g
e 
C
o
d
e 
ROA Y4 Prior  Year of Appointment 
 UNDERSTANDING THE GLASS CLIFF   177 
 
 
 
Figure 28. Logistic regression results showing the interaction effect of CEO gender and change 
in ROA between three years and one year prior to the CEO appointment (dichotomous) on the 
likelihood of the occurrence of financial change codes. 
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Figure 29. Logistic regression results showing the interaction effect of CEO gender and change 
in ROE between three years and one year prior to the CEO appointment (dichotomous) on the 
likelihood of the occurrence of financial change codes. 
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Figure 30. Logistic regression results showing the interaction effect of CEO gender and change 
in ROE between three years prior to and the year of the CEO appointment (dichotomous) on the 
likelihood of the occurrence of financial change codes. 
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Figure 31. Logistic regression results showing the interaction effect of CEO gender and relative 
change in ROIC-WACC between three years prior to and the year of the CEO appointment 
(continuous) on the likelihood of the occurrence of financial change codes. The performance 
numbers on the x-axis represent -1 and +1 standard deviations from the mean. 
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Figure 32. Logistic regression results showing the interaction effect of CEO gender and the 
difference in ROE between three years and one year prior to the CEO appointment 
(dichotomous) on the likelihood of the occurrence of leadership change codes. 
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Figure 33. Logistic regression results showing the interaction effect of CEO gender and the 
relative change in ROE from three years prior to and the year of the CEO appointment 
(continuous) on the likelihood of the occurrence of leadership change codes. The performance 
numbers on the x-axis represent -1 and +1 standard deviations from the mean. 
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Figure 34. Logistic regression results showing the interaction effect of CEO gender and the 
difference in shareholder return from four years prior to the year of the CEO appointment 
(dichotomous) on the likelihood of the occurrence of image change codes. 
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Figure 35. Logistic regression results showing the interaction effect of CEO gender and the 
relative change in ROE from three years to one year prior to the CEO appointment (continuous) 
on the likelihood of the occurrence of image change codes. The performance numbers on the x-
axis represent -1 and +1 standard deviations from the mean. 
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Figure 36. ANCOVA results showing the interaction effect of CEO gender and the difference in 
ROE between three years to one year prior to the CEO appointment (dichotomous) on the 
proportion of media reports discussing agentic attributes.  
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Figure 37. ANCOVA results showing the interaction effect of CEO gender and the difference in 
ROIC-WACC between three years to one year prior to the CEO appointment (dichotomous) on 
the proportion of media reports discussing agentic attributes.  
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Figure 38. ANCOVA results showing the interaction effect of CEO gender and the difference in 
shareholder return between four years prior to and the year of the CEO appointment 
(dichotomous) on the proportion of media reports discussing agentic attributes.  
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Figure 39. Regression results showing the interaction effect of CEO gender and the relative 
change in ROIC-WACC between four years and one year prior to the CEO appointment 
(continuous) on the proportion of media reports discussing agentic attributes. The performance 
range along which the curves are plotted represents -2 to +2 standard deviations from the mean. 
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Figure 40. Regression results showing the interaction effect of CEO gender and the relative 
change in shareholder return between three years prior to and the year of the CEO appointment 
(continuous) on the proportion of media reports discussing agentic attributes. The performance 
range along which the curves are plotted represents -2 to +2 standard deviations from the mean. 
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Table 1 
Means, standard deviations and correlations among Study 1 variables 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Participant Gender a 1.52 .50 --     
2. Age 42.37 10.98 .01 --    
3. Years Worked 20.72 10.97 .07 .87** --   
4. Years as Manager 11.77 8.04 .11 .68** .74** --  
5. English 1st  Lang. 1.03 .16 .04 -.02 -.04 -.10 -- 
6. Ethnicity 2.72 1.67 -.13 -.08 -.06 -.04 .09 
7. Performance 
Condition ᵇ 
.57 .50 .01 -.08 -.14 -.04 -.06 
8. Candidate Gender   
Condition c 
.51 .50 .06 .05 .06 .10 .16* 
9. Need for Communal 
Attributes 
4.49 .50 -.11 -.15* -.14 -.09 -.03 
10. Need for Agentic 
Attributes 
3.88 .70 -.09 -.23** -.24** -.16* .04 
11. Need for Change 3.74 1.19 -.07 -.07 -.002 -.10 .03 
12. Candidate 
Endorsement  
5.29 1.46 .04 -.19** -.20** -.10 -.01 
13. Suitability 3.47 1.10 .08 -.17* -.18* -.06 -.05 
14. Qualifications 3.63 .96 -.01 -.15* -.16* -.09 -.05 
15. Anticipated 
Effectiveness 
3.51 1.07 .02 -.27** -.29** -.17* -.02 
16. Position Riskiness  4.65 1.32 -.03 -.09 .01 -.06 -.16* 
17. Candidate Value 3.05 1.01 .05 -.17* -.14 -.06 -.03 
18. Position 
Recommendation 
3.90 .93 -.07 -.17* -.17* -.11 -.07 
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Table 1 
Means, standard deviations and correlations among Study 1 variables (continued) 
Variable 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
6. Ethnicity --       
7. Performance 
Condition ᵇ 
-.03 --      
8. Candidate Gender   
Condition c 
-.07 .10 --     
9. Need for Communal 
Attributes 
.05 -.04 .001 --    
10. Need for Agentic 
Attributes 
.06 -.09 .08 .47** --   
11. Need for Change -.03 -.68** -.04 .11 .22** --  
12. Candidate 
Endorsement  
.10 .26** -.001 .30** .24** -.19** -- 
13. Suitability .11 .22** -.04 .33** .24** -.18* .86** 
14. Qualifications .13 .16* -.07 .33** .15* -.12 .82** 
15. Anticipated 
Effectiveness 
.11 .23** -.09 .36** .24** -.19** .82** 
16. Position Riskiness  .07 -.22** -.03 .01 0.05 .33** -.18* 
17. Candidate Value .07 .18* -.02 .38** .24** -.16* .67** 
18. Position 
Recommendation 
.18* .29** .04 .28** .11 -.28** .63** 
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Table 1 
Means, standard deviations and correlations among Study 1 variables (continued) 
 13 14 15 16 17 18 
13. Suitability --      
14. Qualifications .88** --     
15. Anticipated 
Effectiveness 
.90** .86** --    
16. Position Riskiness  -.22** -.17* -.25** --   
17. Candidate Value .73** .70** .75** -.07 --  
18. Position 
Recommendation 
.67** .69** .72** -.19* .60** -- 
a Participant gender is coded as 0 for females and 1 for males. ᵇ Performance condition is coded 
as 0 for decreasing performance and 1 for increasing performance. c Candidate gender condition 
is coded as 0 for females and 1 for males. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01. 
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Table 2 
Regression results for the effects of need for communal attributes, need for change, position 
riskiness, candidate value, and position recommendation on the endorsement, suitability, 
qualifications, and anticipated effectiveness ratings of male and female candidates respectively    
Endorsement 
ratings 
Suitability 
ratings 
Qualification 
ratings 
Anticipated 
effectiveness 
ratings 
Females      
Need for communal 
attributes 
.05 .06 .11 .11 
Need for agentic 
attributes 
.12 .03 -.07 .11 
Need for change .04 .07 .24** .03 
Position riskiness -.22** -.21** -.24** -.27** 
Candidate value .47** .54** .35** .41** 
Position 
recommendation  
.26** .25** .42** .33** 
df 6, 84 6, 84 6, 84 6, 84 
F overall 22.38** 25.38** 21.44** 32.78** 
R² .62 .64 .61 .70 
Males      
Need for communal 
attributes 
-.04 -.05 .01 -.02 
Need for agentic 
attributes 
.09 .18* .05 .07 
Need for change -.07 -.06 -.02 .05 
Position riskiness .02 -.06 .03 -.09 
Candidate value .37** .42** .48** .51** 
Position 
recommendation  
.41** .43** .42** .46** 
df 6, 87 6, 87 6, 87 6, 87 
F overall 15.77** 27.48** 30.52** 45.45** 
R² .52 .66 .68 .76 
Note: Coefficients are beta unless otherwise noted.   
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 3  
Summary of Study 1 hypothesis testing 
Hypothesis Summary  Perspective Tested Supported?  
H1: Company performance interacts with leader 
gender to predict leader endorsement ratings.  
Overall glass cliff 
effect 
No support 
H2: The perceived need for communal attributes 
is stronger under conditions of decreasing versus 
increasing performance, and these stronger 
perceptions of need for communal attributes 
positively relate to endorsement of the female 
but not male candidate. 
Think crisis-think 
female  
No support   
H3: Company performance interacts with 
candidate gender to predict ratings of leader a) 
suitability, b) qualifications, and c) anticipated 
effectiveness. 
Glass cliff effect 
with other outcomes 
No support 
H4: Perceived need for a leader to possess 
communal attributes is stronger under conditions 
of decreasing versus increasing performance, 
and these stronger perceptions of the need for 
communal attributes positively relate to ratings 
of suitability, qualifications, and anticipated 
effectiveness for female but not male candidate.   
Think crisis-think 
female 
No support 
H5: Perceived a) riskiness of the position, b) 
candidate value, and c) extent to which the 
candidate should hold out for a better 
opportunity mediate the interaction effect of 
company performance and leader gender on 
leadership endorsement ratings.  
Think crisis-think 
not male  
No support  
H6: Perceived need for change is stronger under 
conditions of decreasing versus increasing 
performance, and these stronger perceptions of 
needed change positively relate to endorsement 
of the female but not male candidate. 
Females as signals of 
change 
Full support  
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Table 4  
Means and standard deviations of Study 2 variables  
 
  
Variable Mean 
 
SD N 
1. CEO gendera .50 .50 84 
2. Revenue in billions 28.61 36.36 84 
3. Internal/external hireᵇ .74 .44 84 
4. Percentage of female executives in 
industry  
.14 .03 84 
5. Proportion of articles written by malesc  .40 .22 84 
6. Proportion of articles written by 
femalesc  
.28 .21 84 
7. Proportion of  press release articles  .13 .20 84 
8. Proportion of communal attribute codes .01 .01 84 
9. Proportion of agentic attributes codes .01 .01 84 
10. Proportion of position riskiness codes  .01 .01 84 
11. Proportion of apprehension codes .01 .01 84 
12. Proportion of general change codes .02 .02 84 
13. Occurrence of leadership change codes .31 .47 84 
14. Occurrence of financial change codes .34 .48 84 
15. Occurrence of culture change codes  .15 .36 84 
16. Occurrence of image change codes .18 .39 84 
17. ROA Y4-Y1d .38 .49 82 
18. ROA Y4-Y0d .38 .49 81 
19. ROA Y3-Y1d .40 .49 81 
20. ROA Y3-Y0d .48 .50 82 
21. ROE Y4-Y1d .42 .50 79 
22. ROE Y4-Y0d .42 .50 79 
23. ROE Y3-Y1d .46 .50 79 
24. ROE Y3-Y0d .44 .50 79 
25. ROIC-WACC Y4-Y1d  .49 .50 65 
26. ROIC-WACC Y4-Y0d .46 .50 65 
27. ROIC-WACC Y3-Y1d .54 .50 70 
28. ROIC-WACC Y3-Y0d .61 .49 70 
29. Shareholder return Y4-Y1d .43 .50 77 
30. Shareholder return Y4_Y0d .55 .50 77 
 UNDERSTANDING THE GLASS CLIFF   196 
 
Table 4 
Means and standard deviations of Study 2 variables (continued)  
a CEO gender was coded as 1 for females and 0 for males. ᵇ Internal/external hire was coded as 1 
for internal hire and 0 for external hire. ᶜ Certain articles were attributed to a “staff writer” and no 
name was provided. Because the proportion of articles written by males and females do not add 
to 100, the proportion of media articles written by journalists of either gender were included as 
separate covariates. d The dichotomous performance measures are represented by the name of the 
performance measure (e.g. ROA Y4_Y1). Each measure represents the difference in 
performance across the span of years indicated leading up to the CEO appointment. Each was 
coded as 1 for increasing performance and 0 for decreasing performance. e The continuous 
measures are represented by the name of the performance measure prefaced by “Relative change 
in…”. Each performance measure represents the relative increase or decrease in performance 
across the span of years indicated leading up to the CEO appointment.   
Variable Mean 
 
SD N 
31. Shareholder return Y3_Y1d .46 .52 78 
32. Shareholder return Y3_Y0d .53 .50 78 
33. Relative change in ROA Y4_Y1 e 
 
 
.05 1.51 77 
34. Relative change in ROA Y4_Y0 e .12 1.61 77 
35. Relative change in ROA Y3_Y1 e -.37 2.45 81 
36. Relative change in ROA Y3_Y0 e .01 1.54 81 
37. Relative change in ROE Y4_Y1 e .00 2.03 78 
38. Relative change in ROE Y4_Y0 e .06 1.45 78 
39. Relative change in ROE Y3_Y1 e -.21 2.79 81 
40. Relative change in ROE Y3_Y0 e .03 1.87 81 
41. Relative change in ROIC-WACC 
Y4_Y1 e 
1.94 16.62 65 
42. Relative change in ROIC-WACC 
Y4_Y0e 
41 
1.41 10.15 65 
43. Relative change in ROIC-WACC 
Y3_Y1e 
.51 7.40 70 
44. Relative change in ROIC-WACC 
Y3_Y0 e 
1.16 5.53 70 
45. Relative change in shareholder return 
Y4_Y1 e 
.03 6.47 73 
46. Relative change in shareholder return 
Y4_Y0 e 
.76 6.22 73 
47. Relative change in shareholder return 
Y3_Y1 e 
 
 
.98 7.70 75 
48. Relative change in shareholder return 
Y3_Y0 e 
.06 7.07 75 
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Table 5. 
Correlations between Study 2 variables  
 
  
Variable 1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. CEO gendera      --          
2. Revenue in billions -.02 --         
3. Internal/external hireb -.11 .10 --        
4. Percentage of female 
executives in industry  
.03 -.10 .14 --       
5. Proportion of articles 
written by malesc  
-.05 .28* -.07 -.06 --      
6. Proportion of articles 
written by femalesc  
.11 .04 .01 -.12 -.33** --     
7. Proportion of  press 
release articles  
.02 -.36** -.23* -.14 -.40** -.26* --    
8. Proportion of 
communal attribute 
codes 
.27* .27* -.15 -.13 .12 .19 -.23* --   
9. Proportion of agentic 
attributes codes 
.11 .31** -.07 -.24* .20 .12 -.29** .30** --  
10. Proportion of 
position riskiness codes  
-.04 .13 .03 -.03 .39** .14 -.46** .22* .15 -- 
11. Proportion of 
apprehension codes 
-.05 .03 -.27* -.05 .15 -.06 .04 .03 .09 .09 
12. Proportion of 
general change codes 
.12 .00 -.22* .06 .20 .23* -.36** .23* -.02 .21 
13. Occurrence of 
leadership change codes 
.10 .15 -.13 -.09 .18 .15 -.21 .19 .18 .04 
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Table 5. 
Correlations between Study 2 variables (continued).  
  Variable 1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
14. Occurrence of 
financial change codes 
.23* .13 -.08 .04 .21 .12 -.30** .18 .17 .21 
15. Occurrence of 
culture change codes  
.16 .23* -.12 -.06 .08 .19 -.15 .20 .19 .13 
16. Occurrence of image 
change codes 
.15 -.03 .06 -.11 .07 .12 -.09 .13 -.04 -.03 
17. ROA Y4-Y1d -.03 -.04 .00 .07 .05 -.21 .08 -.07 -.21 -.17 
18. ROA Y4-Y0d -.02 -.03 -.06 .13 -.09 -.06 .14 .01 -.10 -.23* 
19. ROA Y3-Y1d -.04 -.11 -.16 .17 -.17 -.06 .12 -.27* -.20 -.31** 
20. ROA Y3-Y0d -.02 -.05 -.11 .05 -.12 -.05 .18 -.16 -.22* -.24* 
21. ROE Y4-Y1d -.07 .02 -.19 -.09 .11 -.22 .20 .05 -.03 -.21 
22. ROE Y4-Y0d -.12 -.02 .04 .00 -.05 -.08 .04 .10 .04 -.24* 
23. ROE Y3-Y1d -.04 -.03 -.14 -.01 -.25* -.06 .26* -.12 -.04 -.34** 
24. ROE Y3-Y0d -.01 -.12 -.10 -.02 -.17 -.03 .29* -.12 -.12 -.24* 
25. ROIC-WACC Y4-
Y1d  
-.05 -.11 -.19 -.01 .12 -.18 .26* -.11 -.20 -.17 
26. ROIC-WACC Y4-
Y0d 
.08 -.05 -.08 -.01 .03 -.05 .17 -.10 .04 -.12 
27. ROIC-WACC Y3-
Y1d 
.17 -.06 -.12 -.10 -.07 .11 .29* .01 -.02 -.27* 
28. ROIC-WACC Y3-
Y0d 
-.03 -.19 .03 -.19 -.19 .14 .24* -.08 .00 -.17 
29. Shareholder return 
Y4-Y1d 
-.01 .08 .09 .15 -.05 .07 -.05 .04 -.15 .12 
30. Shareholder return 
Y4-Y0 d 
-.04 -.17 .05 .11 -.08 -.11 .04 -.04 .01 .05 
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Table 5. 
Correlations between Study 2 variables (continued).  
 
  
Variable 1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
31. Shareholder return 
Y3_Y1d 
-.13 -.13 .25* .00 .15 -.13 -.01 .03 -.05 .15 
32. Shareholder return 
Y3_Y0d 
.00 .00 .21 -.05 .18 -.16 -.10 .08 .09 .05 
33. Relative change in 
ROA Y4_Y1 e 
 
 
.10 .10 -.11 .08 -.23* -.22 .35** -.04 -.16 -.31** 
34. Relative change in 
ROA Y4_Y0 e 
.14 .14 -.27* .12 -.15 -.04 .20 .01 -.06 -.19 
35. Relative change in 
ROA Y3_Y1 e 
.05 .05 -.05 -.01 -.17 -.10 .17 -.14 .00 -.25* 
36. Relative change in 
ROA Y3_Y0 e 
.08 .08 -.16 .10 -.13 .00 .21 -.03 -.04 -.19 
37. Relative change in 
ROE Y4_Y1 e 
.16 .16 -.12 -.04 -.17 -.14 .38** .04 -.01 -.231* 
38. Relative change in 
ROE Y4_Y0 e 
.11 .11 -.26* .05 -.16 .00 .30** .02 -.02 -.22 
39. Relative change in 
ROE Y3_Y1 e 
.00 .00 -.04 -.08 -.18 -.09 .20 -.10 .03 -.28* 
40. Relative change in 
ROE Y3_Y0 e 
-.01 -.01 -.10 .04 -.15 .01 .26* -.06 -.04 -.25* 
41. Relative change in 
ROIC-WACC Y4_Y1 e 
-.09 -.09 .09 -.01 .23 -.14 -.07 .02 .04 .06 
42. Relative change in 
ROIC-WACC Y4_Y0e 
-.06 -.06 .09 -.05 .27* -.15 .00 .00 .02 .04 
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Table 5. 
Correlations between Study 2 variables (continued).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable 1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
43. Relative change in 
ROIC-WACC Y3_Y1e 
.16 -.07 .05 -.02 -.20 .21 -.11 -.05 -.10 -.13 
44. Relative change in 
ROIC-WACC Y3_Y0 e 
.14 -.13 .05 -.16 -.30* .53** -.01 -.15 -.07 -.14 
45. Relative change in 
shareholder return 
Y4_Y1 e 
-.24* .07 .25* .11 -.17 .09 .04 .00 -.15 -.14 
46. Relative change in 
shareholder return 
Y4_Y0 e 
-.18 .00 .19 .10 -.11 -.02 .06 -.01 -.01 -.09 
47. Relative change 
in shareholder return 
Y3_Y1 e 
 
 
-.18 .11 .15 -.01 .11 .00 -.08 .15 .19 .09 
48. Relative change 
in shareholder return 
Y3_Y0 e 
.00 .06 .15 .00 .04 -.02 -.19 .06 -.07 .06 
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Table 5. 
Correlations between Study 2 variables (continued).  
  Variable 11 
 
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
11. Proportion of 
apprehension codes 
--  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
12. Proportion of 
general change codes 
.04 --  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
13. Occurrence of 
leadership change 
codes 
.13 .48** --  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
14. Occurrence of 
financial change 
codes 
.05 .55** .44** --  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
15. Occurrence of 
culture change codes  
.23* .34** .35** .31** --  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
16. Occurrence of 
image change codes 
.13 .31** .34** .27* .09 --  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
17. ROA Y4-Y1d -.13 -.04 -.13 -.14 -.13 .00 --  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
18. ROA Y4-Y0d -.04 -.10 -.09 -.31** -.07 .06 .63** --  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19. ROA Y3-Y1d .01 -.08 -.16 -.32** -.22 -.13 .40** .40** --  
20. ROA Y3-Y0d .08 -.16 -.21 -.33** -.01 -.07 .36** .67** .49** -- 
21. ROE Y4-Y1d .02 -.05 .03 -.14 -.10 .02 .61** .34** .42** .11 
22. ROE Y4-Y0d -.06 -.11 -.13 -.31** -.10 .06 .50** .77** .27* .52** 
23. ROE Y3-Y1d -.01 -.13 -.02 -.15 -.20 -.06 .23* .12 .67** .19 
24. ROE Y3-Y0d -.02 -.21 -.22* -.34** -.12 -.06 .19 .46** .54** .72** 
25. ROIC-WACC 
Y4-Y1d  
.01 -.05 .11 -.15 -.03 .17 .51** .29* .45** .23 
26. ROIC-WACC 
Y4-Y0d 
-.15 -.10 .02 -.24 -.17 .07 .38** .35** .25* .23 
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Table 5. 
Correlations between Study 2 variables (continued).  
 
  
Variable 11 
 
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
27. ROIC-WACC Y3-
Y1d .04 -.06 .10 -.12 -.08 .19 .34
** .22 .48** .26* 
28. ROIC-WACC Y3-
Y0d -.07 -.18 -.12 -.29
* -.06 .04 .23 .27* .31** .40** 
29. Shareholder return 
Y4-Y1d .20 .03 -.02 -.06 -.18 .05 .09 .15 .14 .17 
30. Shareholder return 
Y4_Y0d .15 -.04 -.29
* -.23* -.01 -.15 .06 .06 .06 .09 
31. Shareholder return 
Y3_Y1d -.07 -.30
** -.14 -.13 -.14 -.07 .04 .09 -.04 .15 
32. Shareholder return 
Y3_Y0d -.15 -.08 -.12 -.01 .29
* -.04 .04 .14 -.15 .08 
33. Relative change in 
ROA Y4_Y1 e 
 
 
-.08 -.16 -.06 -.21 -.26* -.01 .57** .42** .49** .30** 
34. Relative change in 
ROA Y4_Y0 e .09 -.02 -.03 -.16 .04 .08 .53
** .62** .47** .55** 
35. Relative change in 
ROA Y3_Y1 e .13 -.22
* .00 -.30** -.23* -.02 .29** .21 .41** .19 
36. Relative change in 
ROA Y3_Y0 e .22
* -.15 -.14 -.24* .06 .03 .30** .45** .44** .56** 
37. Relative change in 
ROE Y4_Y1 e -.04 -.16 .01 -.24
* -.17 .03 .42** .28* .36** .19 
38. Relative change in 
ROE Y4_Y0 e .10 .00 .01 -.14 .07 .09 .50
** .58** .44** .51** 
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Table 5. 
Correlations between Study 2 variables (continued).  
 
  
Variable 11 
 
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
39. Relative change in 
ROE Y3_Y1 e .13 -.22
* .02 -.27* -.26* .00 .19 .12 .37** .11 
40. Relative change in 
ROE Y3_Y0 e .21 -.17 -.15 -.23
* .06 .04 .20 .33** .40** .49** 
41. Relative change in 
ROIC-WACC Y4_Y1 e -.03 .08 -.07 -.09 -.09 -.02 .20 .13 -.06 -.12 
42. Relative change in 
ROIC-WACC Y4_Y0e 
41 
-.07 .05 -.11 -.14 -.08 -.03 .21 .19 -.05 .00 
43. Relative change in 
ROIC-WACC Y3_Y1e -.02 .01 .10 -.08 -.12 .05 .02 -.12 .33
** .03 
44. Relative change in 
ROIC-WACC Y3_Y0 e -.08 -.03 .00 -.11 .01 .03 -.09 -.03 .25
* .17 
45. Relative change in 
shareholder return 
Y4_Y1 e 
.03 -.20 -.22 -.25* -.09 .00 .20 .27* .10 .30** 
46. Relative change in 
shareholder return 
Y4_Y0 e 
.04 -.22 -.29* -.24* .07 -.03 .15 .14 .08 .14 
47. Relative change in 
shareholder return 
Y3_Y1 e 
 
 
-.04 -.04 -.04 .11 -.06 -.03 -.06 -.03 .10 -.05 
48. Relative change in 
shareholder return 
Y3_Y0 e 
.00 -.11 -.03 -.16 .03 .02 .09 .10 -.12 .03 
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Table 5. 
Correlations between Study 2 variables (continued).  
  
Variable 21 
 
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
21. ROE Y4-Y1d --          
22. ROE Y4-Y0d .48** --         
23. ROE Y3-Y1d .51** .20 --        
24. ROE Y3-Y0d .33** .54** .46** --       
25. ROIC-WACC Y4-
Y1d  
.66** .22 .35** .28* --      
26. ROIC-WACC Y4-
Y0d 
.47** .41** .15 .34** .57** --     
27. ROIC-WACC Y3-
Y1d 
.49** .25* .52** ..50** .50** .41** --    
28. ROIC-WACC Y3-
Y0d 
.25* .36** .27* .50** .29* .46** .51** --   
29. Shareholder return 
Y4-Y1d 
-.06 .05 -.06 .07 -.22 -.10 .07 .05 --  
30. Shareholder return 
Y4_Y0d 
.00 .16 -.11 .08 -.16 -.09 -.07 .06 .37** --  
31. Shareholder return 
Y3_Y1d 
-.04 .01 -.01 .12 -.16 .10 .07 .10 .35** .02 
32. Shareholder return 
Y3_Y0d 
-.02 .14 -.15 .03 -.09 .10 -.17 .02 -.08 .14 
33. Relative change in 
ROA Y4_Y1 e 
 
 
.52** .29* .41** .29* .32** .29* .32** .09 .14 .05 
34. Relative change in 
ROA Y4_Y0 e 
.46** .53** .33** .52** .26* .40** .31** .27* .14 .11 
35. Relative change in 
ROA Y3_Y1 e 
.33** .17 .39** .18 .12 .03 .20 -.07 .24* .19 
36. Relative change in 
ROA Y3_Y0 e 
.33** .37** .37** .54** .27* .33** .29* .31* .19 .13 
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Table 5. 
Correlations between Study 2 variables (continued).  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable 21 
 
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
37. Relative change in 
ROE Y4_Y1 e 
.52** .25* .44** .29* .28* .22 .37** .07 .20 .14 
38. Relative change in 
ROE Y4_Y0 e 
.54** .55** .40** .56** .32* .46** .42** .35** .12 .14 
39. Relative change in 
ROE Y3_Y1 e 
.33** .15 .47** .22 .03 -.09 .24* .00 .26* .20 
40. Relative change in 
ROE Y3_Y0 e 
.31** .32** .42** .55** .22 .23 .42** .42** .16 .16 
41. Relative change in 
ROIC-WACC Y4_Y1 e 
.20 .14 -.06 -.10 .20 .19 -.06 -.13 -.09 -.16 
42. Relative change in 
ROIC-WACC Y4_Y0e 
41 
.21 .24 -.07 .01 .21 .28* .00 -.01 -.10 -.14 
43. Relative change in 
ROIC-WACC Y3_Y1e 
.10 -.14 .32** .09 .28* .16 .36** .12 .06 -.19 
44. Relative change in 
ROIC-WACC Y3_Y0 e 
-.05 -.04 .22 .27* .16 .32** .29* .37** -.11 -.15 
45. Relative change in 
shareholder return 
Y4_Y1 e 
.04 .24* .05 .13 -.09 -.06 .06 .19 .49** .23* 
46. Relative change in 
shareholder return 
Y4_Y0 e 
.12 .19 .02 .10 -.10 .02 -.04 .07 .22 .47** 
47. Relative change in 
shareholder return 
Y3_Y1 e 
 
 
-.10 -.05 .07 -.04 -.17 -.11 .13 .12 .31** -.10 
48. Relative change in 
shareholder return 
Y3_Y0 e 
.09 .16 -.15 .07 -.04 .03 -.15 -.09 -.03 .30* 
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Table 5. 
Correlations between Study 2 variables (continued).  
  Variable 31 
 
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 
31. Shareholder return 
Y3_Y1d 
--          
32. Shareholder return 
Y3_Y0d .42
** 
--         
33. Relative change in 
ROA Y4_Y1 e 
 
 
.04 -.05 
--        
34. Relative change in 
ROA Y4_Y0 e .00 .00 .70
** 
--       
35. Relative change in 
ROA Y3_Y1 e .10 -.15 .72
** .39** 
--      
36. Relative change in 
ROA Y3_Y0 e .09 .02 .49
** .78** .40** 
--     
37. Relative change in 
ROE Y4_Y1 e .16 -.02 .86
** .51** .74** .31** 
--    
38. Relative change in 
ROE Y4_Y0 e .02 .02 .66
** .93** .31** .74** .55** 
--   
39. Relative change in 
ROE Y3_Y1 e .08 -.15 .63
** .31** .91** .33** .76** .31** 
--  
40. Relative change in 
ROE Y3_Y0 e .07 -.02 .42
** .67** .35** .91** .31** .72** .39** 
-- 
41. Relative change in 
ROIC-WACC Y4_Y1 e -.10 .10 .12 .03 .06 -.04 .13 .06 .05 -.03 
42. Relative change in 
ROIC-WACC Y4_Y0e 
41 
-.04 .15 .08 .07 -.01 .03 .11 .12 -.01 .04 
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Table 5. 
Correlations between Study 2 variables (continued).  
 
  
Variable 31 
 
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 
43. Relative change in 
ROIC-WACC Y3_Y1e -.01 -.27
* .33** .04 .29* .06 .24* .03 .30* .08 
44. Relative change in 
ROIC-WACC Y3_Y0 e -.01 -.13 .01 .08 .04 .17 .01 .10 .08 .21 
45. Relative change in 
shareholder return 
Y4_Y1 e 
.38** .11 .24* .26* .38** .56** .21 .27* .34** .58** 
46. Relative change in 
shareholder return 
Y4_Y0 e 
.18 .31** .22 .25* .38** .54** .23 .27* .36** .59** 
47. Relative change in 
shareholder return 
Y3_Y1 e 
 
 
.39** .04 .04 .03 .03 .05 .06 .03 .04 .03 
48. Relative change in 
shareholder return 
Y3_Y0 e 
.11 .44** .01 .01 .03 -.01 .12 .01 .07 -.02 
43. Relative change in 
ROIC-WACC Y3_Y1e -.01 -.27
* .33** .04 .29* .06 .24* .03 .30* .08 
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Table 5. 
Correlations between Study 2 variables (continued).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. n for correlations vary from 62 to 84, as some company performance data was not available. The year the CEO was appointed 
was dummy coded into 18 variables, and was not included in the correlation table.  ͣ CEO gender was coded as 1 for females and 0 for 
males. ᵇ Internal/external hire was coded as 1 for internal hire and 0 for external hire. ᶜ Certain articles were attributed to a “staff 
writer” and no name was provided. Because the proportion of articles written by males and females do not add to 100, the proportion 
of media articles written by journalists of either gender were included as separate covariates. ᵈ The dichotomous performance 
measures are represented by the name of the performance measure (e.g. ROA Y4_Y1). Each measure represents the difference in 
Variable 41 
 
42 43 44 45 46 47 48 
41. Relative change in 
ROIC-WACC Y4_Y1 e 
--        
42. Relative change in 
ROIC-WACC Y4_Y0e 
 
.96** --       
43. Relative change in 
ROIC-WACC Y3_Y1e 
.12 .04 --      
44. Relative change in 
ROIC-WACC Y3_Y0 e 
-.02 .10 .68** --  
 
    
45. Relative change in 
shareholder return 
Y4_Y1 e 
-.05 -.04 .05 .09 --    
46. Relative change in 
shareholder return 
Y4_Y0 e 
-.10 -.11 -.13 -.16 .73** --   
47. Relative change in 
shareholder return 
Y3_Y1 e 
 
 
-.05 -.03 .01 .03 .21 .04 --  
48. Relative change in 
shareholder return 
Y3_Y0 e 
.05 .03 -.16 -.22 .03 .242* -.61** -- 
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performance across the span of years indicated leading up to the CEO appointment. Each was coded as 1 for increasing performance 
and 0 for decreasing performance. ᵉ The continuous measures are represented by the name of the performance measure prefaced by 
“Relative change in…”. Each performance measure represents the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of 
years indicated leading up to the CEO appointment.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 6 
Results of chi-square analyses investigating the frequency of male and female CEOs appointment 
when company performance was decreasing versus increasing  
  Frequencies 
Performance 
Measure 
Chi-
Square p 
Male/ 
Improving 
Male/ 
Declining 
Female/ 
Improving 
Female/ 
Declining 
ROAY4_Y1 .05 .82 16 25 15 26 
ROAY4_Y0 .02 .89 16 25 15 25 
ROAY3_Y1 .13 .72 17 24 15 25 
ROAY3_Y0 .05 .83 20 21 19 22 
ROEY4_Y1 .35 .56 18 22 15 24 
ROEY4_Y0 1.09 .30 19 21 14 25 
ROEY3_Y1 .12 .73 19 21 17 22 
ROEY3_Y0 .02 .90 18 22 17 22 
ROIC-
WACCY4_Y1 
.14 .71 17 16 15 17 
ROIC-
WACCY4_Y0 
.38 .54 14 19 16 16 
ROIC-
WACCY3_Y1 
2.07 .15 16 19 22 13 
ROIC-
WACCY3_Y0 
.06 .81 22 13 21 14 
SRY4_Y1 .02 .90 17 22 16 22 
SRY4_Y0 .11 .74 22 17 20 18 
SRY3_Y1 1.33 .25 21 19 15 23 
SRY3_Y0 .00 .9 21 19 20 18 
Note. Degrees of freedom were 1 for each chi square analysis. Each performance measure 
represents the increase or decrease in performance across the span of years indicated leading up 
to the CEO appointment and represented as a dichotomous variable. For example, ROAY3_Y1 
represents the difference in ROA from three years prior to one year prior to the CEO 
appointment. If this difference value was positive, it was coded as 1 for increasing performance. 
If negative, it was coded as 0 for decreasing performance.  
  
 UNDERSTANDING THE GLASS CLIFF   211 
 
 
Table 7 
Logistic regression results for the effects of ROA (continuous) on CEO gender  
Predictor Relative change 
in ROAY4_ Y1 ͣ 
Relative change 
in ROAY4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in ROAY3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in ROAY3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Revenue in billions -.003 (2.15) -.003 (1.00) -.001 (1.00) -.001 (1.00) 
Internal/external 
hire 
-.26 (.77) -.19 (.83) -.31 (.73) -.36 (.70) 
Percentage of 
female executives 
in industry 
15.33 (4.53E+6) 14.72 (2.47E+6) 18.02 (6.73E+7) 19.02 (1.82E+8) 
ROA .16 (1.18) .08 (1.08) .12 (1.13) -.081 (.92) 
χ
2  
e 30.67 30.36 32.81 32.22 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years 
indicated leading up to the CEO appointed and represented as a continuous variable. Gender was 
coded as 1 for female and 0 for male. Year CEO was appointed was controlled through dummy 
coding; the 18 dummy coded variables entered into the analysis are not included in this table.  
ͣ n for ROAY4_Y1 = 77. ᵇ n for ROAY4_Y0 = 77.  ᶜ n for ROAY3_Y1= 81. ᵈ n for ROAY3_ Y0 
= 81. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-square were 22. 
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Table 8 
Logistic regression results for the effects of ROE (continuous) on CEO gender  
Predictor Relative change 
in ROEY4_ Y1 ͣ 
Relative change 
in ROEY4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in ROEY3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in ROEY3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Revenue in billions -.004 (1.00) -.003 (1.00) -.001 (1.00) -.001 (1.00) 
Internal/external 
hire 
-.31 (.73) -.19 (.83) -.34 (.72) -.39 (.68) 
Percentage of 
female executives 
in industry 
16.63 (1.67E+7) 17.48 (3.90E+7) 18.65 (1.26E+8) 19.30 (2.41E+8) 
ROE .39 (1.47) .08 (1.09) 1.00 (1.10) -.14 (.87) 
χ
2  
e 33.03 29.55 32.65 32.73 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years 
indicated leading up to the CEO appointed and represented as a continuous variable. Gender was 
coded as 1 for female and 0 for male. Year CEO was appointed was controlled through dummy 
coding; the 18 dummy coded variables entered into the analysis are not included in this table. 
ͣ n for ROEY4_ Y1 = 78. ᵇ n for ROEY4_Y0 = 78. ᶜ n for ROEY3_Y1 = 81. ᵈ n for ROEY3_ Y0 
= 81.  
e Degrees of freedom for each chi-square were 22. 
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Table 9 
Logistic regression results for the effects of ROIC-WACC (continuous) on CEO gender  
Predictor Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY4_ Y1  ͣ
Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Revenue in billions -.004 (1.00) -.004 (1.00) .001 (1.00) -.001 (1.00) 
Internal/external 
hire 
-.02 (.98) -.04 (.96) -.40 (.67) -.39 (.68) 
Percentage of 
female executives 
in industry 
19.00 (1.78E+8) 18.08 (7.14E+7) 18.12 (7.42 E+7) 19.30 (2.41E+8) 
ROIC-WACC -.02 (.99) -.01 (.99) .08 (1.08) -.14 (.87) 
χ
2  
e 22.68 22.26 25.16 24.80 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years 
indicated leading up to the CEO appointed and represented as a continuous variable. Gender was 
coded as 1 for female and 0 for male. Year CEO was appointed was controlled through dummy 
coding; the 12 dummy coded variables entered into the analysis are not included in this table. 
ͣ n for ROIC-WACCY4_ Y1 = 65. ᵇ n for ROIC-WACCY4_Y0 = 65. ᶜ n for ROIC-
WACCY3_Y1= 70. ᵈ n for ROIC-WACCY3_ Y0 = 70. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-square 
were 16. 
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Table 10 
Logistic regression results for the effects of shareholder return (continuous) on CEO gender  
Predictor Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y4_ Y1 ͣ 
Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Revenue in billions -.012 (.99) -.008 (.99) -.003 (1.00) -.002 (1.00) 
Internal/external 
hire 
-.315 (.73) -.464 (.63) -.474 (.62) -.648 (.52) 
Percentage of 
female executives 
in industry 
17.95 
(6.26E+7) 
18.47 (1.05E+8) 19.96 
(4.68E+8) 
23.68 
(1.92E+10) 
Shareholder return -.28 (.76)* -.21 (.81) -.12 (.89) -.14 (.87) 
χ
2  
e 43.85** 40.27** 36.56* 34.99* 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years 
indicated leading up to the CEO appointed and represented as a continuous variable. Gender was 
coded as 1 for female and 0 for male. Year CEO was appointed was controlled through dummy 
coding; the 18 dummy coded variables entered into the analysis are not included in this table. 
ͣ n for shareholder return Y4_ Y1 = 77. ᵇ n for shareholder return Y4_Y0 = 77. ᶜ n for shareholder 
return Y3_Y1= 78. ᵈ n for shareholder return Y3_Y0 = 78. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-
square were 21. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 11 
ANCOVA results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROA (dichotomized) 
on the proportion of communal attribute codes 
 ROAY4_Y1 ROAY4_Y0 ROAY3_Y1 ROAY3_Y0 
Proportion of news 
articles written by males 
1.02 .98 .43 .89 
Proportion of news 
articles written by females 
1.80 1.70 1.45 1.57 
Proportion of press release 
articles 
.78 .90 .80 .89 
CEO gender 5.51 6.08* 5.80* 6.49* 
ROA .07 .22 4.27* 1.01 
CEO gender x ROA  .13 .08 .26 .21 
df 4, 75 4, 74 4, 74 4, 75 
Note. F coefficients are shown. Each performance measure represents the difference in 
performance across the span of years indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and 
represented as a dichotomous variable. For example, ROAY3_Y1 represents the difference in 
ROA from three years prior to one year prior to the CEO appointment. If this difference value 
was positive, it was coded as 1 for increasing performance. If negative, it was coded as 0 for 
decreasing performance.  
* p < .05 
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Table 12 
ANCOVA results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROE (dichotomized) 
on the proportion of communal attribute codes 
 ROEY4_Y1 ROEY4_Y0 ROEY3_Y1 ROEY3_Y0 
Proportion of news articles 
written by males 
1.98 2.72 1.92 2.18 
Proportion of news articles 
written by females 
2.28 2.56 1.58 1.93 
Proportion of press release 
articles 
.89 .55 .73 .58 
CEO gender 11.59** 11.48** 10.02** 11.16** 
ROE 1.26 2.70 .03 .22 
CEO gender x ROE  1.50 .20 .21 2.40 
df 
4, 72 4, 72 4, 72 4, 72 
Note. F coefficients are shown. Each performance measure represents the difference in 
performance across the span of years indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and 
represented as a dichotomous variable. For example, ROEY3_Y1 represents the difference in 
ROE from three years prior to one year prior to the CEO appointment. If this difference value 
was positive, it was coded as 1 for increasing performance. If negative, it was coded as 0 for 
decreasing performance.  
** p < .01 
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Table 13 
ANCOVA results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROIC-WACC 
(dichotomized) on the proportion of communal attribute codes 
 ROIC-
WACC 
Y4_Y1 
ROIC-
WACC 
Y4_Y0 
ROIC-
WACC 
Y3_Y1 
ROIC-
WACC 
Y3_Y0 
Proportion of news 
articles written by males 
.20 .26 .49 .47 
Proportion of news 
articles written by females 
.82 1.31 .73 .82 
Proportion of press release 
articles 
.73 .68 .54 .50 
CEO gender 5.53* 6.08* 4.73* 4.57* 
ROIC-WACC .15 .66 .01 .16 
CEO gender x ROIC-
WACC 
2.02 1.19 .001 .0003 
df 
4, 58 4, 58 4, 63 4, 63 
Note. F coefficients are shown. Each performance measure represents the difference in 
performance across the span of years indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and 
represented as a dichotomous variable. For example, ROIC-WACCY3_Y1 represents the 
difference in ROIC-WACC from three years prior to one year prior to the CEO appointment. If 
this difference value was positive, it was coded as 1 for increasing performance. If negative, it 
was coded as 0 for decreasing performance.  
* p < .05 
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Table 14 
ANCOVA results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in shareholder return 
(dichotomized) on the proportion of communal attribute codes 
 SR Y4_Y1 SR Y4_Y0 SR Y3_Y1 SR Y3_Y0 
Proportion of news articles 
written by males 
.59 .41 .57 .32 
Proportion of news articles 
written by females 
3.10 2.89 3.40 3.24 
Proportion of press release 
articles 
.95 1.08 .93 1.02 
CEO gender 6.99* 7.18** 8.09** 7.79** 
Shareholder return .08 .01 .59 .68 
CEO gender x Shareholder 
return  
.17 .21 .53 1.35 
df 4, 70 4, 70 4, 71 4, 71 
Note. F coefficients are shown. Each performance measure represents the difference in 
performance across the span of years indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and 
represented as a dichotomous variable. For example, SRY3_Y1 represents the difference in 
shareholder return from three years prior to one year prior to the CEO appointment. If this 
difference value was positive, it was coded as 1 for increasing performance. If negative, it was 
coded as 0 for decreasing performance.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 15 
Hierarchical moderated regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and relative 
change in ROA (continuous) on the proportion of communal attribute codes 
Predictor Relative 
change in 
ROAY4_ Y1 ͣ 
Relative change 
in ROAY4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in ROAY3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in ROAY3_Y0 ᵈ 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
.13 .12 .11 .13 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
.18 .17 .16 .17 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-.10 -.11 -.10 -.11 
CEO gender .27* .27* .28* .28* 
ROA .06 .03 -.06 -.01 
CEO gender x ROA  -.04 -.01 -.07 -.002 
df 6, 70 6, 70 6, 74 6, 74 
F overall 1.99 1.97 2.47* 2.24* 
R² .15 .14 .17 .15 
Note: Beta coefficients from the final model are shown. Each performance measure represents 
the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender was coded as 1 for 
female and 0 for male.  
ͣ n for ROAY4_ Y1 = 77. ᵇ n for ROAY4_Y0 = 77.  ᶜ n for ROAY3_Y1= 81. ᵈ n for ROAY3_ Y0 
= 81. 
* p < .05 
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Table 16 
Hierarchical moderated regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and relative 
change in ROE (continuous) on the proportion of communal attribute codes 
Predictor Relative change 
in ROEY4_ Y1 ͣ 
Relative change 
in ROEY4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in ROEY3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in ROEY3_Y0 ᵈ 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
.12 .12 .19 .13 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
.17 .17 .16 .17 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-.18 -.11 -.12 -.11 
CEO gender .25* .27* .28* .28* 
ROE -.03 .03 -.06 -.06 
CEO gender x ROE  .18 -.01 .03 .04 
df 6, 71 6, 70 6, 74 6, 74 
F overall 2.25* 1.96 2.27* 2.25* 
R² .16 .14 .16 .15 
Note: Beta coefficients from the final model are shown. Each performance measure represents 
the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender was coded as 1 for 
female and 0 for male.  
ͣ n for ROEY4_ Y1 = 78. ᵇ n for ROEY4_Y0 = 78. ᶜ n for ROEY3_Y1 = 81. ᵈ n for ROEY3_ Y0 
= 81.  
* p < .05 
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Table 17 
Hierarchical moderated regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and relative 
change in ROIC-WACC (continuous) on the proportion of communal attribute codes 
Predictor Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY4_ Y1  ͣ
Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY3_Y0 ᵈ 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
.07 .07 .10 .08 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
.16 .16 .25 .32* 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-.11 -.12 -.08 -.09 
CEO gender .24 .27* .27* .28* 
ROIC-WACC .06 .06 .10 -.08 
CEO gender x 
ROIC-WACC  
-.10 -.11 -.31 -.28 
df 6, 58 6, 58 6, 63 6, 63 
F overall 1.74 1.76 2.04 2.65* 
R² .15 .15 .16 .20 
Note: Beta coefficients from the final model are shown. Each performance measure represents 
the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender was coded as 1 for 
female and 0 for male.  
ͣ n for ROIC-WACCY4_ Y1 = 65. ᵇ n for ROIC-WACCY4_Y0 = 65. ᶜ n for ROIC-
WACCY3_Y1= 70. ᵈ n for ROIC-WACCY3_ Y0 = 70. 
* p < .05 
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Table 18 
Hierarchical moderated regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and relative 
change in shareholder return (continuous) on the proportion of communal attribute codes 
Predictor Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y4_ Y1 ͣ 
Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y3_Y1 ᶜ 
Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y3_Y0 ᵈ 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
.24 .17 .14 .14 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
.25* .24 .24* .23 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-.06 -.10 -.08 -.03 
CEO gender .37** .34** .43** .34** 
Shareholder return .36 .03 .16 -.12 
CEO gender x 
shareholder return 
-.30 .05 .15 .31* 
df 6, 66 6, 66 6, 68 6, 68 
F overall 3.65** 3.14** 4.46** 4.65** 
R² .25 .22 .28 .29 
Note: Beta coefficients from the final model are shown. Each performance measure represents 
the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender was coded as 1 for 
female and 0 for male.  
ͣ n for shareholder return Y4_ Y1 = 73. ᵇ n for shareholder return Y4_Y0 = 73. ᶜ n for shareholder 
return Y3_Y1= 75. ᵈ n for shareholder return Y3_Y0 = 75. 
*p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 19 
ANCOVA results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROA (dichotomized) 
on the proportion of position riskiness codes 
 ROAY4_Y1 ROAY4_Y0 ROAY3_Y1 ROAY3_Y0 
Proportion of news 
articles written by males 
7.41** 6.83* 4.96* 6.51* 
Proportion of news 
articles written by females 
1.50 2.39 1.42 2.40 
Proportion of press release 
articles 
5.62* 4.89* 6.08* 5.44* 
CEO gender .26 .03 .09 .12 
ROA 1.73 2.42 5.13* 2.18 
CEO gender x ROA  .57 .72 .29 1.98 
df 4, 75 4, 74 4, 74 4, 75 
Note. F coefficients are shown. Each performance measure represents the difference in 
performance across the span of years indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and 
represented as a dichotomous variable. For example, ROAY3_Y1 represents the difference in 
ROA from three years prior to one year prior to the CEO appointment. If this difference value 
was positive, it was coded as 1 for increasing performance. If negative, it was coded as 0 for 
decreasing performance.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 20 
ANCOVA results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROE (dichotomized) 
on the proportion of position riskiness codes 
 ROEY4_Y1 ROEY4_Y0 ROEY3_Y1 ROEY3_Y0 
Proportion of news articles 
written by males 
14.03** 10.34** 8.02** 11.38** 
Proportion of news articles 
Written by females 
2.69 2.71 1.93 3.12 
Proportion of press release 
articles 
3.51 5.11* 4.76* 4.36* 
CEO gender .01 .01 .01 .07 
ROE 3.07 4.26* 3.05 1.04 
CEO gender x ROE  .19 .38 1.10 5.17* 
df 
4, 72 4, 72 4, 72 4, 72 
Note. F coefficients are shown. Each performance measure represents the difference in 
performance across the span of years indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and 
represented as a dichotomous variable. For example, ROEY3_Y1 represents the difference in 
ROE from three years prior to one year prior to the CEO appointment. If this difference value 
was positive, it was coded as 1 for increasing performance. If negative, it was coded as 0 for 
decreasing performance.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 21 
ANCOVA results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROIC-WACC 
(dichotomized) on the proportion of position riskiness codes 
 ROIC-
WACC 
Y4_Y1 
ROIC-
WACC 
Y4_Y0 
ROIC-
WACC 
Y3_Y1 
ROIC-
WACC 
Y3_Y0 
Proportion of news 
articles written by males 
6.18* 5.92* 8.48** 6.74* 
Proportion of news 
articles Written by 
females 
2.77 3.13 3.32 2.00 
Proportion of press release 
articles 
4.99* 5.84* 2.94 4.71* 
CEO gender .69 .52 .34 .98 
ROIC-WACC .67 .29 3.17 .37 
CEO gender x ROIC-
WACC 
.22 .35 3.15 1.07 
df 4, 58 4, 58 4, 63 4, 63 
Note. F coefficients are shown. Each performance measure represents the difference in 
performance across the span of years indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and 
represented as a dichotomous variable. For example, ROIC-WACCY3_Y1 represents the 
difference in ROIC-WACC from three years prior to one year prior to the CEO appointment. If 
this difference value was positive, it was coded as 1 for increasing performance. If negative, it 
was coded as 0 for decreasing performance. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 22 
ANCOVA results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in shareholder return 
(dichotomized) on the proportion of position riskiness codes 
 SR Y4_Y1 SR Y4_Y0 SR Y3_Y1 SR Y3_Y0 
Proportion of news articles 
written by males 
5.20* 5.20* 5.81* 5.89* 
Proportion of news articles 
Written by females 
3.15 3.15 3.46 2.81 
Proportion of press release 
articles 
6.26* 6.26* 5.71* 5.72* 
CEO gender .27 .29 .05 .10 
Shareholder return 1.15 1.15 1.58 .002 
CEO gender x Shareholder 
return  
1.43 1.43 .78 .005 
df 4, 70 4, 70 4, 71 4, 71 
Note. F coefficients are shown. Each performance measure represents the difference in 
performance across the span of years indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and 
represented as a dichotomous variable. For example, SRY3_Y1 represents the difference in 
shareholder return from three years prior to one year prior to the CEO appointment. If this 
difference value was positive, it was coded as 1 for increasing performance. If negative, it was 
coded as 0 for decreasing performance.  
* p < .05 
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Table 23 
Hierarchical moderated regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and relative 
change in ROA (continuous) on the proportion of position riskiness codes 
Predictor Relative 
change in 
ROAY4_ Y1 ͣ 
Relative change 
in ROAY4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in ROAY3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in ROAY3_Y0 ᵈ 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
.28* .30* .29* .32** 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
.14 .17 .16 .18 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-.32* -.32** -.26* -.24 
CEO gender -.06 -.06 -.03 -.02 
ROA -.13 -.26 -.07 -.44 
CEO gender x ROA  .03 .23 -.10 .38 
df 6, 70 6, 70 6, 74 6, 74 
F overall 4.92** 5.12** 5.15** 5.40** 
R² .30 .31 .30 .30 
Note: Beta coefficients from the final model are shown. Each performance measure represents 
the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender was coded as 1 for 
female and 0 for male.  
ͣ n for ROAY4_ Y1 = 77. ᵇ n for ROAY4_Y0 = 77.  ᶜ n for ROAY3_Y1= 81. ᵈ n for ROAY3_ Y0 
= 81. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 24 
Hierarchical moderated regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and relative 
change in ROE (continuous) on the proportion of position riskiness codes 
Predictor Relative change 
in ROEY4_ Y1 ͣ 
Relative change 
in ROEY4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in ROEY3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in ROEY3_Y0 ᵈ 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
.30* .30* .29* .32** 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
.16 .18 .15 .19 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-.36** -.31* -.27* -.20 
CEO gender -.08 -.06 -.03 -.04 
ROE -.11 -.29 -.18 -.63** 
CEO gender x ROE  .13 .27 .02 .53* 
df 6, 71 6, 71 6, 74 6, 74 
F overall 4.93** 5.43** 5.19** 6.40** 
R² .29 .32 .30 .34 
Note: Beta coefficients from the final model are shown. Each performance measure represents 
the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender was coded as 1 for 
female and 0 for male.  
ͣ n for ROEY4_ Y1 = 78. ᵇ n for ROEY4_Y0 = 78. ᶜ n for ROEY3_Y1 = 81. ᵈ n for ROEY3_ Y0 
= 81.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 25 
Hierarchical moderated regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and relative 
change in ROIC-WACC (continuous) on the proportion of position riskiness codes 
Predictor Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY4_ Y1  ͣ
Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY3_Y0 ᵈ 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
.33* .31* .35** .35** 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
.22 .23 .32* .29 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-.31* -.33* -.27* -.28* 
CEO gender -.12 -.09 -.07 -.06 
ROIC-WACC -.01 -.02 .09 -.27 
CEO gender x 
ROIC-WACC  
-.07 .02 -.31 .10 
df 6, 58 6, 58 6, 63 6, 63 
F overall 4.44** 4.38** 5.27** 4.80** 
R² .32 .31 .33 .31 
Note: Beta coefficients from the final model are shown. Each performance measure represents 
the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender was coded as 1 for 
female and 0 for male.  
ͣ n for ROIC-WACCY4_ Y1 = 65. ᵇ n for ROIC-WACCY4_Y0 = 65. ᶜ n for ROIC-
WACCY3_Y1= 70. ᵈ n for ROIC-WACCY3_ Y0 = 70. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 26 
Hierarchical moderated regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and relative 
change in shareholder return (continuous) on the proportion of position riskiness codes 
Predictor Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y4_ Y1 ͣ 
Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y3_Y1 ᶜ 
Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y3_Y0 ᵈ 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
.40** .40** .37** .37** 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
.28* .27* .22 .22 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-.24 -.25* -.28* -.28* 
CEO gender .01 .02 -.02 -.01 
Shareholder return .004 .05 .04 -.01 
CEO gender x 
shareholder return 
-.10 -.07 -.04 .01 
df 6, 66 6, 66 6, 68 6, 68 
F overall 6.48** 6.25** 5.94** 5.88** 
R² .37 .36 .34 .34 
Note: Beta coefficients from the final model are shown. Each performance measure represents 
the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender was coded as 1 for 
female and 0 for male.  
ͣ n for shareholder return Y4_ Y1 = 73. ᵇ n for shareholder return Y4_Y0 = 73. ᶜ n for shareholder 
return Y3_Y1= 75. ᵈ n for shareholder return Y3_Y0 = 75. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 27 
ANCOVA results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROA (dichotomized) 
on the proportion of apprehension codes 
 ROAY4_Y1 ROAY4_Y0 ROAY3_Y1 ROAY3_Y0 
Proportion of news 
articles written by males 
2.14 2.34 2.43 2.69 
Proportion of news 
articles Written by 
females 
.05 .16 .16 .13 
Proportion of press release 
articles 
1.18 1.22 1.11 .94 
CEO gender .03 .08 .15 .18 
ROA 1.71 .12 .08 .61 
CEO gender x ROA  1.23 .20 .01 .40 
df 4, 75 4, 74 4, 74 4, 75 
Note. F coefficients are shown. Each performance measure represents the difference in 
performance across the span of years indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and 
represented as a dichotomous variable. For example, ROAY3_Y1 represents the difference in 
ROA from three years prior to one year prior to the CEO appointment. If this difference value 
was positive, it was coded as 1 for increasing performance. If negative, it was coded as 0 for 
decreasing performance.  
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Table 28 
ANCOVA results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROE (dichotomized) 
on the proportion of apprehension codes 
 ROEY4_Y1 ROEY4_Y0 ROEY3_Y1 ROEY3_Y0 
Proportion of news articles 
written by males 
2.18 1.74 2.06 2.12 
Proportion of news articles 
Written by females 
.10 .11 .12 .12 
Proportion of press release 
articles 
1.10 1.06 .96 1.07 
CEO gender .10 .11 .13 .15 
ROE .06 .25 .01 .05 
CEO gender x ROE  .07 .23 .01 .02 
df 
4, 72 4, 72 4, 72 4, 72 
Note. F coefficients are shown. Each performance measure represents the difference in 
performance across the span of years indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and 
represented as a dichotomous variable. For example, ROEY3_Y1 represents the difference in 
ROE from three years prior to one year prior to the CEO appointment. If this difference value 
was positive, it was coded as 1 for increasing performance. If negative, it was coded as 0 for 
decreasing performance.  
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Table 29 
ANCOVA results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROIC-WACC 
(dichotomized) on the proportion of apprehension codes 
 ROIC-
WACC 
Y4_Y1 
ROIC-
WACC 
Y4_Y0 
ROIC-
WACC 
Y3_Y1 
ROIC-
WACC 
Y3_Y0 
Proportion of news 
articles written by males 
1.98 2.50 1.94 1.86 
Proportion of news 
articles Written by 
females 
.06 .02 .000008 .00008 
Proportion of press release 
articles 
1.36 1.73 1.11 1.96 
CEO gender .90 .51 .74 1.12 
ROIC-WACC .27 2.09 .03 .44 
CEO gender x ROIC-
WACC 
.63 3.29 .000009 .87 
df 4, 58 4, 58 4, 63 4, 63 
Note. F coefficients are shown. Each performance measure represents the difference in 
performance across the span of years indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and 
represented as a dichotomous variable. For example, ROIC-WACCY3_Y1 represents the 
difference in ROIC-WACC from three years prior to one year prior to the CEO appointment. If 
this difference value was positive, it was coded as 1 for increasing performance. If negative, it 
was coded as 0 for decreasing performance. 
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Table 30 
ANCOVA results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in shareholder return 
(dichotomized) on the proportion of apprehension codes 
 SR Y4_Y1 SR Y4_Y0 SR Y3_Y1 SR Y3_Y0 
Proportion of news articles 
written by males 
3.74 2.80 2.94 2.29 
Proportion of news articles 
Written by females 
.11 .24 .06 .0001 
Proportion of press release 
articles 
1.86 1.16 1.25 .70 
CEO gender .52 .12 .37 .21 
Shareholder return 3.60 2.06 .97 2.26 
CEO gender x Shareholder 
return  
3.49 .10 .87 1.26 
df 4, 70 4, 70 4, 71 4, 71 
Note. F coefficients are shown. Each performance measure represents the difference in 
performance across the span of years indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and 
represented as a dichotomous variable. For example, SRY3_Y1 represents the difference in 
shareholder return from three years prior to one year prior to the CEO appointment. If this 
difference value was positive, it was coded as 1 for increasing performance. If negative, it was 
coded as 0 for decreasing performance.  
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Table 31 
Hierarchical moderated regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and relative 
change in ROA (continuous) on the proportion of apprehension codes 
Predictor Relative 
change in 
ROAY4_ Y1 ͣ 
Relative change 
in ROAY4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in ROAY3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in ROAY3_Y0 ᵈ 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
.18 .22 .25 .21 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
.01 .05 .09 .04 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
.16 .13 .16 .07 
CEO gender -.03 -.05 -.06 -.08 
ROA -.14 -.18 .27 .67* 
CEO gender x ROA  .06 .33 -.17 -.48 
df 6, 70 6, 70 6, 74 6, 74 
F overall .58 1.00 1.03 1.80 
R² .05 .08 .08 .13 
Note: Beta coefficients from the final model are shown. Each performance measure represents 
the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender was coded as 1 for 
female and 0 for male.  
ͣ n for ROAY4_ Y1 = 77. ᵇ n for ROAY4_Y0 = 77.  ᶜ n for ROAY3_Y1= 81. ᵈ n for ROAY3_ Y0 
= 81. 
* p < .05 
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Table 32 
Hierarchical moderated regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and relative 
change in ROE (continuous) on the proportion of apprehension codes 
Predictor Relative change 
in ROEY4_ Y1 ͣ 
Relative change 
in ROEY4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in ROEY3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in ROEY3_Y0 ᵈ 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
.20 .20 .26 .21 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
.04 .04 .10 .03 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
.19 .12 .16 .04 
CEO gender -.03 -.05 -.05 -.04 
ROE -.01 -.15 .38* .67* 
CEO gender x ROE  -.08 .30 -.30 -.49 
df 6, 71 6, 71 6, 74 6, 74 
F overall .56 .98 1.33 1.81 
R² .05 .08 .10 .13 
Note: Beta coefficients from the final model are shown. Each performance measure represents 
the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender was coded as 1 for 
female and 0 for male.  
ͣ n for ROEY4_ Y1 = 78. ᵇ n for ROEY4_Y0 = 78. ᶜ n for ROEY3_Y1 = 81. ᵈ n for ROEY3_ Y0 
= 81.  
* p < .05 
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Table 33 
Hierarchical moderated regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and relative 
change in ROIC-WACC (continuous) on the proportion of apprehension codes 
Predictor Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY4_ Y1  ͣ
Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY3_Y0 ᵈ 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
.24 .26 .23 .23 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
-.03 -.02 .01 -.01 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
.17 .18 .18 .18 
CEO gender -.17 -.13 -.11 -.09 
ROIC-WACC -.09 -.13 .08 -.25 
CEO gender x 
ROIC-WACC  
-.09 -.06 -.02 .29 
df 6, 58 6, 58 6, 63 6, 63 
F overall .84 .92 .78 .92 
R² .08 .09 .07 .08 
Note: Beta coefficients from the final model are shown. Each performance measure represents 
the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender was coded as 1 for 
female and 0 for male.  
ͣ n for ROIC-WACCY4_ Y1 = 65. ᵇ n for ROIC-WACCY4_Y0 = 65. ᶜ n for ROIC-
WACCY3_Y1= 70. ᵈ n for ROIC-WACCY3_ Y0 = 70. 
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Table 34 
Hierarchical moderated regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and relative 
change in shareholder return (continuous) on the proportion of apprehension codes 
Predictor Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y4_ Y1 ͣ 
Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y3_Y1 ᶜ 
Relative 
change in 
shareholder 
return Y3_Y0 ᵈ 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
.25 .19 .22 .20 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
.03 .02 .03 .04 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
.16 .13 .13 .15 
CEO gender -.02 -.05 -.09 -.05 
Shareholder return .26 -.02 -.05 .01 
CEO gender x 
shareholder return 
-.24 .07 -.08 .02 
df 6, 66 6, 66 6, 68 6, 68 
F overall .61 .43 .52 .42 
R² .05 .04 .04 .04 
Note: Beta coefficients from the final model are shown. Each performance measure represents 
the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender was coded as 1 for 
female and 0 for male.  
ͣ n for shareholder return Y4_ Y1 = 73. ᵇ n for shareholder return Y4_Y0 = 73. ᶜ n for shareholder 
return Y3_Y1= 75. ᵈ n for shareholder return Y3_Y0 = 75. 
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Table 35 
ANCOVA results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROA (dichotomized) 
on the proportion of change codes 
 ROAY4_Y1 ROAY4_Y0 ROAY3_Y1 ROAY3_Y0 
Proportion of news 
articles written by males 
2.44 1.83 2.14 2.06 
Proportion of news 
articles written by females 
3.66 2.33 3.73 2.43 
Proportion of press release 
articles 
2.56 2.93 2.80 3.25 
CEO gender .82 1.11 .74 1.29 
ROA .60 .09 .01 .63 
CEO gender x ROA  2.32 3.68 2.88 2.47 
df 4, 75 4, 74 4, 74 4, 75 
Note. F coefficients are shown. Each performance measure represents the difference in 
performance across the span of years indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and 
represented as a dichotomous variable. For example, ROAY3_Y1 represents the difference in 
ROA from three years prior to one year prior to the CEO appointment. If this difference value 
was positive, it was coded as 1 for increasing performance. If negative, it was coded as 0 for 
decreasing performance.  
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Table 36 
ANCOVA results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROE (dichotomized) 
on the proportion of change codes 
 ROEY4_Y1 ROEY4_Y0 ROEY3_Y1 ROEY3_Y0 
Proportion of news articles 
written by males 
1.01 2.37 1.58 1.35 
Proportion of news articles 
written by females 
2.69 2.13 2.98 2.77 
Proportion of press release 
articles 
3.94 4.10* 2.46 2.18 
CEO gender 1.53 .97 1.17 1.06 
ROE .83 .01 .03 1.33 
CEO gender x ROE  .16 5.07* 1.13 2.08 
df 
4, 72 4, 72 4, 72 4, 72 
Note. F coefficients are shown. Each performance measure represents the difference in 
performance across the span of years indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and 
represented as a dichotomous variable. For example, ROEY3_Y1 represents the difference in 
ROE from three years prior to one year prior to the CEO appointment. If this difference value 
was positive, it was coded as 1 for increasing performance. If negative, it was coded as 0 for 
decreasing performance.  
* p < .05 
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Table 37 
ANCOVA results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROIC-WACC 
(dichotomized) on the proportion of change codes 
 ROIC-
WACC 
Y4_Y1 
ROIC-
WACC 
Y4_Y0 
ROIC-
WACC 
Y3_Y1 
ROIC-
WACC 
Y3_Y0 
Proportion of news 
articles written by males 
2.35 2.83 2.15 2.01 
Proportion of news 
articles written by females 
5.37* 6.71* 3.09 3.63 
Proportion of press release 
articles 
1.77 1.11 1.27 1.06 
CEO gender 2.79 2.74 .86 .73 
ROIC-WACC .13 .45 .12 1.38 
CEO gender x ROIC-
WACC 
3.48 .15 .04 .02 
df 4, 58 4, 58 4, 63 4, 63 
Note. F coefficients are shown. Each performance measure represents the difference in 
performance across the span of years indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and 
represented as a dichotomous variable. For example, ROIC-WACCY3_Y1 represents the 
difference in ROIC-WACC from three years prior to one year prior to the CEO appointment. If 
this difference value was positive, it was coded as 1 for increasing performance. If negative, it 
was coded as 0 for decreasing performance. 
* p < .05 
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Table 38 
ANCOVA results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in shareholder return 
(dichotomized) on the proportion of change codes 
 SR Y4_Y1 SR Y4_Y0 SR Y3_Y1 SR Y3_Y0 
Proportion of news articles 
written by males 
2.04 2.97 2.40 1.53 
Proportion of news articles 
written by females 
5.83* 6.81* 5.37* 5.06* 
Proportion of press release 
articles 
2.51 2.40 3.20 3.29 
CEO gender 2.35 3.02 1.20 1.69 
Shareholder return .01 .12 7.32** .61 
CEO gender x Shareholder 
return  
.002 2.09 .69 .44 
df 4, 70 4, 70 4, 71 4, 71 
Note. F coefficients are shown. Each performance measure represents the difference in 
performance across the span of years indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and 
represented as a dichotomous variable. For example, SRY3_Y1 represents the difference in 
shareholder return from three years prior to one year prior to the CEO appointment. If this 
difference value was positive, it was coded as 1 for increasing performance. If negative, it was 
coded as 0 for decreasing performance.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 39 
Hierarchical moderated regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and relative 
change in ROA (continuous) on the proportion of change codes 
Predictor Relative change 
in ROAY4_ Y1 ͣ 
Relative change 
in ROAY4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in ROAY3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in ROAY3_Y0 ᵈ 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
.17 .17 .15 .16 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
.23 .22 .20 .22 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-.16 -.20 -.20 -.23 
CEO gender .17 .14 .14 .13 
ROA .10 .45* -.07 .30 
CEO gender x ROA  -.16 -.47* -.12 -.43 
df 6, 70 6, 70 6, 74 6, 74 
F overall 2.81* 3.80** 3.23** 3.46** 
R² .19 .25 .21 .22 
Note: Beta coefficients from the final model are shown. Each performance measure represents 
the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender was coded as 1 for 
female and 0 for male.  
ͣ n for ROAY4_ Y1 = 77. ᵇ n for ROAY4_Y0 = 77.  ᶜ n for ROAY3_Y1= 81. ᵈ n for ROAY3_ Y0 
= 81. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01  
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Table 40 
Hierarchical moderated regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and relative 
change in ROE (continuous) on the proportion of change codes 
Predictor Relative change 
in ROEY4_ Y1 ͣ 
Relative change 
in ROEY4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in ROEY3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in ROEY3_Y0 ᵈ 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
.20 .21 .16 .16 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
.22 .21 .22 .22 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-.16 -.23 -.19 -.24 
CEO gender .17 .14 .13 .13 
ROE -.01 .43* .01 .34 
CEO gender x ROE  -.07 -.41* -.20 -.47* 
df 6, 71 6, 71 6, 74 6, 74 
F overall 2.75* 3.78** 3.35** 3.67** 
R² .19 .24 .21 .23 
Note: Beta coefficients from the final model are shown. Each performance measure represents 
the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender was coded as 1 for 
female and 0 for male.  
ͣ n for ROEY4_ Y1 = 78. ᵇ n for ROEY4_Y0 = 78. ᶜ n for ROEY3_Y1 = 81. ᵈ n for ROEY3_ Y0 
= 81.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 41 
Hierarchical moderated regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and relative 
change in ROIC-WACC (continuous) on the proportion of change codes 
Predictor Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY4_ Y1  ͣ
Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY3_Y0 ᵈ 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
.20 .23 .21 .18 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
.36* .34* .32* .37* 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-.16 -.14 -.15 -.19 
CEO gender .20 .18 .10 .09 
ROIC-WACC .08 .09 .10 .29 
CEO gender x 
ROIC-WACC  
.03 -.12 -.20 -.53* 
df 6, 58 6, 58 6, 63 6, 63 
F overall 3.08* 3.21** 2.04 2.90* 
R² .24 .25 .16 .22 
Note: Beta coefficients from the final model are shown. Each performance measure represents 
the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender was coded as 1 for 
female and 0 for male.  
ͣ n for ROIC-WACCY4_ Y1 = 65. ᵇ n for ROIC-WACCY4_Y0 = 65. ᶜ n for ROIC-
WACCY3_Y1= 70. ᵈ n for ROIC-WACCY3_ Y0 = 70. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 42 
Hierarchical moderated regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and relative 
change in shareholder return (continuous) on the proportion of change codes 
Predictor Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y4_ Y1 ͣ 
Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y3_Y1 ᶜ 
Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y3_Y0 ᵈ 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
.16 .19 .19 .17 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
.35** .34** .29* .28* 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-.17 -.17 -.23 -.29* 
CEO gender .14 .16 .09 .16 
Shareholder return -.14 .01 -.02 -.05 
CEO gender x 
shareholder return 
-.03 -.19 -.18 -.21 
df 6, 66 6, 66 6, 68 6, 68 
F overall 4.01** 4.13** 3.76** 4.26** 
R² .27 .27 .25 .27 
Note: Beta coefficients from the final model are shown. Each performance measure represents 
the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender was coded as 1 for 
female and 0 for male.  
ͣ n for shareholder return Y4_ Y1 = 73. ᵇ n for shareholder return Y4_Y0 = 73. ᶜ n for shareholder 
return Y3_Y1= 75. ᵈ n for shareholder return Y3_Y0 = 75. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 43 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROA 
(dichotomized) on the likelihood of financial change codes occurring 
Predictor ROAY4_ Y1 ͣ ROAY4_Y0ᵇ ROAY3_Y1ᶜ ROAY3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
2.10 (8.17) 1.63 (5.10) 1.70 (5.46) 1.94 (6.96) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
.90 (2.47) .59 (1.81) 1.58 (4.85) 1.16 (3.17) 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-4.83 (.01) -5.47 (.004) -4.72 (.01) -6.07 (.002) 
CEO gender 1.46 (4.32)* 2.02 (7.50)** 2.05 (7.80)** 2.05 (7.75)* 
ROA -.03 (.97) .35 (1.42) -.01 (.99) -.35 (.71) 
CEO gender x 
ROA 
-.93 (.40) -2.36 (.10)* -2.77 (.06)* -2.01 (.13) 
χ
2  
e 18.07**  23.79**  28.19**  27.33**  
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the difference in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a dichotomous variable. ROA was coded as 1 for 
increasing performance and 0 for decreasing performance. Gender was coded as 1 for female and 
0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did not occur and 1 for code 
occurred. 
ͣ n for ROAY4_ Y1 = 82. ᵇ n for ROAY4_Y0 = 81.  ᶜ n for ROAY3_Y1= 81. ᵈ n for ROAY3_ Y0 
= 82. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-square were 6. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 44 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROE 
(dichotomized) on the likelihood of financial change codes occurring 
Predictor ROEY4_ Y1 ͣ ROEY4_Y0ᵇ ROEY3_Y1ᶜ ROEY3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
1.82 (6.19) 1.62 (5.05) 3.01 (20.24) 2.21 (9.15) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
.62 (1.85) .08 (1.08) 2.14 (8.46) 1.52 (4.59) 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-4.71 (.01) -5.15 (.006) -4.43 (.01) -5.65 (.004) 
CEO gender 1.35 (3.86)* 1.52 (4.58)* 2.38 (10.85)** 2.25 (9.45)** 
ROE -.30 (.74) -1.07 (.35) 1.35 (3.84) -.01 (.99) 
CEO gender x ROE -.32 (.73) -.63 (.53) -2.79 (.06)* -2.67 (.07)* 
χ
2  
e 17.23**  22.69**  22.10**  28.11**  
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the difference in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a dichotomous variable. ROE was coded as 1 for 
increasing performance and 0 for decreasing performance.  Gender was coded as 1 for female 
and 0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did not occur and 1 for code 
occurred. 
ͣ n for ROEY4_ Y1 = 79. ᵇ n for ROEY4_Y0 = 79. ᶜ n for ROEY3_Y1 = 79. ᵈ n for ROEY3_ Y0 
= 79. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-square were 6. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 45 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROIC-
WACC (dichotomized) on the likelihood of financial change codes occurring 
Predictor ROIC-
WACCY4_ Y1  ͣ
ROIC-
WACCY4_Y0ᵇ 
ROIC-
WACCY3_Y1ᶜ 
ROIC-
WACCY3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
2.52 (12.42) 3.15 (23.25) 2.23 (9.29) 2.34 (10.35) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
1.63 (5.10) 2.20 (9.02) 1.56 (4.75) 2.53 (12.52) 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-4.28 (.01) -4.55 (.01) -3.86 (.02) -5.45 (.004) 
CEO gender 1.27 (3.55) 1.56 (4.75)* 1.64 (5.15)* 2.50 (12.20)* 
ROIC-WACC -.91 (.40) -1.86 (.16) .01 (1.01) .11 (1.11) 
CEO gender x 
ROIC-WACC  
.44 (1.55) .44 (1.55)  -1.03 (.36) -2.54 (.08) 
χ
2  
e 15.70*  20.25**  13.84*  20.47** 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the difference in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a dichotomous variable. ROIC-WACC was coded as 1 
for increasing performance and 0 for decreasing performance.  Gender was coded as 1 for female 
and 0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did not occur and 1 for code 
occurred. 
ͣ n for ROIC-WACCY4_ Y1 = 65. ᵇ n for ROIC-WACCY4_Y0 = 65. ᶜ n for ROIC-
WACCY3_Y1= 70. ᵈ n for ROIC-WACCY3_ Y0 = 70. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-square 
were 6. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 46 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in 
shareholder return (dichotomized) on the likelihood of financial change codes occurring 
Predictor Shareholder 
return Y4_ Y1 ͣ 
Shareholder 
return Y4_Y0ᵇ 
Shareholder 
return Y3_Y1 ᶜ 
Shareholder 
return Y3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
2.54 (12.69) 1.62 (5.08) 2.20 (9.03) 1.74 (5.69) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
1.90 (6.71) .95 (2.58) 1.75 (5.73) 1.44 (4.21) 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-4.33 (.01) -5.03 (.01) -4.85 (.01) -4.70 (.01) 
CEO gender 1.85 (6.36)* 1.03 (2.81) .65 (1.92) .36 (1.43) 
Shareholder return .33 (1.39) -1.53 (.22) -1.27 (.28) -1.20 (.30) 
CEO gender x 
Shareholder return  
-1.31 (.27) .76 (2.14) .98 (2.67) 1.59 (4.91) 
χ
2  
e 18.96**  20.96**  18.41** 18.43** 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the difference in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a dichotomous variable. Shareholder return was coded 
as 1 for increasing performance and 0 for decreasing performance.  Gender was coded as 1 for 
female and 0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did not occur and 1 for 
code occurred. 
ͣ n for shareholder return Y4_ Y1 = 77. ᵇ n for shareholder return Y4_Y0 = 77. ᶜ n for shareholder 
return Y3_Y1= 78. ᵈ n for shareholder return Y3_Y0 = 78. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-
square were 6. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 47 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROA 
(continuous) on the likelihood of financial change codes occurring 
Predictor Relative change 
in ROAY4_ Y1 ͣ 
Relative change 
in ROAY4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in ROAY3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in ROAY3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
2.13 (8.44) 2.41 (11.11) 1.51 (4.41) 2.05 (7.77) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
.89 (2.43) 1.25 (3.50) 1.11 (3.03) 1.46 (4.31) 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-3.61 (.03) -4.21 (.02) -4.43 (.01) -4.47 (.01) 
CEO gender 1.36 (3.90)* 1.42 (4.13)* 1.66 (5.28)** 1.23 (3.42)* 
ROA -.05 (.95) .04 (1.04) -.23 (.80) -.12 (.89) 
CEO gender x 
ROA 
-.64 (.53) -.37 (.69) -1.03 (.36) -.49 (.62) 
χ
2  
e 20.83**  19.58** 26.42** 21.24** 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years 
indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender 
was coded as 1 for female and 0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did 
not occur and 1 for code occurred. 
ͣ n for ROAY4_ Y1 = 77. ᵇ n for ROAY4_Y0 = 77.  ᶜ n for ROAY3_Y1= 81. ᵈ n for ROAY3_ Y0 
= 81. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-square were 6. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 48 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROE 
(continuous) on the likelihood of financial change codes occurring 
Predictor Relative change 
in ROEY4_ Y1 ͣ 
Relative change 
in ROEY4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in ROEY3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in ROEY3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
2.48 (11.93) 2.54 (12.67) 1.83 (6.26) 2.17 (8.79) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
1.03 (2.79) 1.31 (3.69) 1.42 (4.14) 1.54 (4.68) 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-3.71 (.02) -4.26 (.01) -4.00 (.02) -4.87 (.01) 
CEO gender 1.45 (4.28)* 1.25 (3.50)* 1.32 (3.74)* 1.12 (3.05)* 
ROE -.23 (.79) .15 (1.16) -.09 (.91) .20 (1.22) 
CEO gender x ROE -.45 (.64) -.49 (.61) -.72 (.49) -.66 (.52) 
χ
2  
e 22.56** 18.44** 23.78** 20.41** 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years 
indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender 
was coded as 1 for female and 0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did 
not occur and 1 for code occurred. 
ͣ n for ROEY4_ Y1 = 78. ᵇ n for ROEY4_Y0 = 78. ᶜ n for ROEY3_Y1 = 81. ᵈ n for ROEY3_ Y0 
= 81. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-square were 6.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 49 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROIC-
WACC (continuous) on the likelihood of financial change codes occurring 
Predictor Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY4_ Y1  ͣ
Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
2.76 (15.83) 3.50 (33.01) 2.05 (7.80) 1.76 (5.84) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
1.46 (4.29) 2.37 (10.74) 3.18 (24.13) 4.01 (55.23) 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-3.94 (.02) -3.94 (.02) -3.43 (.03) -5.73 (.003) 
CEO gender 1.05 (2.86) 1.07 (2.93) .98 (2.66) .72 (2.06) 
ROIC-WACC -.04 (.97) -.20 (.82) .11 (1.11) .13 (1.14) 
CEO gender x 
ROIC-WACC  
-.21 (.81) -.33 (.72) -.49 (.62) -.56 (.57)* 
χ
2  
e 16.82** 20.66** 19.16** 21.55** 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years 
indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender 
was coded as 1 for female and 0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did 
not occur and 1 for code occurred. 
ͣ n for ROIC-WACCY4_ Y1 = 65. ᵇ n for ROIC-WACCY4_Y0 = 65. ᶜ n for ROIC-
WACCY3_Y1= 70. ᵈ n for ROIC-WACCY3_ Y0 = 70. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-square 
were 6. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 50 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in 
shareholder return (continuous) on the likelihood of financial change codes occurring 
Predictor Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y4_ Y1 ͣ 
Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y3_Y1 ᶜ 
Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
2.50 (12.11) 1.48 (4.37) 2.17 (8.74) 1.89 (6.65) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
2.23 (9.29) 1.16 (3.18) 1.76 (5.79) 1.15 (3.15) 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-4.25 (.01) -4.98 (.01) -4.38 (.01) -4.97 (.01) 
CEO gender 1.17 (3.21)* 1.24 (3.47)* 1.48 (4.37)* 1.43 (4.17)* 
Shareholder return -.02 (.99) -.19 (.83) .04 (1.04) -.35 (.71) 
CEO gender x 
Shareholder return  
-.31 (.74) .07 (1.07) -.07 (.93) .31 (1.37) 
χ
2  
e 20.64** 18.96** 18.88** 23.11** 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years 
indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender 
was coded as 1 for female and 0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did 
not occur and 1 for code occurred. 
ͣ n for shareholder return Y4_ Y1 = 73. ᵇ n for shareholder return Y4_Y0 = 73. ᶜ n for shareholder 
return Y3_Y1= 75. ᵈ n for shareholder return Y3_Y0 = 75. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-
square were 6. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 51 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROA 
(dichotomized) on the likelihood of leadership change codes occurring 
Predictor ROAY4_ Y1 ͣ ROAY4_Y0ᵇ ROAY3_Y1ᶜ ROAY3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
2.57 (13.11) 2.33 (10.22) 2.61 (13.55) 2.55 (12.76) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
2.14 (8.47) 2.08 (7.97) 2.70 (14.93) 2.32 (10.15) 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-1.54 (.22) -1.69 (.19) -1.37 (.26) -1.87 (.16) 
CEO gender .65 (1.92) .83 (2.29) 1.13 (3.09) .97 (2.63) 
ROA -.28 (.76) .23 (1.25) .43 (1.54) -.19 (.83) 
CEO gender x 
ROA 
-.40 (.67) -.80 (.45) -1.75 (.17) -1.13 (.32) 
χ
2  
e 9.53 9.13 11.73 12.37 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the difference in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a dichotomous variable. ROA was coded as 1 for 
increasing performance and 0 for decreasing performance. Gender was coded as 1 for female and 
0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did not occur and 1 for code 
occurred. 
ͣ n for ROAY4_ Y1 = 82. ᵇ n for ROAY4_Y0 = 81.  ᶜ n for ROAY3_Y1= 81. ᵈ n for ROAY3_ Y0 
= 82. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-square were 6. 
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Table 52 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROE 
(dichotomized) on the likelihood of leadership change codes occurring 
Predictor ROEY4_ Y1 ͣ ROEY4_Y0ᵇ ROEY3_Y1ᶜ ROEY3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
2.21 (9.08) 2.32 (10.22) 3.89 (49.02) 2.66 (14.29) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
2.25 (9.51) 1.86 (6.45) 3.47 (32.20) 2.57 (13.09) 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-2.10 (.12) -1.73 (.18) -1.42 (.24) -1.60 (.20) 
CEO gender .79 (2.20) .83 (2.30) 1.66 (5.25)* 1.26 (3.54) 
ROE .71 (2.03) -.05 (.95) 1.71 (5.53) .18 (1.19) 
CEO gender x ROE -.53 (.59) -.74 (.48) -2.47 (.09)* -1.94 (.14) 
χ
2  
e 8.82 9.11 12.70* 13.46* 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the difference in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a dichotomous variable. ROE was coded as 1 for 
increasing performance and 0 for decreasing performance. Gender was coded as 1 for female and 
0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did not occur and 1 for code 
occurred. 
ͣ n for ROEY4_ Y1 = 79. ᵇ n for ROEY4_Y0 = 79. ᶜ n for ROEY3_Y1 = 79. ᵈ n for ROEY3_ Y0 
= 79. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-square were 6. 
* p < .05 
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Table 53 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROIC-
WACC (dichotomized) on the likelihood of leadership change codes occurring 
Predictor ROIC-
WACCY4_ Y1  ͣ
ROIC-
WACCY4_Y0ᵇ 
ROIC-
WACCY3_Y1ᶜ 
ROIC-
WACCY3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
2.17 (8.74) 2.64 (13.95) 2.73 (15.27) 2.56 (12.93) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
2.77 (15.92) 3.09 (22.07) 2.32 (10.20) 2.63 (12.93) 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-1.82 (.16) -1.04 (.36) -1.77 (.17) -.51 (.60) 
CEO gender -.07 (.94) .78 (2.18) .62 (1.86) .13 (1.13) 
ROIC-WACC .19 (1.21) .44 (1.55) .93 (2.53) -.73 (.48) 
CEO gender x 
ROIC-WACC 
.97 (2.64) -.73 (.48) -.70 (.50) .43 (1.54) 
χ
2  
e 8.10 6.47 13.84 6.34 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the difference in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a dichotomous variable. ROIC-WACC was coded as 1 
for increasing performance and 0 for decreasing performance.  Gender was coded as 1 for female 
and 0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did not occur and 1 for code 
occurred. 
ͣ n for ROIC-WACCY4_ Y1 = 65. ᵇ n for ROIC-WACCY4_Y0 = 65. ᶜ n for ROIC-
WACCY3_Y1= 70. ᵈ n for ROIC-WACCY3_ Y0 = 70. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-square 
were 6. 
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Table 54 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in 
shareholder return (dichotomized) on the likelihood of leadership change codes occurring 
Predictor Shareholder 
return Y4_ Y1 ͣ 
Shareholder 
return Y4_Y0ᵇ 
Shareholder 
return Y3_Y1 ᶜ 
Shareholder 
return Y3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
3.17 (23.72) 2.58 (13.25) 2.74 (15.49) 2.60 (13.43) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
3.08 (21.78) 2.70 (14.82) 2.83 (16.91) 2.64 (14.01) 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-1.10 (.33) -1.43 (.24) -1.80 (.17) -1.98 (.14) 
CEO gender 1.46 (4.33) 1.08 (2.94) .97 (2.64) .63 (1.87) 
Shareholder return .73 (2.07) -.89 (.41) -.20 (.82) -.74 (.48) 
CEO gender x 
shareholder return  
-1.56 (.21) -.59 (.56) -1.00 (.37) .04 (1.04) 
χ
2  
e 12.28 15.57* 12.03 11.22 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the difference in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a dichotomous variable. Shareholder return was coded 
as 1 for increasing performance and 0 for decreasing performance. Gender was coded as 1 for 
female and 0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did not occur and 1 for 
code occurred. 
ͣ n for shareholder return Y4_Y1 = 77. ᵇ n for shareholder return Y4_Y0 = 77. ᶜ n for shareholder 
return Y3_Y1= 78. ᵈ n for shareholder return Y3_Y0 = 78. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-
square were 6. 
* p < .05 
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Table 55 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROA 
(continuous) on the likelihood of leadership change codes occurring 
Predictor Relative change 
in ROAY4_ Y1 ͣ 
Relative change 
in ROAY4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in ROAY3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in ROAY3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
3.03 (20.59) 2.89 (18.07) 3.03 (20.59) 2.77 (16.02) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
2.51 (12.31) 2.32 (10.16) 2.87 (17.66) 2.70 (14.79) 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-.82 (.44) -1.20 (.30) -1.56 (.21) -2.32 (.10) 
CEO gender .60 (1.82) .60 (1.81) .60 (1.83) .44 (1.55) 
ROA .24 (1.27) .20 (1.22) .45 (1.57) .57 (1.77) 
CEO gender x 
ROA 
-.31 (.73) -.26 (.77) -.50 (.61) -.93 (.40) 
χ
2  
e 8.67 8.50 10.83 12.77* 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years 
indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender 
was coded as 1 for female and 0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did 
not occur and 1 for code occurred. 
ͣ n for ROAY4_ Y1 = 77. ᵇ n for ROAY4_Y0 = 77.  ᶜ n for ROAY3_Y1= 81. ᵈ n for ROAY3_ Y0 
= 81. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-square were 6. 
* p < .05 
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Table 56 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROE 
(continuous) on the likelihood of leadership change codes occurring 
Predictor Relative change 
in ROEY4_ Y1 ͣ 
Relative change 
in ROEY4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in ROEY3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in ROEY3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
3.32 (27.57) 3.07 (21.64) 3.35 (28.40) 2.90 (18.23) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
2.79 (16.31) 2.41 (11.08) 3.13 (22.96) 2.91 (18.39) 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-.75 (.47) -1.46 (.23) -1.80 (.17) -2.96 (.05) 
CEO gender .64 (1.89) .62 (1.86) .67 (1.95) .45 (1.57) 
ROE .55 (1.73) .40 (1.49) .49 (1.63) .60 (1.82) 
CEO gender x ROE -.66 (.52) -.45 (.64) -.53 (.59) -.94 (.39)* 
χ
2  
e 11.26 9.56 13.47* 14.35* 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years 
indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender 
was coded as 1 for female and 0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did 
not occur and 1 for code occurred. 
ͣ n for ROEY4_ Y1 = 78. ᵇ n for ROEY4_Y0 = 78. ᶜ n for ROEY3_Y1 = 81. ᵈ n for ROEY3_ Y0 
= 81. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-square were 6.  
* p < .05 
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Table 57 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROIC-
WACC (continuous) on the likelihood of leadership change codes occurring 
Predictor Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY4_ Y1  ͣ
Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
2.99 (19.96) 3.46 (31.88) 3.35 (28.44) 2.78 (16.03) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
2.91 (18.44) 3.19 (24.28) 3.30 (27.01) 3.57 (35.34) 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-.92 (.40) -.37 (.69) -.37 (.69) -1.38 (.25) 
CEO gender .35 (1.42) .23 (1.25) .32 (1.38) .28 (1.33) 
ROIC-WACC -.02 (.98) -.05 (.95) .19 (1.21) .14 (1.15) 
CEO gender x 
ROIC-WACC  
-.05 (.95) -.18 (.84) -.20 (.82) -.22 (.80) 
χ
2  
e 6.70 8.90 8.11 8.30 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years 
indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender 
was coded as 1 for female and 0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did 
not occur and 1 for code occurred. 
ͣ n for ROIC-WACCY4_ Y1 = 65. ᵇ n for ROIC-WACCY4_Y0 = 65. ᶜ n for ROIC-
WACCY3_Y1= 70. ᵈ n for ROIC-WACCY3_ Y0 = 70. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-square 
were 6. 
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Table 58 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in 
shareholder return (continuous) on the likelihood of leadership change codes occurring 
Predictor Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y4_ Y1 ͣ 
Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y3_Y1 ᶜ 
Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
2.76 (15.85) 1.80 (6.07) 2.91 (18.30) 2.89 (17.97) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
3.26 (26.00) 2.24 (9.38) 2.85 (17.21) 2.99 (19.85) 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-1.15 (.32) -1.86 (.16) -1.78 (.17) -2.69 (.07) 
CEO gender .41 (1.51) .47 (1.60) .38 (1.46) .73 (2.07) 
Shareholder return -.01 (1.00) -.24 (.79) -.01 (.99) .03 (1.03) 
CEO gender x 
Shareholder return  
-.27 (.76) .01 (1.01) -.24 (.79) -.19 (.83) 
χ
2  
e 13.47* 14.88* 11.34 12.87* 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years 
indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender 
was coded as 1 for female and 0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did 
not occur and 1 for code occurred. 
ͣ n for shareholder return Y4_ Y1 = 73. ᵇ n for shareholder return Y4_Y0 = 73. ᶜ n for shareholder 
return Y3_Y1= 75. ᵈ n for shareholder return Y3_Y0 = 75. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-
square were 6. 
* p < .05 
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Table 59 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROA 
(dichotomized) on the likelihood of image change codes occurring 
Predictor ROAY4_ Y1 ͣ  ROAY4_Y0ᵇ ROAY3_Y1ᶜ ROAY3_Y0 
ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
4.33 (75.83) 4.23 (68.49) 5.23 (187.23) 4.46 (86.42) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
2.76 (15.79) 2.91 (18.38) 4.14 (67.72) 3.09 (21.87) 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-4.61 (.01) -5.09 (.01) -3.74 (.02) -4.98 (.01) 
CEO gender .82 (2.27) 1.10 (3.01) 1.72 (5.59)* 1.15 (3.15) 
ROA -.68 (.51) .55 (1.73) .92 (2.52) .32 (1.38) 
CEO gender x 
ROA 
.22 (1.24) -.74 (.48) -3.06 (.05) -.70 (.50) 
χ
2  
e 13.32* 12.80* 17.58* 13.19* 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the difference in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. ROA was coded as 1 for 
increasing performance and 0 for decreasing performance. Gender was coded as 1 for female and 
0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did not occur and 1 for code 
occurred. 
ͣ n for ROAY4_ Y1 = 82. ᵇ n for ROAY4_Y0 = 81.  ᶜ n for ROAY3_Y1= 81. ᵈ n for ROAY3_ Y0 
= 82. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-square were 6. 
* p < .05 
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Table 60 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROE 
(dichotomized) on the likelihood of image change codes occurring 
Predictor ROEY4_ Y1 ͣ ROEY4_Y0ᵇ ROEY3_Y1ᶜ ROEY3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
2.66 (14.34) 3.01 (20.29) 3.01 (20.35) 2.67 (14.46) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
3.17 (23.77) 3.28 (26.52) 4.03 (56.31) 3.44 (31.25) 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-1.05 (.35) -1.55 (.21) -.70 (.50) -.91 (.40) 
CEO gender .84 (2.32) 1.45 (4.25) 1.33 (3.78) .95 (2.59) 
ROE -.55 (.58) .56 (1.74) -.32 (.72) -.58 (.56) 
CEO gender x ROE .27 (1.32) -1.44 (.24) -1.15 (.32) -.02 (.98) 
χ
2  
e 7.83 8.73 10.39 8.28 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the difference in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a dichotomous variable. ROE was coded as 1 for 
increasing performance and 0 for decreasing performance. Gender was coded as 1 for female and 
0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did not occur and 1 for code 
occurred. 
ͣ n for ROEY4_ Y1 = 79. ᵇ n for ROEY4_Y0 = 79. ᶜ n for ROEY3_Y1 = 79. ᵈ n for ROEY3_ Y0 
= 79. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-square were 6. 
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Table 61 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROIC-
WACC (dichotomized) on the likelihood of image change codes occurring 
Predictor ROIC-
WACCY4_ Y1  ͣ
ROIC-
WACCY4_Y0ᵇ 
ROIC-
WACCY3_Y1ᶜ 
ROIC-
WACCY3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
3.08 (21.78) 4.33 (75.69) 3.33 (27.94) 3.12 (22.59) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
4.31 (74.24) 5.36 (212.06) 4.17 (64.60) 3.99 (54.17) 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-1.35 (.26) -.84 (.43) .20 (1.22) 1.02 (2.77) 
CEO gender -.02 (.98) .19 (1.21) .67 (1.96) -.36 (.70) 
ROIC-WACC -1.06 (.35) -20.00 (2.05E-9) -.83 (.43) -1.76 (.17) 
CEO gender x 
ROIC-WACC 
1.58 (4.87) 19.45 (2.80E+8) .24 (1.27) 2.07 (7.89) 
χ
2  
e 7.55 11.94 6.16 7.40 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the difference in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a dichotomous variable. ROIC-WACC was coded as 1 
for increasing performance and 0 for decreasing performance. Gender was coded as 1 for female 
and 0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did not occur and 1 for code 
occurred. 
ͣ n for ROIC-WACCY4_ Y1 = 65. ᵇ n for ROIC-WACCY4_Y0 = 65. ᶜ n for ROIC-
WACCY3_Y1= 70. ᵈ n for ROIC-WACCY3_ Y0 = 70. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-square 
were 6. 
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Table 62 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in 
shareholder return (dichotomized) on the likelihood of image change codes occurring 
Predictor Shareholder 
return Y4_ Y1 ͣ 
Shareholder 
return Y4_Y0ᵇ 
Shareholder 
return Y3_Y1 ᶜ 
Shareholder 
return Y3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
6.32 (556.51)* 7.15 (1277.86)* 3.81 (45.15) 3.69 (39.98) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
4.48 (88.21) 5.87 (355.67)* 3.44 (31.12) 3.53 (34.12) 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-4.07 (.02) -4.55 (.01) -4.85 (.01) -4.59 (.01) 
CEO gender 1.89 (6.62) 3.31 (27.37)* .86 (2.36) .69 (1.99) 
Shareholder return .71 (2.04) 2.08 (8.00) .20 (1.22) .37 (1.44) 
CEO gender x 
shareholder return  
-1.23 (.29) -3.69 (.03)* .13 (1.14) .29 (1.33) 
χ
2  
e 16.02* 21.35** 13.14* 13.65* 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the difference in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a dichotomous variable. Shareholder return was coded 
as 1 for increasing performance and 0 for decreasing performance. Gender was coded as 1 for 
female and 0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did not occur and 1 for 
code occurred. 
ͣ n for shareholder return Y4_ Y1 = 77. ᵇ n for shareholder return Y4_Y0 = 77. ᶜ n for shareholder 
return Y3_Y1= 78. ᵈ n for shareholder return Y3_Y0 = 78. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-
square were 6. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 63 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROA 
(continuous) on the likelihood of image change codes occurring 
Predictor Relative change 
in ROAY4_ Y1 ͣ 
Relative change 
in ROAY4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in ROAY3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in ROAY3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
6.73 (839.06)* 6.31 (550.10)* 5.44 (229.67)* 4.43 (83.86) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
4.53 (92.58) 4.15 (63.35) 3.96 (52.51) 2.98 (19.60) 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-3.86 (.02) -4.51 (.01) -5.19 (.01) -5.47 (.004) 
CEO gender 1.16 (3.19) 1.13 (3.10) .92 (2.51) .72 (2.05) 
ROA .78 (2.18) .68 (1.97) .81 (2.25) .41 (1.51) 
CEO gender x 
ROA 
-1.02 (.36) -.57 (.57) -1.00 (.37) -.32 (.73) 
χ
2  
e 16.73* 16.67* 15.51* 13.10* 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years 
indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender 
was coded as 1 for female and 0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did 
not occur and 1 for code occurred. 
ͣ n for ROAY4_ Y1 = 77. ᵇ n for ROAY4_Y0 = 77.  ᶜ n for ROAY3_Y1= 81. ᵈ n for ROAY3_ Y0 
= 81. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-square were 6. 
* p < .05 
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Table 64 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROE 
(continuous) on the likelihood of image change codes occurring 
Predictor Relative change 
in ROEY4_ Y1 ͣ 
Relative change 
in ROEY4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in ROEY3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in ROEY3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
6.89 (977.87)* 6.26 (522.85)* 7.19 (1329.10)* 5.00 (149.00) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
4.68 (107.94) 4.06 (57.93) 5.08 (160.47) 3.33 (27.93) 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-4.26 (.01) -4.99 (.01) -7.61 (.0005) -7.69 (.0005) 
CEO gender 1.39 (4.01) 1.14 (3.13) 1.28 (3.60) .69 (2.00) 
ROE 1.10 (3.01) .79 (2.19) 1.01 (2.73)* .83 (2.30) 
CEO gender x ROE -1.07 (.34) -.63 (.53) -1.08 (.34)** -.69 (.50) 
χ
2  
e 18.47** 17.31** 21.06** 15.39* 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years 
indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender 
was coded as 1 for female and 0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did 
not occur and 1 for code occurred. 
ͣ n for ROEY4_ Y1 = 78. ᵇ n for ROEY4_Y0 = 78. ᶜ n for ROEY3_Y1 = 81. ᵈ n for ROEY3_ Y0 
= 81. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-square were 6. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 65 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROIC-
WACC (continuous) on the likelihood of image change codes occurring 
Predictor Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY4_ Y1  ͣ
Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
6.71 (817.45)* 7.49 (1780.60)* 7.02 (1123.08)* 6.35 (572.66)* 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
3.19 (24.16) 3.73 (41.84) 4.12 (61.54) 4.37 (78.86) 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-3.23 (.04) -2.63 (.07) -4.33 (.01) -5.10 (.01) 
CEO gender .46 (1.59) .96 (2.62) .58 (1.79) .24 (1.27) 
ROIC-WACC -.03 (.98) -.22 (.80) .46 (1.58)* .29 (1.33) 
CEO gender x 
ROIC-WACC  
-.09 (.91) .12 (1.13) -.47 (.63) -.40 (.67) 
χ
2  
e 11.32 12.15 15.93* 14.49* 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years 
indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender 
was coded as 1 for female and 0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did 
not occur and 1 for code occurred. 
ͣ n for ROIC-WACCY4_ Y1 = 65. ᵇ n for ROIC-WACCY4_Y0 = 65. ᶜ n for ROIC-
WACCY3_Y1= 70. ᵈ n for ROIC-WACCY3_ Y0 = 70. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-square 
were 6. 
* p < .05 
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Table 66 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in 
shareholder return (continuous) on the likelihood of image change codes occurring 
Predictor Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y4_ Y1 ͣ 
Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y3_Y1 ᶜ 
Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
5.73 (306.79)* 6.85 (939.93)* 4.91 (136.18) 6.07 (433.72)* 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
3.96 (52.29) 5.38 (217.91) 3.91 (49.93) 4.77 (117.35) 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-4.20 (.02) -4.11 (.02) -3.88 (.02) -2.88 (.06) 
CEO gender 1.34 (3.82) 1.48 (4.39) 1.40 (4.05) 1.43 (4.17) 
Shareholder return .11 (1.11) .30 (1.35) -.001 (1.00) .19 (1.21) 
CEO gender x 
Shareholder return  
-.08 (.93) -.28 (.75) .21 (1.23) -.08 (.92) 
χ
2  
e 13.70* 16.07* 15.66* 17.28** 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years 
indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender 
was coded as 1 for female and 0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did 
not occur and 1 for code occurred. 
ͣ n for shareholder return Y4_ Y1 = 73. ᵇ n for shareholder return Y4_Y0 = 73. ᶜ n for shareholder 
return Y3_Y1= 75. ᵈ n for shareholder return Y3_Y0 = 75. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-
square were 6. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 67 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROA 
(dichotomized) on the likelihood of culture change codes occurring 
Predictor ROAY4_ Y1 ͣ ROAY4_Y0ᵇ ROAY3_Y1ᶜ ROAY3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
3.02 (20.50) 2.71 (15.02) 1.91 (6.74) 2.97 (19.52) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
3.35 (28.48) 3.28 (26.54) 3.08 (21.81) 3.55 (34.93) 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-1.07 (.34) -1.62 (.20) -1.21 (.30) -1.59 (.21) 
CEO gender 1.01 (2.75) 1.39 (4.01) .71 (2.04) 1.09 (2.97) 
ROA -.38 (.68) .70 (2.02) -19.13 (.4.9E-9) .41 (1.51) 
CEO gender x 
ROA 
-.37 (.69) -1.38 (.25) 18.13 (7.46E+7) -.44 (.64) 
χ
2  
e 8.77 8.84 12.29 8.16 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the difference in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. ROA was coded as 1 for 
increasing performance and 0 for decreasing performance. Gender was coded as 1 for female and 
0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did not occur and 1 for code 
occurred. 
ͣ n for ROAY4_ Y1 = 82. ᵇ n for ROAY4_Y0 = 81.  ᶜ n for ROAY3_Y1= 81. ᵈ n for ROAY3_ Y0 
= 82. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-square were 6. 
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Table 68 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROE 
(dichotomized) on the likelihood of culture change codes occurring 
Predictor ROEY4_ Y1 ͣ  ROEY4_Y0ᵇ ROEY3_Y1ᶜ ROEY3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
2.66 (14.34) 3.01 (20.29) 3.01 (20.35) 2.67 (14.46) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
3.17 (23.77) 3.28 (26.52) 4.03 (56.31) 3.44 (31.25) 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-1.05 (.35) -1.55 (.21) -.70 (.50) -.91 (.40) 
CEO gender .84 (2.32) 1.45 (4.25) 1.33 (3.78) .95 (2.59) 
ROE -.55 (.58) .56 (1.74) -.32 (.72) -.58 (.56) 
CEO gender x ROE .27 (1.32) -1.44 (.24) -1.15 (.32) -.02 (.98) 
χ
2  
e 7.83 8.73 10.39 8.28 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the difference in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. ROE was coded as 1 for 
increasing performance and 0 for decreasing performance. Gender was coded as 1 for female and 
0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did not occur and 1 for code 
occurred. 
ͣ n for ROEY4_ Y1 = 79. ᵇ n for ROEY4_Y0 = 79. ᶜ n for ROEY3_Y1 = 79. ᵈ n for ROEY3_ Y0 
= 79. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-square were 6. 
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Table 69 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROIC-
WACC (dichotomized) on the likelihood of culture change codes occurring 
Predictor ROIC-
WACCY4_ Y1  ͣ
ROIC-
WACCY4_Y0ᵇ 
ROIC-
WACCY3_Y1ᶜ 
ROIC-
WACCY3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
3.08 (21.78) 4.33 (75.69) 3.33 (27.94) 3.12 (22.59) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
4.31 (74.24) 5.36 (212.06) 4.17 (64.60) 3.99 (54.17) 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-1.35 (.26) -.84 (.43) .20 (1.22) 1.02 (2.77) 
CEO gender -.02 (.98) .19 (1.21) .67 (1.96) -.36 (.70) 
ROIC-WACC -1.06 (.35) -20.00 (2.05E-9) -.83 (.43) -1.76 (.17) 
CEO gender x 
ROIC-WACC 
1.58 (4.87) 19.45 (2.80E+8) .24 (1.27) 2.07 (7.89) 
χ
2  
e 7.55 11.94 6.16 7.40 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the difference in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a dichotomous variable. ROIC-WACC was coded as 1 
for increasing performance and 0 for decreasing performance.  Gender was coded as 1 for female 
and 0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did not occur and 1 for code 
occurred. 
ͣ n for ROIC-WACCY4_ Y1 = 65. ᵇ n for ROIC-WACCY4_Y0 = 65. ᶜ n for ROIC-
WACCY3_Y1= 70. ᵈ n for ROIC-WACCY3_ Y0 = 70. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-square 
were 6. 
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Table 70 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in 
shareholder return (dichotomized) on the likelihood of culture change codes occurring 
Predictor Shareholder 
return Y4_ Y1 ͣ 
Shareholder 
return Y4_Y0ᵇ 
Shareholder 
return Y3_Y1 ᶜ 
Shareholder return 
Y3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
2.44 (11.48) 3.07 (21.43) 3.12 (22.57) 1.69 (5.41) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
4.52 (91.36)* 4.95 (141.21)* 4.37 (79.32)* 5.61 (272.35)* 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-2.05 (.13) -1.97 (.14) -1.73 (.18) -1.53 (.22) 
CEO gender 1.02 (2.77) 2.22 (9.18) 1.39 (4.03) 19.24 (22.71E+9) 
Shareholder return -1.17 (.31) 1.69 (5.44) -.07 (.94) 20.33 (6755.92) 
CEO gender x 
shareholder return  
-.25 (.78) -2.18 (.11) -1.21 (.30) -18.62 (8.18E-9) 
χ
2  
e 12.64* 11.35 11.23 19.70** 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the difference in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a dichotomous variable. Shareholder return was coded 
as 1 for increasing performance and 0 for decreasing performance.  Gender was coded as 1 for 
female and 0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did not occur and 1 for 
code occurred. 
ͣ n for shareholder return Y4_ Y1 = 77. ᵇ n for shareholder return Y4_Y0 = 77. ᶜ n for shareholder 
return Y3_Y1= 78. ᵈ n for shareholder return Y3_Y0 = 78. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-
square were 6. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 71 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROA 
(continuous) on the likelihood of culture change codes occurring 
Predictor Relative change 
in ROAY4_ Y1 ͣ 
Relative change 
in ROAY4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in ROAY3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in ROAY3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
1.31 (3.71) 2.68 (14.53) 2.47 (11.84) 2.79 (16.25) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
2.03 (7.63) 3.41 (30.12) 3.45 (31.54) 3.44 (31.18) 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-2.77 (.06) -1.32 (.27) -1.03 (.36) -1.58 (.21) 
CEO gender 1.04 (2.83) .78 (2.19) .95 (2.58) .82 (2.26) 
ROA -.65 (.52) .15 (1.16) -.14 (.87) .26 (1.29) 
CEO gender x 
ROA 
.19 (1.21) -.07 (.93) -.10 (.91) -.14 (.87) 
χ
2  
e 11.12 7.12 10.58 8.27 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years 
indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender 
was coded as 1 for female and 0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did 
not occur and 1 for code occurred. 
ͣ n for ROAY4_ Y1 = 77. ᵇ n for ROAY4_Y0 = 77.  ᶜ n for ROAY3_Y1= 81. ᵈ n for ROAY3_ Y0 
= 81. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-square were 6. 
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Table 72 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROE 
(continuous) on the likelihood of culture change codes occurring 
Predictor Relative change 
in ROEY4_ Y1 ͣ 
Relative change 
in ROEY4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in ROEY3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in ROEY3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
2.80 (16.45) 2.71 (14.97) 2.50 (12.20) 2.90 (18.09) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
3.45 (31.49) 3.43 (30.99) 3.54 (34.32) 3.50 (33.11) 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-.57 (.57) -1.66 (.19) -.98 (.37) -2.26 (.10) 
CEO gender .88 (2.41) .80 (2.22) .89 (2.45) .83 (2.30) 
ROE -.13 (.88) .37 (1.44) -.13 (.88) .42 (1.53) 
CEO gender x ROE -.40 (.67) -.27 (.76) -.11 (.90) -.31 (.73) 
χ
2  
e 10.24 7.81 11.30 8.81 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years 
indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender 
was coded as 1 for female and 0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did 
not occur and 1 for code occurred. 
ͣ n for ROEY4_ Y1 = 78. ᵇ n for ROEY4_Y0 = 78. ᶜ n for ROEY3_Y1 = 81. ᵈ n for ROEY3_ Y0 
= 81. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-square were 6. 
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Table 73 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROIC-
WACC (continuous) on the likelihood of culture change codes occurring 
Predictor Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY4_ Y1  ͣ
Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
2.56 (12.97) 4.04 (56.83) 1.94 (6.98) 3.62 (37.46) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
3.04 (20.85) 5.05 (156.41) 1.51 (4.51) 5.30 (200.04) 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-4.26 (.01) -.20 (.82) -5.28 (.01) .11 (1.11) 
CEO gender 1.38 (3.97) .91 (2.48) 1.09 (2.97) .87 (2.38) 
ROIC-WACC -.32 (.73) -.19 (.83) -.31 (.74) -.19 (.83) 
CEO gender x 
ROIC-WACC  
.23 (1.26) .10 (1.11) .33 (1.39) .14 (1.15) 
χ
2  
e 10.38 7.54 10.68 6.43 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years 
indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender 
was coded as 1 for female and 0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did 
not occur and 1 for code occurred. 
ͣ n for ROIC-WACCY4_ Y1 = 65. ᵇ n for ROIC-WACCY4_Y0 = 65. ᶜ n for ROIC-
WACCY3_Y1= 70. ᵈ n for ROIC-WACCY3_ Y0 = 70. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-square 
were 6. 
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Table 74 
Logistic regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in 
shareholder return (continuous) on the likelihood of culture change codes occurring 
Predictor Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y4_ Y1 ͣ 
Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y3_Y1 ᶜ 
Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y3_Y0 ᵈ 
 B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) B, (e
B
) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
2.03 (7.61) 2.65 (14.12) 2.69 (14.79) 3.33 (27.84) 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
4.32 (75.04) 4.63 (102.03)* 4.08 (59.34) 4.95 (140.62)* 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-1.35 (.26) -1.56 (.21) -2.22 (.11) -1.45 (.24) 
CEO gender .69 (2.00) .97 (2.64) .56 (1.76) 1.18 (3.25) 
Shareholder return -.01 (.99) .16 (1.17) -.01 (.99) .16 (1.18) 
CEO gender x 
Shareholder return  
-.02 (.98) -.10 (.91) -.23 (.79) -.24 (.79) 
χ
2  
e 7.85 8.98 10.08 10.72 
Note: B = unstandardized logistic coefficients. Exp(B)= exponentiated B. Each performance 
measure represents the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years 
indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender 
was coded as 1 for female and 0 for male. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for code did 
not occur and 1 for code occurred. 
ͣ n for shareholder return Y4_ Y1 = 73. ᵇ n for shareholder return Y4_Y0 = 73. ᶜ n for shareholder 
return Y3_Y1= 75. ᵈ n for shareholder return Y3_Y0 = 75. e Degrees of freedom for each chi-
square were 6. 
* p < .05 
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Table 75  
Summary of Study 2 hypothesis testing 
Hypothesis Summary Perspective Tested Supported with 
dichotomous 
performance?  
Supported with 
continuous 
performance? 
Consistency 
between 
dichotomous and 
continuous 
performance?  
H1: The likelihood of female versus male 
CEOs being appointed is greater when 
performance is decreasing but not increasing. 
Overall glass cliff 
effect 
No support Partial support; 
Supported by 
relative change in 
shareholder return 
Y4_Y1 
Not consistent 
H2: The proportion of media reports 
discussing CEO possession of communal 
traits differs based on the interaction between 
company performance and CEO gender. The 
proportion of media reports regarding 
communal attributes are greater in discussions 
concerning the appointment of a female CEO 
to a company whose performance is declining 
in comparison to all other conditions. 
Think crisis-think 
female  
No support No support Consistent  
H3: The proportion of media reports 
discussing position riskiness differs based on 
the interaction between company performance 
and CEO gender. Company performance 
affects the proportion of media reports 
regarding position riskiness more strongly for 
male versus female CEOs. Under conditions 
of declining as compared to improving 
performance, there is a greater proportion of 
position riskiness codes for male, but not 
female, CEOs. 
Think crisis-think 
not male  
Partial support; 
Supported by the 
interaction of CEO 
gender and ROE 
Y3_Y0  
Partial support; 
Supported by the 
interaction of CEO 
gender and relative 
change in ROE 
Y3_Y0 
Consistent 
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Table 75  
Summary of Study 2 hypothesis testing (continued) 
Hypothesis Summary Perspective Tested Supported with 
dichotomous 
performance?  
Supported with 
continuous 
performance? 
Consistency 
between 
dichotomous and 
continuous 
performance  
H4: The proportion of media reports 
discussing apprehension surrounding the 
position differs based on the interaction 
between company performance and CEO 
gender. The proportion of media reports 
regarding apprehension is greater in 
discussions concerning the appointment of a 
male CEO to a company whose performance 
is declining in comparison to all other 
situations. 
Think crisis-think 
not male 
No support No support Consistent 
H5: The proportion of media reports 
discussing organizational desire for change 
differs based on the interaction between 
company performance and CEO gender. The 
proportion of media reports regarding change 
is greater in discussions concerning the 
appointment of a female as compared to a 
male CEO to a company whose performance 
is declining, but not improving. 
Females as signals 
of change  
Partial support; 
Supported by the 
interaction of CEO 
gender and ROE 
Y4_Y0 
Strong support; 
Supported by the 
interaction of CEO 
gender with relative 
change in:  
- ROA Y4_Y0 
- ROE Y4_Y0 
- ROE Y3_Y0 
- ROIC-WACC 
Y3_Y0 
Somewhat 
consistent 
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Table 75  
Summary of Study 2 hypothesis testing (continued) 
Hypothesis Summary Perspective Tested Supported with 
dichotomous 
performance?  
Supported with 
continuous 
performance? 
Consistency 
between 
dichotomous and 
continuous 
performance? 
H6a: The occurrence of codes regarding 
organizational desire for financial change 
differs based on the interaction between 
company performance and CEO gender. 
Financial change codes are more likely to 
occur in discussions concerning the 
appointment of a female as compared to a 
male CEO to a company experiencing 
declining, but not improving, performance. 
Females as signals 
of change 
Strong support; 
Supported by the 
interaction of CEO 
gender with:  
- ROAY4_Y0 
- ROA Y3_Y1 
- ROE Y3_Y1 
- ROE Y3_Y0 
 
Partial support; 
Supported by the 
interaction of CEO 
gender with relative 
change in ROIC-
WACC Y3_Y0 
Not consistent  
H6b: The occurrence of codes regarding 
organizational desire for leadership change 
differs based on the interaction between 
company performance and CEO gender. 
Leadership change codes are more likely to 
occur in discussions concerning the 
appointment of a female as compared to a 
male CEO to a company experiencing 
declining, but not improving, performance. 
Females as signals 
of change 
Partial support; 
Supported by the 
interaction of CEO 
gender with ROE 
Y3_Y1 
 
Partial support; 
Supported by the 
interaction of CEO 
gender with relative 
change in ROE 
Y3_Y0 
 
Not consistent 
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Table 75  
Summary of Study 2 hypothesis testing (continued) 
Hypothesis Summary Perspective Tested Supported with 
dichotomous 
performance?  
Supported with 
continuous 
performance? 
Consistency 
between 
dichotomous and 
continuous 
performance? 
H6c: The occurrence of codes regarding 
organizational desire for image change differs 
based on the interaction between company 
performance and CEO gender. Image change 
codes are more likely to occur in discussions 
concerning the appointment of a female as 
compared to a male CEO to a company 
experiencing declining, but not improving, 
performance. 
Females as signals 
of change 
Partial support; 
Supported by the 
interaction of CEO 
gender with 
shareholder return 
Y4_Y0 
Partial support; 
Supported by the 
interaction of CEO 
gender with relative 
change in ROE 
Y3_Y1 
 
Not consistent  
H6d: The occurrence of codes regarding 
organizational desire for culture change 
differs based on the interaction between 
company performance and CEO gender. 
Culture change codes are more likely to occur 
in discussions concerning the appointment of 
a female as compared to a male CEO to a 
company experiencing declining, but not 
improving, performance. 
Females as signals 
of change 
No support No support Consistent 
Note. Each performance measure represents the difference in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to the CEO 
appointment. For example, ROAY3_Y1 represents the difference in ROA from three years prior to one year prior to the CEO 
appointment. 
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Table 76 
ANCOVA results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROA (dichotomized) 
on the proportion of agentic attribute codes 
 ROAY4_Y1 ROAY4_Y0 ROAY3_Y1 ROAY3_Y0 
Proportion of news 
articles written by males 
1.45 1.12 1.09 1.21 
Proportion of news 
articles written by females 
.29 .39 .87 .50 
Proportion of press release 
articles 
2.17 2.30 2.04 1.91 
CEO gender .76 .74 .44 1.12 
ROA 2.97 .23 1.86 2.32 
CEO gender x ROA  .48 1.12 3.45 .67 
df 4, 75 4, 74 4, 74 4, 75 
Note. F coefficients are shown. Each performance measure represents the difference in 
performance across the span of years indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and 
represented as a dichotomous variable. For example, ROAY3_Y1 represents the difference in 
ROA from three years prior to one year prior to the CEO appointment. If this difference value 
was positive, it was coded as 1 for increasing performance. If negative, it was coded as 0 for 
decreasing performance.  
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Table 77 
ANCOVA results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROE (dichotomized) 
on the proportion of agentic attribute codes 
 ROEY4_Y1 ROEY4_Y0 ROEY3_Y1 ROEY3_Y0 
Proportion of news articles 
written by males 
.95 1.48 2.29 1.08 
Proportion of news articles 
written by females 
.42 .36 1.25 .48 
Proportion of press release 
articles 
2.94 2.82 1.63 2.00 
CEO gender .88 1.13 1.02 1.09 
ROE .03 .39 .35 .13 
CEO gender x ROE  2.36 1.38 4.14* 1.31 
df 
4, 72 4, 72 4, 72 4, 72 
Note. F coefficients are shown. Each performance measure represents the difference in 
performance across the span of years indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and 
represented as a dichotomous variable. For example, ROEY3_Y1 represents the difference in 
ROE from three years prior to one year prior to the CEO appointment. If this difference value 
was positive, it was coded as 1 for increasing performance. If negative, it was coded as 0 for 
decreasing performance.  
* p < .05 
 
 
  
 UNDERSTANDING THE GLASS CLIFF   285 
 
 
Table 78 
ANCOVA results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in ROIC-WACC 
(dichotomized) on the proportion of agentic attribute codes 
 ROIC-
WACC 
Y4_Y1 
ROIC-
WACC 
Y4_Y0 
ROIC-
WACC 
Y3_Y1 
ROIC-
WACC 
Y3_Y0 
Proportion of news 
articles written by males 
2.18 1.28 2.91 2.32 
Proportion of news 
articles written by females 
2.21 1.40 1.68 1.14 
Proportion of press release 
articles 
.72 1.70 1.22 1.61 
CEO gender 1.54 1.40 2.45 2.05 
ROIC-WACC 1.41 .29 .01 .34 
CEO gender x ROIC-
WACC 
3.33 .24 7.52** .54 
df 
4, 58 4, 58 4, 63 4, 63 
Note. F coefficients are shown. Each performance measure represents the difference in 
performance across the span of years indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and 
represented as a dichotomous variable. For example, ROIC-WACCY3_Y1 represents the 
difference in ROIC-WACC from three years prior to one year prior to the CEO appointment. If 
this difference value was positive, it was coded as 1 for increasing performance. If negative, it 
was coded as 0 for decreasing performance.  
** p < .01 
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Table 79 
ANCOVA results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and difference in shareholder return 
(dichotomized) on the proportion of agentic attribute codes 
 SR Y4_Y1 SR Y4_Y0 SR Y3_Y1 SR Y3_Y0 
Proportion of news articles 
written by males 
.84 .40 1.02 .63 
Proportion of news articles 
written by females 
1.20 .74 .95 1.08 
Proportion of press release 
articles 
2.49 2.66 2.22 2.29 
CEO gender .96 .84 1.24 1.23 
Shareholder return 2.19 .16 .13 .47 
CEO gender x Shareholder 
return  
.32 6.69* .03 1.36 
df 4, 70 4, 70 4, 71 4, 71 
Note. F coefficients are shown. Each performance measure represents the difference in 
performance across the span of years indicated leading up to the CEO appointment and 
represented as a dichotomous variable. For example, SRY3_Y1 represents the difference in 
shareholder return from three years prior to one year prior to the CEO appointment. If this 
difference value was positive, it was coded as 1 for increasing performance. If negative, it was 
coded as 0 for decreasing performance.  
* p < .05 
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Table 80 
Hierarchical moderated regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and relative 
change in ROA (continuous) on the proportion of agentic attribute codes 
Predictor Relative change 
in ROAY4_ 
Y1 ͣ 
Relative change 
in ROAY4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in ROAY3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in ROAY3_Y0 ᵈ 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
.13 .14 .16 .14 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
.09 .09 .12 .10 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-.18 -.21 -.19 -.23 
CEO gender .10 .09 .12 .11 
ROA .01 .14 .11 .41 
CEO gender x ROA  -.08 -.17 -.07 -.43 
df 6, 70 6, 70 6, 74 6, 74 
F overall 1.49 1.54 1.67 2.08 
R² .11 .12 .12 .15 
Note: Beta coefficients from the final model are shown. Each performance measure represents 
the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender was coded as 1 for 
female and 0 for male.  
ͣ n for ROAY4_1 = 77. ᵇ n for ROAY4_Y0 = 77.  ᶜ n for ROAY3_Y1= 81. ᵈ n for ROAY3_0 = 
81. 
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Table 81 
Hierarchical moderated regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and relative 
change in ROE (continuous) on the proportion of agentic attribute codes 
Predictor Relative change 
in ROEY4_ Y1 ͣ 
Relative change 
in ROEY4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in ROEY3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in ROEY3_Y0 ᵈ 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
.16 .15 .17 .15 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
.11 .09 .11 .10 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-.24 -.23 -.21 -.23 
CEO gender .08 .09 .12 .12 
ROE .13 .22 .10 .34 
CEO gender x ROE  -.03 -.19 .01 -.34 
df 6, 71 6, 71 6, 74 6, 74 
F overall 1.61 1.67 1.75 1.93 
R² .12 .12 .12 .14 
Note: Beta coefficients from the final model are shown. Each performance measure represents 
the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender was coded as 1 for 
female and 0 for male.  
ͣ n for ROEY4_ Y1 = 78. ᵇ n for ROEY4_Y0 = 78. ᶜ n for ROEY3_Y1 = 81. ᵈ n for ROEY3_ Y0 
= 81.  
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Table 82 
Hierarchical moderated regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and relative 
change in ROIC-WACC (continuous) on the proportion of agentic attribute codes 
Predictor Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY4_ Y1  ͣ
Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY3_Y1ᶜ 
Relative change 
in ROIC-
WACCY3_Y0 ᵈ 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
.24 .20 .22 .20 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
.16 .16 .30 .25 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-.12 -.15 -.11 -.14 
CEO gender .04 .15 .16 .16 
ROIC-WACC .04 .04 .12 -.05 
CEO gender x 
ROIC-WACC  
-.28* -.13 -.36 -.13 
df 6, 58 6, 58 6, 63 6, 63 
F overall 2.31* 1.70 2.35* 1.75 
R² .19 .15 .18 .14 
Note: Beta coefficients from the final model are shown. Each performance measure represents 
the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender was coded as 1 for 
female and 0 for male.  
ͣ n for ROIC-WACCY4_ Y1 = 65. ᵇ n for ROIC-WACCY4_Y0 = 65. ᶜ n for ROIC-
WACCY3_Y1= 70. ᵈ n for ROIC-WACCY3_ Y0 = 70. 
*p < .05 
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Table 83 
Hierarchical moderated regression results for the interaction effects of CEO gender and relative 
change in shareholder return (continuous) on the proportion of agentic attribute codes 
Predictor Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y4_ Y1 ͣ 
Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y4_Y0ᵇ 
Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y3_Y1 ᶜ 
Relative change 
in shareholder 
return Y3_Y0 ᵈ 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
males 
.11 .03 .10 .06 
Proportion of news 
articles written by 
females 
.13 .07 .12 .10 
Proportion of press 
release articles 
-.21 -.25 -.21 -.18 
CEO gender .08 .07 .13 .11 
Shareholder return .01 -.45 .20 -.29* 
CEO gender x 
shareholder return 
-.14 .52 -.04 .33* 
df 6, 66 6, 66 6, 68 6, 68 
F overall 1.65 2.06 2.02 2.77* 
R² .13 .16 .15 .13 
Note: Beta coefficients from the final model are shown. Each performance measure represents 
the relative increase or decrease in performance across the span of years indicated leading up to 
the CEO appointment and represented as a continuous variable. Gender was coded as 1 for 
female and 0 for male.  
ͣ n for shareholder return Y4_ Y 1 = 73. ᵇ n for shareholder return Y4_Y0 = 73. ᶜ n for 
shareholder return Y3_Y1= 75. ᵈ n for shareholder return Y3_Y0 = 75. 
*p < .05 
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Appendix A: Job Description, Company Profile, Resume, and Company Performance Article 
(Study 1) 
Job Description: Premier Manufacturing 
Job Title: Senior Vice President (SVP), Marketing  
Location: New York, NY  
Position Type: Full-Time 
Salary Range: $170,000 - $200,000 
Overview: 
Premier Manufacturing is a major, global manufacturer and distributor of office stationery and 
furniture. With offices in over 20 countries and 5,400 staff worldwide, we place a strong 
emphasis on environmental concerns and the personal development of staff. We are seeking an 
experienced candidate to fill the SVP of Marketing role. The candidate will be responsible for 
developing marketing, advertising, and service policies, programs and systems that support the 
organization’s strategic direction. S/he will oversee all aspects of marketing executing with 
respect to corporate brand: product positioning, product marketing, and marketing 
communications across a range of channels. S/he will be responsible for hiring, managing, and 
coaching all employees within that department. The candidate will partner with the management 
team to ensure best possible service and effective communications to company customers. We 
are looking to fill the position immediately. 
Job Responsibilities: 
● Develop annual marketing, advertising, and service plan in support of organizational 
strategy and objectives. 
● Provide ongoing management of the Premier Manufacturing brand. 
● Direct execution of marketing, advertising, and service policies and practices. 
● Manage all aspects of marketing planning, budgeting, metrics and reporting. 
● Ensure marketing communications are coordinated, support marketing plan objectives, 
and meet organizational expenditure requirements. 
● Work closely with the Sales teams to manage customer channel and partner strategies 
and develop go to market plans to drive revenue. 
● Provide leadership and support for the design, development and implementation of 
products and service lines. 
● Oversee and direct market research, competitor analyses and customer service 
monitoring processes and initiatives. 
● Utilize critical market research to segment and define target markets, and refine and 
improve marketing and sales plans. 
● Determine the appropriate marketing mix for communications across key trade channels 
and partnerships, digital marketing, SEM, social media, lead generation, content 
marketing, and event marketing/tradeshows. 
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● Design, produce, and deliver compelling marketing and sales collateral; including 
targeted communications for customers and partners. 
● Mentor and grow marketing team to ensure a customer centric environment. 
● Build, develop and manage marketing and customer service team capable of carrying out 
needed marketing and service strategies. 
Preferred Education and Experience:  
● Bachelor’s degree in business administration, marketing or related field. 
● Masters of Business Administration 
● Eight+ years of experience in marketing. 
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Premier Manufacturing – Organizational Profile 
Premier Manufacturing is a major manufacturing and distributing company with global resources 
and solutions for office stationery and furniture. We are dedicated to designing and 
manufacturing the highest quality products. We aim to improve daily life for employees in 
offices all over the world. We strive to maintain our national and international reputation for 
excellence and pride ourselves in fulfilling client needs. Since its founding in 1981, Premier 
Manufacturing has become an industry leader in the developing and manufacturing of quality 
office products around the world. 
 
Premier Manufacturing’s powerful combination of financial strength and technical expertise has 
established the company as a recognized manufacturer of market-leading products on a 
worldwide basis. Premier Manufacturing is also recognized for the superior technology of their 
environmentally friendly product innovations through the office supply materials utilized and the 
way in which supplies are created. Premier Manufacturing places a strong emphasis on research 
and development and modern manufacturing plans. With an ongoing commitment to Research 
and Development programs, we continue to provide the most advanced products in the industry. 
Our Values 
• Act with uncompromising honesty and integrity in everything we do. 
• Satisfy our customers with innovative technology and superior quality, value and service. 
• Provide our investors an attractive return through sustainable, global growth. 
• Respect our social and physical environment around the world. 
• Value and develop our employees' diverse talents, initiative and leadership. 
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Organizational Chart  
 
Premier Manufacturing Senior Leadership Roles 
 
 
 
 
  
CEO 
 
Mike Smith 
 
EVP Finance & 
Planning, CFO 
 
Benjamin Mitchell 
 
SVP Chief 
Compliance Officer 
 
Anthony Nelson 
 
EVP Product 
Operations 
 
Lisa Jones 
 
SVP Research & 
Development 
 
Pat Thompson 
 
SVP Marketing 
VACANT* 
SVP Human 
Resources 
 
 
Andrew Hill 
 
* This position was most recently held by Ken Hamilton.          
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Male Candidate Resume 
 
Brian Anderson 
(646) 020- 3939 - Brian.Anderson@premiermanufacturing.com 
 
Career Objective:  
Talented professional interested in the position of Senior Vice President, Marketing Premier 
Manufacturing, Inc., with demonstrated success in increasing revenue, achieving cost reductions, 
and improving client satisfaction in customer-facing operations. Having previously managed the 
marketing team at Premier Manufacturing, this promotion will utilize my expertise in brand 
marketing, product development, and project implementation.  
 
Summary of Qualifications: 
● 4 years of experience with Premier Marketing working to support the SVP of Marketing. 
● Broad marketing experience encompasses strategic planning, qualitative & quantitative 
research, interactive marketing, creative development, media planning and buying, public 
relations, sales promotion and visual merchandising.  
● Talent for analyzing competitive landscape, conducting research, and aligning product 
offerings with customer requirements which translates into lower product development 
and implementation costs.  
 
Professional Experience: 
Premier Manufacturing, Inc., New York, N.Y. Sept. 2011- Present 
Marketing Manager 
● Assist SVP in developing and implementing annual marketing, advertising, and media 
strategies to achieve business results.  
● Research competitors’ products and analyze sales forecast in order to determine the best 
time to launch new campaigns. 
● Assist with financial evaluations of target markets and product implementation strategies. 
● Work with SVP to manage and retain talent in the marketing team. 
● Liaise with sales managers to maximize synergy among departments. 
● Produce and implement branding guidelines across all departments, successfully creating 
a cohesive, strategic look and message company-wide. 
● Increase lead generation by 30% through enhanced vendor relationships and online 
visibility. 
 
Luxury Brands, LLC., New York, N.Y. July 2008 – Sept. 2011  
Marketing Director 
● Directed development of business-to-consumer, business-to-business and associate-to-
family marketing programs that drove incremental annual sales of $4 million. 
● Directed development of interactive, direct marketing, media, creative, sales promotion 
and PR strategies. 
● Redesigned company website to be more engaging and interactive, and improve search 
engine optimization. 
● Initiated a comprehensive, relational database-marketing program, which increased 
customer retention by over 10% in the first month. 
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● Directed the development and implementation of new frame merchandising strategy 
resulting in consistent product presentation across all stores and increased ease of 
customer shopping process by 15%. 
 
Jumpfeed Media, Queens, N.Y.  May 2006 - July 2008 
Marketing & Sales Manager 
● Identified promotional opportunities that enhanced brand awareness and increased market 
share.  
● Interfaced with MIS to develop technology enhancements to facilitate new markets and 
better serve existing client base.  
● Provided Corporate Communications with forward looking projections to facilitate 
shareholder awareness.  
● Designed and implemented sales incentive structure for corporate offices nationwide. 
 
Capital Retail, Brooklyn, N.Y.  June 2003 - May 2006 
Marketing, Sales, & Advertising Associate 
● Planned, developed and managed advertising and sales promotion strategies. 
● Championed marketing programs and general business solutions resulting in increased 
customer traffic and sales. 
● Developed and produced print and electronic advertising media. 
● Directed creative development and production of all advertising and in-store signage. 
 
Alpha Marketing, Brooklyn, N.Y.  July 1998 - June 2003   
Marketing Researcher   
● Conducted large-scale quantitative research projects focused on customer satisfaction 
measurement and total quality implementation, including design, coordination, statistical 
analysis, and report generation.  
● Developed survey to identify purchase intents and patterns for business to consumer 
direct marketers based on identification of target markets, conducting telephone 
interviews and focus groups, and constructing questionnaires.  
● Compiled and analyzed data from surveys and identified key steps for action. 
● Developed comprehensive business plan and marketing reports based on data gathered. 
 
Education: 
University of Washington, Foster • Masters of Business Administration in Marketing (2003) 
New York University • Bachelor of Science in Marketing (1998)  
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Company Performance Manipulation 
 
Declining Company Performance Condition 
 
A Company’s Decline: Premier Manufacturing’s Stock Flop 
June 12, 2015 
 
New York: It has been 10 years since Premier Manufacturing, Inc. first launched its line of 
environmentally-friendly office supplies. While initially acclaimed for their innovation and 
social responsibility, these products have not been the resounding success that the company 
hoped them to be. Premier Manufacturing hit its stride in the early 2000s, and continued to do 
well into the late 2000s, despite the general economic crisis. In addition, the past decade has seen 
considerable expansion in Premier Manufacturing’s national and international markets. 
However, in recent years, the company has experienced a steady drop in its financial 
performance. Manufacturing sales have gradually declined since 2010 and have currently hit an 
all-time low. Further, as demonstrated in the adjoining graph, the company’s stock trading value 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange continues to fall. Can Premier Manufacturing turn 
themselves around to become a giant in manufacturing once again?  
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Improving Company Performance Condition 
 
The Growth of a Company: Premier Manufacturing’s Stock Success  
June 12, 2015 
 
New York: It has been 10 years since Premier Manufacturing, Inc. first launched its line of 
environmentally-friendly office supplies. In keeping with the initial public acclaim they received 
for their innovation and social responsibility, these products have proven that they are the 
resounding success that the company hoped them to be. Premier Manufacturing hit its stride in 
the early 2000s, and continued to do well into the late 2000s, despite the general economic crisis. 
In addition, the past decade has seen considerable expansion in Premier Manufacturing’s 
national and international markets. This growth has been echoed in a steady increase in its 
financial performance. Manufacturing sales have rapidly improved since 2010 and have currently 
hit an all-time high. Further, as demonstrated in the graph below, the company’s stock trading 
value listed on the New York Stock Exchange continues to rise. Premier Manufacturing 
continues to be a giant in the manufacturing industry.   
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Appendix B: Candidate Endorsement and Evaluation (Study 1) 
 
Directions: Please think about the candidate whose resume you just reviewed, as well as Premier 
Manufacturing's company profile and current performance level. Please indicate your level of 
agreement with the following statement. 
Candidate endorsement: This candidate should be chosen for the open leadership position at 
Premier Manufacturing. 
Strongly 
disagree  
     
Strongly 
agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Leader suitability: Please rate the degree to which you think the candidate: 
 
Is Not at All 
Suitable  
Is 
Somewhat 
Suitable 
Is Suitable 
Is Very 
Suitable 
Is Extremely 
Suitable  
  
Is suitable for the 
open Senior Vice 
President of 
Marketing 
position. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Is Not at All 
Well-
Matched 
Is 
Somewhat 
Well-
Matched 
Is Well-
Matched 
Is Very 
Well-
Matched 
Is Extremely 
Well-
Matched 
Is well-matched 
for the role. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Does Not at 
All Fit In 
Somewhat 
Fits In 
Fits In Fits In Well 
Fits In 
Extremely 
Well 
Fits in as a leader 
for the company. 1 2 3 4 5 
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Leader qualifications: Please rate the degree to which you think: 
 Is Not at All 
Qualified   
Is Somewhat 
Qualified 
Is Qualified 
Is Very 
Qualified 
Is Extremely 
Qualified 
 
This candidate is 
qualified for the 
open leadership 
position. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 Is Not at All 
Relevant 
Is Somewhat 
Relevant 
Is Relevant 
Is Very 
Relevant 
Is Extremely 
Relevant 
The candidate's 
past experience is 
relevant to the 
position. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Does Not at 
All Possess 
Possesses to 
Some Degree 
Possesses a 
Good 
Amount 
Possesses to a 
Large Degree 
Very Strongly 
Possesses  
The candidate 
possesses the 
skills and 
experience to lead 
other people. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Anticipated effectiveness: Please rate the degree to which you think this candidate will: 
 Will Not at 
All Be 
Effective  
Will Be 
Somewhat 
Effective 
Will Be 
Effective 
Will Be Very 
Effective 
Will Be 
Extremely 
Effective 
Be an effective 
leader. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
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 Will Not at 
All Have a 
Positive 
Impact 
Will Have 
Somewhat of 
a Positive 
Impact 
Will Have a 
Positive 
Impact 
Will Have a 
Very Positive 
Impact 
Will Have an 
Extremely 
Positive 
Impact 
Have a 
positive 
impact on the 
company. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 Will Not at 
All Drive 
Company 
Performance 
Will 
Somewhat 
Drive 
Performance 
Will Drive 
Performance 
a Good 
Amount 
Will Drive 
Performance 
to a Large 
Degree 
Will Very 
Strongly 
Drive 
Performance 
Drive 
company 
performance. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix C: Communal and Agentic Attributes (Study 1) 
 
Directions: It is important for the new leader to... 
 
Is Not at All 
Important 
Is 
Somewhat 
Important 
Is Important 
Is Very 
Important 
Is 
Extremely 
Important 
Be Communicative 1 2 3 4 5 
Motivate Others 1 2 3 4 5 
Be Cooperative 1 2 3 4 5 
Function well in 
Teams 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Encourage Others 1 2 3 4 5 
Be Understanding 1 2 3 4 5 
Be Tactful 1 2 3 4 5 
      
Be Dominant 1 2 3 4 5 
Be Objective 1 2 3 4 5 
Be Independent 1 2 3 4 5 
Be Decisive 1 2 3 4 5 
Be Competitive 1 2 3 4 5 
Have a High Need 
for Power 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not Feel Easily Hurt 1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix D: Position Riskiness, Candidate Expendability, and Position Recommendation  
(Study 1) 
 
Position riskiness: Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements. 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
     
Strongly 
Agree 
The vacant 
leadership 
position is a risky 
one.   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
     
Strongly 
Agree 
Taking on this 
leadership 
position could be 
risky to the 
candidate’s 
career. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
     
Strongly 
Agree 
Poor 
organizational 
performance 
following this 
candidate’s 
appointment 
would reflect 
badly on him/her.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Candidate value:  Please rate the degree to which you think: 
 Is Not at All 
Critical  
Is Somewhat 
Critical 
Is Critical 
Is Very 
Critical 
Is Extremely 
Critical 
 
As a current 
employee, this 
candidate is 
critical to the 
organization.  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Will Not at 
All Be a Loss 
Will Be 
Somewhat of 
a Loss 
Will Be a 
Loss 
Will Be a 
Great Loss 
Will Be an 
Extreme Loss 
It will be a loss to 
the organization if 
this candidate 
declines the 
position. 
1 2 3 4 5 
       
Position recommendation: Please indicate your level of agreement with the following 
statement. 
 Do Not at 
All Agree  
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Completely 
Agree 
 
This candidate should 
take this position if 
offered. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Is Not at 
All a Good 
Opportunity  
Is 
Somewhat 
of a Good 
Opportunity  
Is a Good 
Opportunity 
Is a Great 
Opportunity 
Is a 
Wonderful 
Opportunity  
Please rate the degree to 
which you think the 
position offers the 
candidate a good 
opportunity to further the 
candidate's career. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix E: Change Perceptions (Study 1)  
Directions: In thinking about Premier Manufacturing, please indicate your level of agreement 
with the following statements. 
 Do not at all 
agree  
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Completely 
Agree 
 
The organization 
is in need of a 
change.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
The organization 
needs a leader 
who will move it 
in a new 
direction.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
The organization 
needs a leader 
who will do 
things differently 
than the routine 
ways of leading.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
The organization 
needs to 
communicate that 
they are making a 
change. 
1 2 3 4 5 
       
       
 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
     
Strongly 
Agree 
The organization 
needs a leader 
who is likely to 
keep it on the 
same track as it 
was before. (R) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The organization 
needs a leader 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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who represents 
"more of the 
same". (R) 
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Appendix F: Degree to which Candidate Possesses Communal and Agentic Attributes (Pilot 
Test) 
Directions: Please think about the candidate whose resume you reviewed and rate the extent to 
which you agree with the following statements, on a scale from "strongly disagree" to "strongly 
agree". 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
     
Strongly 
Agree 
The candidate is 
likely to be 
communicative. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The candidate is 
likely to be 
motivating to others. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The candidate is 
likely to be 
cooperative with 
others. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The candidate is 
likely to function 
well in teams. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
The candidate is 
likely to have 
dominant 
characteristics. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The candidate is 
likely to be 
objective. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The candidate is 
likely to be 
independent. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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The candidate is 
likely to be decisive. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The candidate is 
likely to be 
competitive. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Appendix G: Degree to which Candidate Represents Change and Stability (Pilot Test) 
 
Directions: Please rate the degree to which you agree with the following statements on a scale 
from 1 (do not at all agree) to 7 (completely agree).  
 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
     
Strongly 
Agree 
This candidate 
represent change 
for the 
organization.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
This candidate is 
likely to move the 
organization in a 
new direction. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
This candidate 
will bring a new 
perspective to the 
leadership 
position. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
By choosing this 
candidate, the 
organization will 
communicate that 
they are making a 
change.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
This leader will 
provide a "breath 
of fresh air" to the 
leadership 
position. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Strongly 
Disagree  
Strongly 
Agree 
This candidate 
is likely to keep 
the organization 
going on the 
same track as it 
was before. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
This candidate 
represents 
"more of the 
same." 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
 UNDERSTANDING THE GLASS CLIFF   311 
 
 
Appendix H: List of Matched Sample of CEOs (Study 2) 
 
CEO Name CEO company CEO Gender Year Appointed 
Denise Morrison Campbell Soup 
Company  
Female 2011 
Kasper Jakobsen Mead Johnson Male 2012 
Irene B Rosenfeld Mondelez 
International 
Female 2006 
Donald J Smith 
"Donnie" 
Tyson Foods Male 2009 
Ilene Gordon Ingredion 
Incorporated 
Female 2009 
John T Cahill Kraft Foods Group Male 2014 
Brenda C. Barnes Hillshire Brands 
(Sara Lee) 
Female 2005 
John P Bilbrey Hershey Male 2011 
Patricia A. Woertz Archer-Daniels Female 2006 
Kendall J Powell 
"Ken" 
General Mills Male 2007 
Indra K Nooyi PepsiCo  Female 2006 
Muhtar Kent Coca-Cola Male 2008 
Susan M Cameron Reynolds America Female 2004 
Murray S Kessler Lorillard Male 2010 
Gracia C. Martore Gannett Female 2011 
Robert James 
Thomson 
News Corp Male 2013 
Heather Bresch Myland Female 2012 
Robert J Hugin 
"Bob" 
Celgene Corporation Male 2010 
Andrea Jung Avon  Female 1999 
Ian M Cook Colgate-Palmolive Male 2007 
Sheri McCoy Avon Female 2012 
Fabrizio Freda Estee Lauder Male 2009 
Ellen J Kullman Du Pont Female 2009 
Hugh Grant Monsanto Male 2003 
Lynn Laverty 
Elsenhans 
Sunoco Female 2008 
Roger W Jenkins Murphy Oil 
Company 
Male 2013 
Carly Fiorina Hewlett Packard Female 1999 
Timothy Donald 
Cook "Tim" 
Apple Inc.  Male 2011 
Meg Whitman    Hewlett-Packard Female 2011 
Joseph M Tucci "Joe" EMC Corporation Male 2001 
Ursula M Burns Xerox Female 2009 
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Stephen D Milligan 
"Steve" 
Western Digital Male 2013 
Anne Mulcahy Xerox  Female 2001 
John T Chambers Cisco Systems Male 1995 
Kathleen M. 
Mazzarella 
Graybar Electric 
Company 
Female 2012 
David N Farr Emerson Electric 
Compnay 
Male 2000 
Patricia Russo Alacatel-Lucent Female 2002 
Gregory Q Brown 
"Greg" 
Motorola Solutions Male 2008 
Mary T Barra General Motors Female 2014 
Mark Fields Ford Motor Company Male 2014 
Marillyn A Hewson Lockheed Martin Female 2013 
Gregory J Hayes 
"Greg" 
United Tech 
Corporation 
Male 2014 
Phebe N Novakovic General Dynamics Female 2013 
David M Cote 
"Dave" 
Honeywell 
International 
Male 2002 
Mary Agnes 
(Maggie) Wilderotter 
Frontier 
Communications 
Female 2004 
Jeffrey K Storey 
"Jeff" 
Level 3 
Communications 
Male 2013 
S. Marce Fuller Mirant Female 1999 
Donald E Brandt 
"Don" 
Pinnacle West Male 2009 
Lynn J Good Duke Energy 
Corporation 
Female 2013 
Christopher M Crane 
"Chris" 
Exelon Corporation Male 2012 
Debra L Reed 
"Debbie" 
Sempra Energy  Female 2011 
Benjamin G S Fowke 
III "Ben" 
Xcel Energy Inc. Male 2011 
Howard R Levine Family Dollar Store Male 1998 
Laura Sen BJ's Wholesale Club Female 2009 
Blake Nordstrom Nordstrom Inc. Male 2000 
Barbara Rentler Ross Stores Inc. Female 2014 
Arthur L Peck "Art" The Gap Inc. Male 2015 
Carol Meyrowitz TJX Companies Inc. Female 2007 
Hubert Joly Best Buy Company 
Inc. 
Male 2012 
Claire Babrowski Radioshack Female 2006 
Mary Sammons Rite Aid Female 2003 
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Stefano Pessina Walgreens Boots 
Alliance 
Male 2015 
Beth Elaine Mooney Keycorp Female 2011 
O B Grayson Hall Jr Regions Financial Male 2010 
Angela Braly Wellpoint/Anthem 
Health 
Female 2007 
Mark T Bertolini Aetna Inc. Male 2010 
Paula Rosput 
Reynolds 
Safeco Female 2006 
Gregory C Case 
"Greg" 
Aon PLC Male 2005 
Lauralee E Martin HCP Inc. Female 2013 
Owen D Thomas Boston Properties Male 2013 
Debra A Cafaro Ventas Inc. Female 1999 
William L Meaney 
"Bill" 
Iron Mountain  Male 2013 
Safra Catz Oracle Corporation Female 2014 
Satya Nadella Microsoft 
Corporation 
Male 2014 
 Carol Bartz Yahoo! Female 2009 
Michael A Brown 
"Mike" 
Symantec 
Corporation 
Male 2014 
Marissa Mayer Yahoo!  Female 2012 
J Michael Lawrie 
"Mike" 
CSC Male 2012 
Virginia M Rometty 
"Ginni" 
IBM Female 2012 
Pierre Nanterme Accenture PLC Male 2011 
Edward J Heffernan 
"Ed" 
Alliance Data Male 2009 
Christina A. Gold Western Union Female 2006 
Lisa Su Advanced Micro 
Devices 
Female 2014 
Brian Krzanich Intel Male 2013 
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Appendix I: Study 2 Codebook9 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
These instructions are intended to help you in the coding process. Please read and follow them 
carefully. This is a study about media reports of recently appointed CEOs. Your job is to read the 
newspaper articles concerning the CEOs, identify certain themes, and code for certain variables. 
A few form and demographic variables must be coded for each article as well.  
 
Below, I will provide definitions and examples of the themes and variables for which you will be 
coding. Please refer to these definitions throughout your coding procedures. Before you begin 
coding, familiarize yourself with the definitions of each theme and variable.  
 
If you are having difficulty deciding how to code a certain portion of the text, please copy and 
paste the text exactly as it appears in the news article and note the issue on the coding sheet. 
Please be specific as to what problem you encountered when trying to code. We will discuss any 
coding issues during our meetings. However, if the issue is holding you up from making 
progress, please feel free to email me to discuss it.  
 
Please save each coding spreadsheet using your first name and the range of CEO numbers that 
you coded. For example, if the spreadsheet that I code includes articles regarding the first 5 
CEOs on the list, I would save the spreadsheet in the following format: Yael_CEOs 1-5. The 
CEO number can be found on the spreadsheet entitled: Full CEO News List. The number for 
each CEO is the corresponding row number.  
 
The relevant articles for each CEO can be found in the main spreadsheet: Full CEO News List. 
For each CEO, you will look up the articles listed on this spreadsheet. I have included 
information about the media source as well as the article’s title, author, and date written, but 
please verify this information before you include it in the coding spreadsheet.  
 
I gathered the articles from 3 main sources: the database Factiva, the database ABI/Inform, and 
Google News. When looking up the articles, please search these sources in the order provided 
above. Factiva and ABI/Inform can be accessed online using college or graduate school login 
information. If you do not have a current login, I will provide you with login credentials to use.  
 
For each article, please complete the coding spreadsheet by documenting: 1) relevant 
background information, 2) theme information, 3) variable coding.  
 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION  
 
- Article information  
o News source (which newspaper?) 
o Type of media (e.g. news, feature, editorial, blog, press release) 
o Article title  
o Word length of article 
o Date of the article 
▪ Include: day, month, and year  
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- Journalist information  
o Journalist name 
o Journalist gender (If gender is not immediately obvious based on the name, please 
make a note of it and we can look this up at a later date.)  
 
THEME INFORMATION 
 
- Were any of these following themes the overall “point” of the article? For each one, 
please code 0 for No or 1 for Yes. 
o CEO possess communal attributes  
o CEO possesses agentic attributes  
o Riskiness of CEO role  
o Apprehension surrounding the position  
o CEO appointed to bring/signal change  
o CEO appointed to maintain stability  
 
VARIABLE CODING: INSTRUCTIONS AND DEFINITIONS  
 
Overall instructions: Please read each article thoroughly. Remember, the variables you are 
looking for may be found in words, phrases, or sentences. As you code, please record all 
descriptions on the codesheet. Please be sure to copy and paste the relevant text exactly as it 
appeared in the news source. Below you will find more specific definitions and/or additional 
instructions when relevant.  
For each coding variable, please record:  
- Whether or not the coding variable was mentioned in the article (0 = No, 1 = Yes) 
- The corresponding text, if the coding variable was mentioned 
- The source of the text  
o 1 = the writer/journalist 
o 2 = a quote from an internal organizational stakeholder 
o 3 = a quote from a party external to the organization 
o 4 = another news source/writer 
- Whether or not the text cited was identical to text found in another article (0 = No, 1 = 
Yes) 
 
1. CEO possession of communal attributes 
 
Definition: Communal attributes primarily describe concern with the welfare of others. 
These characteristics tend to be relationship-oriented, in that they are important to one’s 
interpersonal skills and interactions with others.  Communal attributes may also refer to 
behaviors that reflect understanding and consideration of others’ wellbeing. Some 
common communal attributes are: affectionate, helpful, communicative, motivating, 
cooperative, functions well in teams, tactful, understanding, supportive, encouraging, 
accommodating, sympathetic, courteous, sensitive, conflict resolution skills, 
participative, intuitive, perceptive, insightful, sophisticated, kind, caring, nurturing, 
gentle, aware of others’ feelings, and interpersonally sensitive.  
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For example, a Fortune article describing the promotion of Belinda Johnson to chief 
business affairs and legal officer at Airbnb makes mention of her communal attributes. 
The article quotes the company’s CEO as saying, “She’s one of the most empathetic and 
compassionate people I know.” 
 
Instructions: Please code for any mention of communal attributes in reference to the 
CEO. This includes mere mention of communality. This also includes, but is not limited 
to, any of the common communal attributes that are listed above. The list above is meant 
to give you a clear picture of qualities that are encompassed within the communal 
attributes category. However, please do not consider the list to be all-inclusive. There are 
other communal attributes that might be mentioned in an article that are not recorded 
above. Any mention of skills, qualities, traits, abilities, or actions that can be considered 
in line with the attributes listed above should be coded within this category. For example, 
mention of a CEO’s collaborative skills should be coded under this variable though this 
adjective was not included in the list above.  
 
2. CEO possession of agentic attributes 
 
Definition: Agentic attributes are primarily achievement-oriented and describe a 
tendency to be controlling and assertive. Some common agentic attributes are: assertive, 
ambitious, motivated, go-getting, decisive, determined, controlling, dominant, confident, 
self-confident, self-assured, forward, not easily emotionally disturbed, not overly 
emotional, forceful, firm, emphatic, resolute, certain, clear-sighted, focused, autonomous, 
independent, self-sufficient, hard-hitting, and aggressive.  
 
Instructions: Please code for any mention of the CEO possessing agentic attributes. This 
includes mere mention of agency. This also includes, but is not limited to, any of the 
common agentic attributes that are listed above. While the list above is meant to give you 
a clear picture of qualities that are encompassed within the agentic attributes category, 
please do not consider the list to be all-inclusive. As mentioned earlier, there are other 
agentic attributes that might be mentioned in an article that are not listed above. Any 
mention of skills, qualities, traits, abilities, or actions that can be considered in line with 
these attributes should be coded within this category.  
 
3. Position riskiness 
 
Definition: Position riskiness refers to discussions of the CEO role itself being risky. 
According to this variable, the CEO position may be described as risky, challenging, 
high-stakes, uncertain, unsafe, dangerous, turbulent, and/or difficult.  
 
Instructions: Please code for any mention of CEO position riskiness as well as 
organizational position riskiness. Please keep in mind that riskiness of the position may 
be conveyed through other words beyond those that are listed above. 
 
4. Apprehension surrounding the position  
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Definition: This variable includes any apprehension or doubt regarding the CEO’s 
decision to accept the role, and/or any apprehension regarding possible damage to the 
individual’s career that s/he will incur by taking on this role. (Please note that this 
variable does NOT refer to any doubt regarding the CEO’s ability to do the job or doubt 
as to whether this individual is the best person for the job. This type of doubt is captured 
in the “CEO Qualifications” category below.) For example, an article might question 
whether taking on the CEO role was the best move for this individual, or discuss the 
possibility that this move might be harmful to the individual’s future.  
 
Instructions: Please code for any text conveying doubt around the CEO’s decision to 
accept the position. Additionally, please code for any statement regarding the possible 
negative impact that accepting the CEO position will have on the CEO’s future career.  
 
5. CEO to bring/signal change  
 
Definition: This variable includes any discussion of a company’s desire to communicate 
change, or to make a significant change in their processes, procedures, strategy, decision-
making, leadership, or culture through the appointment of this CEO. An article may 
explicitly mention change or discuss the idea that this CEO will create new processes, 
generate new strategy, or act as a fresh face for the organization.  
 
For example, a Washington Post article discussing President Obama’s appointment of 
Julia Pierson to Secret Service Director emphasizes that she was selected following “an 
extraordinarily difficult year at the service, which was enveloped by a prostitution 
scandal exposing its male-dominated culture.” The article continues the discourse on the 
secret service’s “macho” culture and goes on to say that Pierson “has a lot of work ahead 
of her to create a culture that respects the important job the agency is tasked with.” These 
paragraphs underscore the organization’s aim to create change through the promotion of 
this CEO. 
 
Additionally, as you code for this variable, please note the type of change that the CEO is 
meant to bring and/or convey. For instance, the Washington Post example above refers to 
a culture change. For each option below, please code 0 for No or 1 for Yes. 
- Change in leadership 
- Financial change 
- Internal organizational cultural change 
- Change to company operations and functions  
- Change to company public image 
 
Instructions: As you read, please code for any discussion concerning the company’s 
desire to create and/or convey change, as well as the type of change that the company 
hopes to bring. 
 
6. CEO to maintain stability/keep organization on same track  
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Definition: This variable includes any discussion of a company’s desire to maintain 
stability and keep the organization on the same track that is was on with the previous 
CEO.  An article might specifically mention that a CEO was chosen in order to preserve 
the company’s current style of operating and functioning. In addition, an article might 
specify that the incoming CEO intends to carry out a business strategy, proposal, or 
vision that was outlined by the previous CEO. There are other ways that an article might 
stress or mention that the appointed CEO is not meant to make any largescale changes or 
disrupt the way the company currently functions.  
 
For example, a Business Insider article discussing the recent appointment of Bill Veghte 
as SurveyMonkey CEO says, “Goldberg [the former CEO] was in the middle of moving 
SurveyMonkey past its roots as an online survey company and into "big data" services. 
Shortly before his death, Goldberg had rolled out SurveyMonkey's first new new data 
service, Benchmarks, which lets customers compare their survey results to others who 
asked those same questions. Veghte's long history at Microsoft and HP makes him well 
suited to continue Goldberg's vision. "By hiring Bill as a leader, we feel like we stuck the 
landing with this one," Lurie told us. 
 
7. CEO qualifications  
 
Definition: This variable refers to the CEO’s qualifications. Specifically, this variable 
includes the following two coding components:  
- Confidence in CEO qualifications based on previous experience and background: 
This component refers to any mention of the individual being qualified for the current 
position based on their previous experience, jobs, and background.  
- Doubt over CEO qualifications: This component refers to any doubt or lack of 
confidence in the individuals’ qualifications, as well as doubt as to whether or not 
they are ready for the current CEO position.  
 
8. Expectation of success 
 
Definition: This variable includes any mention of whether or not the individual is 
expected to succeed in the new CEO role. This variable includes the following two 
components:  
- Expectation of success in CEO role: This component refers to confidence in the 
likelihood of the promoted individual to succeed in the CEO role.  
- Doubt over expected success: This component refers to doubt or lack of confidence in 
the appointed individuals’ likelihood of success in the CEO role.  
 
9. CEO as safe vs. risky choice for organization  
 
Definition: This variable includes any discussion of whether the individual promoted is a 
risky or safe choice for the organization. This variable includes the following two 
components:  
- Safe choice: This component refers to any mention of the individual being a safe 
choice for the organization. 
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- Risky choice: This component refers to any mention of the individual being a risky 
choice for the organization.  
 
10. Insider/outsider 
Definition: This variable refers to whether or not the articles emphasize the insider or 
outsider status of the individual chosen as CEO.  
Instructions: For each of the following components, please code 0 for No and 1 for Yes:  
- Emphasis on insider status 
- Emphasis on outsider status   
 
11. Dismissal of previous CEO  
  
Instructions: For this variable, please code whether or not the articles mentioned that the 
previous CEO was fired from his or her post. Please code 1 if the previous CEO was fired 
and/or asked to step down, 2 if the CEO chose to step down on his or her own accord, 
and 0 if there was no reason mentioned for the previous CEO leaving his or her position. 
Only 1 code per CEO is needed for this variable.  
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